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1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the Convention against Torture on refoulement. Tibet Findings During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party pressed the ``core interest'' policy that seeks to isolate the Dalai Lama internationally and diminish or end his international influence. The policy is based on Chinese assertions that ``Tibet'' is one of China's two ``core interests'' (``Taiwan'' is the other); the Dalai Lama is a separatist; and other governments therefore should not permit the Dalai Lama to enter their countries and thereby threaten China's ``territorial integrity.'' The policy operates in tandem with the Party's domestic campaign to isolate Tibetans in China from the Dalai Lama. The results of such government policies could include further increases of human rights abuses of Tibetans concurrent with a decrease in the ability of the international community to detect, document, and respond to such abuses. The 25-member Party Political Bureau (Politburo) met in January to formulate a ``new general strategy for governing Tibet'' based on the notion of ``four adherences'' that emphasizes the high degree of subordination imposed on local ethnic autonomous governments established under China's Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. One ``adherence'' reaffirms the Party's intention to continue the policy of creating a Tibet where the fundamental objectives are Chinese but where some ``Tibetan traits'' will remain. Formulation of a ``new'' Tibetan governance strategy by a body made up of the highest ranking representatives of central Party and government power, and lacking Tibetan representation, demonstrates the poor implementation of ``ethnic autonomy'' in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. The Politburo Standing Committee presided in January over the Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum), applying the highest imprimatur of political power to achieving sweeping economic, social, and cultural policy objectives for the Tibetan areas of China by 2020. The Fifth Forum expanded the Party's Tibet policy purview beyond the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to include the Tibetan autonomous areas in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. The policy change more than doubles the number of Tibetans who live within the forum's contiguous target area, and nearly doubles the area subject to central-level policy coordination. Party General Secretary and President of China Hu Jintao outlined goals that prioritize changes to rural Tibetan areas, where most Tibetans live. Heightened emphasis on the link between rural development and regional stability follows Tibetan farmers' and herders' participation in the wave of protests (and some rioting) that began in March 2008. The Dalai Lama's envoys arrived in China for the ninth round of formal dialogue with Party officials in January 2010, less than one week after the Fifth Forum concluded. The 15-month interval between the eighth and ninth rounds of dialogue was the longest since such contacts resumed in 2002. Neither side reported substantive progress, both sides reiterated key positions, and the Party added more preconditions on the Dalai Lama, but dialogue participants referred to certain developments in a positive manner. A senior Party official praised the ``better attitude'' of the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, and the Special Envoy referred favorably to the Fifth Forum decision to consider development issues throughout all Tibetan autonomous areas. The Dalai Lama expressed deepening alarm about the outlook for Tibetan Buddhism in China, saying in March that ``monasteries function more like museums and are intended to deliberately annihilate [Tibetan] Buddhism.'' A senior TAR official said in March that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the then-five-year-old boy who disappeared after the Dalai Lama recognized him as the Panchen Lama in 1995, is in the TAR living a ``very good life'' as ``an ordinary citizen'' with his family, and that he and his family are ``reluctant to be disturbed.'' The Karmapa, the spiritual head of the Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, stated publicly in January that he fled his religious seat in the TAR at the end of 1999 and escaped to India because he feared the government would have assigned him ``political duties'' when he was older. The government and Party created increasing restraints on the exercise of freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists by strengthening the push to use policy and legal measures to shape and control what officials refer to as the ``normal order'' for Tibetan Buddhism. At the Fifth Forum, Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao used the Marxist premise of ``special contradiction'' to reinforce the Party campaign against the Dalai Lama and seek to end his influence among Tibetans in China. Legal measures requiring nationwide re-registration of ``professional religious personnel,'' underway during 2010, could result in substantial losses to the Tibetan monastic community if authorities apply re-registration in a manner intended to weed out monks and nuns whom authorities suspect of holding religious views that the government does not deem to be ``legal.'' Such views include religious devotion toward the Dalai Lama and support of the Dalai Lama's recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama. Government and Party economic development objectives for 2010 to 2020 principally focus on accelerating and strengthening a development model that subordinates respecting and protecting Tibetan culture to Party and government priorities. Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao outlined Fifth Forum objectives that included building major infrastructure projects, increasing natural resource exploitation, and continuing to push forward the construction of a ``socialist new countryside'' (compulsory settlement of nomadic herders and resettlement of farmers). China's state-run media provided information showing that, by the end of 2009, more than 1.33 million TAR nomadic herders and farmers (a figure equal to about half the TAR Tibetan population) will have been settled in new housing, and that by 2020 officials plan for the mining industry share of TAR GDP to increase from about 3 percent currently to between 30 percent and 50 percent. Reports during this reporting year disclosed limited progress on Tibetan railway construction. Government security and judicial institutions' use of laws on ``splittism'' and ``leaking state secrets'' during this reporting year infringed upon China's constitutionally protected freedoms of speech, religion, association, and assembly--first by using the law on ``splittism'' to punish Tibetans who criticize or peacefully protest against government policies, and then by using the law on ``leaking state secrets'' to punish Tibetans who attempt to share with other Tibetans information about incidents of repression and punishment. Reports of Tibetan political protest and detention declined during this reporting year based on Commission monitoring as of September 2010. The apparent decline may suggest that Tibetans generally are not risking the consequences of political protest in the presence of the ongoing security crackdown. Courts sentenced Tibetans to imprisonment for using cultural or entertainment media to articulate their views. Recommendations Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to: Urge the Chinese government to engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives on protecting the Tibetan culture, language, religion, and heritage within the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces--a geographic area that both sides identify as the focus of their Tibet policies. A Chinese government decision to engage in such dialogue can result in a durable and mutually beneficial outcome for Chinese and Tibetans, and improve the outlook for local and regional security in coming decades. Convey to the Chinese government the urgent importance of refraining from using legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan Buddhists' right to the freedom of religion. Such measures include: aggressive campaigns of ``patriotic education'' that compel Tibetans to endorse state antagonism toward the Dalai Lama; preventing Tibetan Buddhists from identifying and educating religious teachers in a manner consistent with Tibetan preferences and traditions; and enacting laws and issuing regulations that remold Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state. Request that the Chinese government follow up on the March 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as an ``ordinary citizen'' along with his family. Urge the government to invite a representative of an international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi Nyima so that he can express his wishes with respect to privacy, photograph the international representative and Gedun Choekyi Nyima together, and publish Gedun Choekyi Nyima's statement and the photograph. Encourage the Chinese government to maximize benefits to Tibetans resulting from the Fifth Tibet Work Forum by fully taking into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when planning infrastructure and natural resource development projects in Tibetan areas of China. Encourage the Chinese government to engage appropriate experts in assessing the impact of infrastructure and natural resource development projects, and in advising the government on the implementation, progress, and impact of such projects. Increase support for U.S. non-governmental organizations to develop programs that can assist Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully protect and develop their culture, language, and heritage; that can help to improve education, economic, health, and environmental conservation conditions of ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and that create sustainable benefits without encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas. Continue to convey to the Chinese government the importance of honoring reference to the freedoms of speech, religion, association, and assembly in China's Constitution, and refraining from using the security establishment, courts, and law to infringe upon and repress Tibetans' exercise of such rights. Continue to convey to the Chinese government the importance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters and rioters, and request the Chinese government to provide complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced with protest-related crimes. Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative examples include: former Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now serving an extended 18- year sentence for printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Tibetans as a reincarnated teacher; serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for ``inciting splittism''); and nomad Ronggye Adrag (sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a public festival). Developments in Hong Kong and Macau Findings In November 2009, the Hong Kong government issued a consultation document on election of the Legislative Council (Legco) and of the chief executive in Hong Kong's 2012 elections, and in April 2010, submitted its final proposals on elections. The document and proposals increased from 800 to 1200 the number of members of an election committee that chooses the chief executive, and increased the number of Legco members from 60 to 70, but otherwise did not increase the proportion of Legco seats returned by direct election. A 2007 decision of China's National People's Congress Standing Committee, which prohibited the people of Hong Kong from directly electing both the chief executive and all members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage in the 2012 elections, had limited the scope and form of the Hong Kong government's proposal. In July 2009, the election committee in Macau selected a new chief executive in an uncontested election, and 29 members of the Legislative Assembly, with 12 selected by direct election. Recommendations Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to: Make every effort to visit Hong Kong when traveling to mainland China. Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials should meet with their counterparts in the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and with members of the Hong Kong government administration. Such meetings would show U.S. support for a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong under the system of ``one country, two systems.'' Urge Chinese government officials to allow the people of Hong Kong to make their own determination as to constitutional reform, without interference from the central government either through decisions of the National People's Congress or informally, and to allow the introduction of universal suffrage with one person, one vote, if this is the wish of the people of Hong Kong. The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 17 to 0 with one abstention. Political Prisoner Database Recommendations When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to: Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (http://ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on a prisoner or groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner's database record for more detailed information about the prisoner's case, including his or her alleged crime, specific human rights that officials have violated, stage in the legal process, and location of detention or imprisonment, if known. Advise official and private delegations traveling to China to present Chinese officials with lists of political and religious prisoners compiled from database records. Urge U.S. state and local officials and private citizens involved in sister-state and sister- city relationships with China to explore the database, and to advocate for the release of political and religious prisoners in China. A MORE POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY The Commission's 2010 Annual Report provides information about Chinese political and religious prisoners\1\ in the context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many of the abuses result from the Communist Party's and government's application of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly available online database maintained by the Commission, for its own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare summaries of information about political and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials. On July 29, 2010, the Commission announced the availability of a PPD upgrade that doubles the number of types of information available to the public and enables faster and easier methods of finding and downloading information about political and religious prisoners. The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual Report, and to access and make use of the upgraded PPD at http://ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is available at: http:// www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.) The PPD received approximately 34,400 online requests for prisoner information during the 12-month period ending August 31, 2010. During the entire period of PPD operation beginning in late 2004, approximately 29 percent of the requests for information have originated from U.S. Government (.gov) Internet domains, 15 percent from commercial (.com) domains, 15 percent from network (.net) domains, 12 percent from international (e.g., .fr, .de, .ca) domains, 3 percent from nonprofit organization (.org) domains, 2 percent from education (.edu) domains, 2 percent from Arpanet (.arpa) domains, and 1 percent from international treaty organization (.int) domains. Approximately 19 percent of the requests have been from numerical Internet addresses that do not provide information about the name of the registrant or the type of domain. POLITICAL PRISONERS The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work to maintain and update political prisoner records based on their areas of expertise. The staff seeks to provide objective analysis of information about individual prisoners and about events and trends that drive political and religious imprisonment in China. As of September 3, 2010, the PPD contained information on 5,608 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of those, 1,426 are cases of political and religious prisoners currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 4,182 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have been released or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there are considerably more than 1,426 cases of current political and religious imprisonment in China. The Commission staff works on an ongoing basis to add cases of political and religious imprisonment to the PPD. The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their extensive experience and data on political and religious prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on information provided by non- governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources of information. MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational institutions, and individuals who research political and religious imprisonment in China or who advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly leverages the capacity of the Commission's information and technology resources to support such research, reporting, and advocacy. [See New Political Prisoner Database Features in this section.] The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her detention. These types include violations of the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change and to criticize government policy or government officials. Users may search for a prisoner by name, using either the Latin alphabet or Chinese characters. The PPD allows users to construct queries that include one or more types of information. [For a list of types of information, see box titled Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database: Previous and Additional Data Fields in this section.] The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the Internet to query the database and download prisoner data without providing personal information to the Commission, and without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a user's computer. Users have the option to create a user account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries, but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal information to set up such an account. The PPD does not download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as a result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be a nickname) and password are the only information required to set up a user account. New Political Prisoner Database Features Some of the new PPD features that will strengthen reporting on political and religious imprisonment in China and advocacy on behalf of Chinese political prisoners are listed below. An easy-to-use Welcome Page search box for a prisoner's name. An increase in the number of types of information (fields) from 19 to 40. Several of the additional fields are on the judicial process--for example, court names and dates and articles of China's Criminal Law. All 40 of the PPD fields may be queried separately or in any combination. A full-text search that applies to all 40 fields in a PPD record. A one-click download of all of the field data for all of the records in the PPD as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. An Excel spreadsheet download of the data for every PPD record that satisfies a query or a full-text search that a user creates. Opening a PPD record from another Web site, blog, document, or email by using the PPD record's Web link. The link will open the current state of the database record, not a stored Web page. Opening reports, articles, and texts of Chinese laws that are available on the Commission's Web site or on another Web site by clicking links in a PPD record's short summary. (Many PPD records contain a short summary of the case that includes basic details about the political or religious imprisonment and the legal process leading to imprisonment.) Exporting a PPD record to a single-page Adobe PDF document that contains all of the available record data, including the short summary. Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database: Previous and Additional Data Fields ------------------------------------------------------------------------ PPD Fields Added in the July 2010 Upgrade PPD Fields Available (21) Prior to Upgrade (19) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Affiliation CECC record number Residence (province) Detention status Residence (prefecture) Issue category Residence (county) Main name Formal arrest date Chinese characters (main name) Trial date Other (or lay) name Trial court Alternate name(s) Sentence date Pinyin name (for non-Han) Sentence court Ethnic group Appeal date Sex Appeal court Age at detention Appeal ruling date Religion Appeal ruling court Occupation Sentence ends per PRC Date of detention Actual date released Province where imprisoned Charge (statute) Current prison Sentence length (months) Sentence length (years) Sentence length (weeks) Legal process Sentence length (days) Short summary Prefecture where imprisoned County where imprisoned ------------------------------------------------------------------------ II. Human Rights Freedom of Expression Introduction The Chinese government and Communist Party's system of restrictions on free expression consists of two core components: content prohibitions and prior restraints. Content prohibitions are based on vague and broadly worded criminal and administrative provisions covering a wide range of media. These provisions prohibit Chinese citizens from expressing or accessing content the Party or government deems to ``incite subversion of state power,'' ``spread rumors,'' or ``attack the Chinese Communist Party,'' among other things.\1\ Such provisions continued to serve as the basis for punishing peaceful critics of the Party this past year. The Commission's 2009 Annual Report noted the arrest of prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo as part of a crackdown on citizens who supported Charter 08, a treatise advocating political reform and human rights circulated online.\2\ In December 2009, a Beijing court sentenced Liu to 11 years in prison for inciting subversion, the longest known sentence for that crime.\3\ Officials also moved forward with cases against Tan Zuoren and Huang Qi, the activists who criticized authorities for not doing enough to investigate school collapses in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake.\4\ Courts in Sichuan province sentenced Tan to five years' imprisonment for inciting subversion and Huang to three years' imprisonment for leaking state secrets. These cases reflect officials' heightened concern about the Internet, as Liu, Tan, and Huang had peacefully used that medium for rights advocacy and political expression. Officials continued to censor political expression across a wide range of media, from the Internet to print publications. In March 2010, after 13 Chinese newspapers published a joint editorial criticizing and calling for reform of China's household registration system, officials disciplined editors at the Economic Observer and ordered the editorial removed from Web sites.\5\ The second core component of China's system of restrictions, prior restraints, refers to a system by which the government controls, through a licensing requirement for example, who may use a forum for expression. In China, prior restraints are extensive. Any person or group wishing to publish a newspaper, magazine, or book; \6\ host a Web site; \7\ or work as a journalist \8\ must first obtain a license from or register with the government. Reflecting heightened concern over the Internet, the government during the Commission's 2010 reporting year sought to tighten prior restraints on those applying for domain names for Web sites, to curb anonymity on the Internet, and to crack down on unlicensed video Web sites. In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the government shut down Internet, text messaging, and international phone call service altogether following demonstrations and riots in July 2009, and only gradually began lifting restrictions in December. Officials also sought to tighten control over the news industry nationwide, announcing in March 2010 a qualification exam for journalists that would require knowledge of ``Chinese Communist Party journalism'' and warning against unlicensed citizen journalists sharing news on the Internet. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FREE EXPRESSION The Chinese government's content restrictions and prior restraints aimed at controlling political and religious content are inconsistent with international human rights standards and also with the rights to free speech and the press enumerated in China's Constitution.\9\ Chinese officials, however, continue to insist that these rights are protected.\10\ Under international human rights standards, a restriction on free expression is permitted so long as it is (1) for the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of others or protecting national security, public order, public health or morals, or the general welfare; (2) set forth in law; and (3) narrowly tailored.\11\ The vagueness of the Chinese government's content prohibitions provides Chinese officials with broad discretion to apply prohibitions for purposes impermissible under international human rights standards, such as to target criticism of the Communist Party.\12\ The vagueness with which prohibitions are set forth in law also leaves citizens with no clear guidance on the boundaries of free speech.\13\ The government's prior restraints on various speech activities also are not narrowly tailored, allowing officials the discretion to suppress unlicensed expression that they find politically disagreeable.\14\ Moreover, officials apply restrictions on expression with little transparency \15\ and without sufficient judicial oversight.\16\ Abuse of Vague Criminal Law Provisions CRIME OF SUBVERSION During this reporting year, Chinese officials continued to label peacefully expressed criticism of the government or the Party as a threat to state security, relying in some cases on Article 105 of China's Criminal Law. Article 105 provides for sentences of up to life imprisonment for attempts to subvert state power or up to 15 years for inciting such subversion.\17\ Chinese courts make little assessment of whether the speech in question poses an actual threat to state security.\18\ Chinese lawyers have noted that courts can apply Article 105 arbitrarily because no legislative or judicial interpretation defines the specific boundaries between free expression and state security.\19\ In June 2010, Joshua Rosenzweig of the Dui Hua Foundation, a human rights organization, said, ``There's little doubt that . . . the intent of the law against inciting subversion is the silencing of political speech.'' \20\ This past year, courts continued to punish alleged subversion in trials marred by procedural abuses and in which the defendants' online activity figured prominently. The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court levied what is reportedly the longest known sentence for inciting subversion, 11 years, against the prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo in December 2009.\21\ [See box titled Liu Xiaobo below.] In February 2010, a court in Chengdu city sentenced the activist Tan Zuoren to five years in prison for inciting subversion.\22\ The court cited online essays Tan wrote criticizing the government's handling of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Tan's efforts to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the protests, and interviews he gave to foreign media in which he criticized the government's response to the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake.\23\ Tan was detained while conducting an investigation into school collapses in the quake. During Tan's trial, the judge refused to allow Tan's lawyers to call witnesses or to show evidence, frequently cut his lawyers off, and barred reporters from the courtroom.\24\ In October 2009, a court in Jiangsu province sentenced former professor Guo Quan to 10 years in prison for subversion for using the Internet to organize an ``illegal'' political party and publishing ``reactionary'' articles online.\25\ [See Section III-- Institutions of Democratic Governance.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Liu Xiaobo ------------------------------------------------------------------------- On December 25, 2009, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced the prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison for inciting subversion.\26\ The court cited six essays Liu had written and posted on the Internet as well as his work on Charter 08, a treatise advocating political reform and human rights circulated online for signatures.\27\ The essays, with titles such as ``The Chinese Communist Party's Dictatorial Patriotism'' and ``Can It Be That the Chinese People Are Only Suited To Accepting `Party-Ruled Democracy'? '', criticize the Communist Party's governance of China but do not advocate violence.\28\ The court noted how Liu had taken advantage of the Internet's ``rapid transmission of information, broad reach, great social influence, and high degree of public attention.'' \29\ Liu's case was marred by official abuses. When police first took Liu into custody in December 2008, they kept him under residential surveillance at a secret location instead of his home in Beijing and did so beyond the legal six-month limit.\30\ At trial, the judge limited Liu's defense lawyers to less than 20 minutes to present their arguments and prevented Liu from finishing his remarks.\31\ In February 2010, the Beijing High People's Court affirmed the lower court judgment and rejected Liu's argument that his residential surveillance amounted to de facto detention and should be counted toward time served.\32\ In March, officials in Shanghai municipality ordered Shanghai petitioner Mao Hengfeng to serve 18 months of reeducation through labor for shouting slogans outside Liu's trial in December 2009.\33\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ OTHER CRIMES: SPLITTISM, STATE SECRETS, AND SLANDER This past year authorities used legal provisions criminalizing slander and acts of endangering state security-- ``splittism'' (separatism) and possessing or trafficking state secrets--to punish persons who criticized officials or who dealt with commercial information. Gheyret Niyaz. In July 2010, a court in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), sentenced Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist and Web editor, to 15 years' imprisonment for ``leaking state secrets.'' Prosecutors cited essays by Gheyret Niyaz addressing economic and social problems affecting Uyghurs; sources also connected the prison sentence to interviews Gheyret Niyaz gave to foreign media that criticized aspects of government policy in the XUAR.\34\ [For information on other Uyghur cases, see box titled Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang in Section IV--Xinjiang.] Xue Feng. In July 2010, a Beijing court sentenced Xue Feng, a naturalized American citizen and geologist, to eight years in prison for trafficking state secrets.\35\ Xue had helped an American company purchase information on oil wells in China.\36\ Officials reportedly did not declare the information a state secret until after the purchase took place and allegedly tortured Xue.\37\ Xue's lengthy detention and trial violated China's Criminal Procedure Law, while officials violated China's consular treaty with the United States by delaying notification of the case and access to Xue by U.S. officials.\38\ Tagyal (Shogdung). In May 2010, authorities in Qinghai province arrested the Tibetan writer known as Shogdung, whose real name is Tagyal, on the charge of inciting splittism.\39\ The writer had signed an open letter suggesting that people avoid sending donations for the April 2010 Yushu earthquake in Qinghai through official channels, citing corruption concerns, and had written a book about the March 2008 Tibetan protests.\40\ [For information on other Tibetan cases, see box titled Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural Expression in Section V--Tibet.] Fan Yanqiong, Wu Huaying, and You Jingyou. In April, a court in Fujian province sentenced Fan Yanqiong to two years in prison and Wu Huaying and You Jingyou each to one year in prison for the crime of slander (Article 246 of China's Criminal Law) after they wrote essays and created a video documenting a mother's claim that her daughter was gang-raped and murdered by people with ties to local police.\41\ The court claimed the allegations were fabricated and had caused a stir on the Internet.\42\ Authorities reportedly suspended the license of Wu's lawyer before the trial.\43\ The Commission's 2009 Annual Report noted rising official abuse of Article 246 to retaliate against Internet whistleblowers.\44\ Huang Qi. In November 2009, a court in Chengdu city, Sichuan province, sentenced the rights activist Huang Qi to three years in prison for illegal possession of state secrets.\45\ Huang's human rights Web site advocated on behalf of grieving parents after the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Authorities have considerable discretion to declare almost any matter of public concern a state secret. [See box titled Open Government Information and the Amended State Secrets Law below.] Huang's lawyer said the ``state secrets'' were rules for government agencies on dealing with citizen petitions.\46\ [For information on authorities' use of extralegal tactics and restrictions on freedom of movement to punish free expression, see Section II--Criminal Justice--Abuse of Police Powers: Suppression of Dissent and Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Open Government Information and the Amended State Secrets Law ------------------------------------------------------------------------- China's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan emphasizes citizens' ``right to be informed'' and says the ``Chinese government will make more efforts to keep the public informed of government affairs, and improve relevant laws and regulations, so as to guarantee citizens' right of information.'' \47\ Effective in May 2008, the Regulations on Open Government Information require governments to disclose information involving the vital interests of citizens and give citizens the right to request information.\48\ One barrier to transparency, however, is a state secrets framework that gives officials wide latitude to declare almost any matter of public concern a state secret, from death penalty statistics to the state's reeducation through labor policy, and to deny requests for information.\49\ The Commission's 2009 Annual Report noted that Chinese officials were considering proposed changes to the state secrets law in effect since 1989,\50\ and in April 2010, the National People's Congress Standing Committee passed the amended Law on the Protection of State Secrets, which took effect on October 1, 2010.\51\ The definition of ``state secrets'' in the 2010 law, however, remains vague and broad. According to Article 9, a state secret may relate to major policy decisions on state affairs, national economic and social development, and science and technology, or other matters as determined by officials.\52\ Like the previous law, the amended law does not provide for any judicial review of a state agency's determination that information is a state secret. It remains to be seen whether other provisions in the amended law, including one that places time limits on state secrets, reduce the number of state secrets.\53\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Internet and Other Electronic Media CHINA'S INTERNET POLICY As the Commission has documented in recent annual reports,\54\ the Chinese government continued to encourage the Internet for economic development while maintaining political control over the medium. According to a white paper on the Internet released by the State Council Information Office (SCIO) in June 2010, the government plans to increase the percentage of Internet users from 28.9 percent of the population to 45 percent in five years.\55\ According to official statistics, there were 420 million Internet users in China as of the end of June 2010, an increase of 82 million over the previous year.\56\ The white paper noted the government's investments in Internet infrastructure and the role the Internet has played in driving China's economy.\57\ The white paper also repeated the government's argument that increased access to the Internet, as evidenced by the large number of blogs in China and the presence of lively exchanges on China's Internet, shows that China ``guarantees citizens' freedom of speech on the Internet.'' \58\ This past year, Chinese citizens continued to use communication technologies to advocate for rights and to criticize government policies. In early summer 2010, for example, workers in China used the Internet and cell phones to organize and document strikes.\59\ Such phenomena, however, are insufficient evidence that China guarantees free speech, in light of the continued political censorship documented below. While greater Internet access has afforded Chinese citizens unprecedented opportunities for expression, it has not signified Chinese officials' willingness to loosen political control. In an April 2010 speech before the National People's Congress Standing Committee, SCIO Director Wang Chen said the government is using the Internet to promote ``positive propaganda''; ``guide public opinion'' (citing guidance of the Internet following unrest in Tibetan and Uyghur areas of China in 2008 and 2009); enhance China's ``soft power''; and ``balance the hegemony of the Western media.'' \60\ Wang also said the government is campaigning to gain global acceptance for its model of Internet control: Our nation has successively engaged in dialogue and exchanges with more than 70 countries and international organizations. We have explained our Internet management policy, introduced the achievements of our Internet construction . . . countered Western enemy forces' smears against us, and enhanced the international community's acceptance and understanding of our model of managing the Internet.\61\ Officials remained concerned about citizens' use of the Internet to network socially and post commentary. In mid-July 2010, Chinese and foreign media reported that officials were behind service disruptions at major microblogging sites, the removal of the blogs of well-known activists and lawyers, and increased monitoring of journalists' blogs.\62\ In April 2010, the New York Times reported that the SCIO had established a new bureau to monitor social networking sites, which have grown in popularity in China.\63\ The Chinese government continued to employ paid agents to issue pro-government comments online.\64\ In his April speech, Wang said officials would ``strengthen the blocking of harmful information from outside [China's] borders.'' \65\ In December 2009, Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu published an essay saying the Internet had become an important tool for ``anti-China forces'' and ``a new challenge for public security forces safeguarding state security and social stability.'' \66\ CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL CONTENT Scope of Censorship Censorship of political content on the Internet remained pervasive this reporting year. The Chinese government readily acknowledges the blocking of some online content, such as content it considers to be pornographic,\67\ but it provides few details about how it determines other content to block, including what political content it censors.\68\ The scope of content the Chinese government requires authorities and private actors to censor remains ill-defined, and therefore allows officials to target political and religious content arbitrarily.\69\ OpenNet Initiative, an Internet research organization, noted in a 2009 report that censors primarily target Chinese-language content, including content dealing with the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Tibetan rights, and Falun Gong, as well as ``human rights, political reform, sovereignty issues, and circumvention tools.'' \70\ The following are select examples of censored political content from the past year, as reported by Chinese Internet users and foreign media in China. News items were removed from Web sites, including an article examining the role of the Internet in mass incidents in China; \71\ a transcript of U.S. President Barack Obama's November 2009 town hall meeting in Shanghai, where he called for a free Internet; \72\ and a Chinese editorial cartoon that appeared to refer to the government suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\73\ In October 2009, the organizers of an overseas Web site inviting visitors to comment on the fall of the Berlin Wall reported the site was blocked in China.\74\ In March 2010, the Chinese government reportedly instructed Web sites to limit online discussion of the controversy between the U.S. technology company, Google, and the Chinese government.\75\ In April 2010, Internet users reportedly were unable to search the word ``carrot'' on the Internet because it shares the same Chinese character as ``Hu'' in President Hu Jintao's name.\76\ In May 2010, several popular Uyghur Web sites remained shut down after authorities restored Internet access to the XUAR.\77\ China's Internet Censors and the Rule of Law Both Chinese officials and Internet companies in China have a responsibility under China's laws and regulations to censor content. Chinese officials block or filter access to foreign Web sites through control of the gateway connection between China and the global Internet.\78\ Chinese authorities continue to block social media sites based overseas, such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Flickr.\79\ According to Xiao Qiang, an expert on China's Internet based at the University of California at Berkeley, ``There is an Internet monitoring and surveillance unit in every city, wherever you have an Internet connection.'' \80\ Chinese Internet regulations provide lists of prohibited categories of content including content that ``harms the honor or interests of the nation,'' ``destroys ethnic unity,'' ``spreads rumors,'' or ``disrupts national policies on religion.'' \81\ These vague and broadly worded categories provide little guidance to Internet users or Internet companies in China,\82\ the latter of which are required by Chinese regulations to censor content and to monitor and report customer activity to authorities.\83\ [See box titled Chinese Media Article Exposes Problems With China's Internet Censorship below.] In January 2010, Chinese cell phone users complained about unclear standards during a crackdown on text messages containing pornography or ``unhealthy'' information.\84\ Vague content prohibitions also apply to other electronic media, such as television.\85\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Chinese Media Article Exposes Problems With China's Internet Censorship ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Global Times, which operates under the official People's Daily, issued a rare article in February 2010 on the subject of Internet censorship in China that highlighted a number of problems, including lack of transparency and clear standards and the absence of adequate procedural protections.\86\ According to a professor of Internet politics at Nanjing University cited in the article, the 14 regulations dealing with online content in China are all vague and lack detailed provisions.\87\ The professor also noted that content bans were becoming increasingly unpredictable and that affected Internet users receive no explanation or opportunity to appeal.\88\ The article noted how these factors led Internet users to practice self-censorship and placed pressure on Internet companies, especially those without government connections, who feared being closed down for any misstep.\89\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This past year, the government introduced measures that could increase the pressure on Internet companies to censor politically sensitive content. In April 2010, the National People's Congress Standing Committee passed an amended state secrets law, effective October 1, 2010.\90\ [For more information, see the box titled Open Government Information and the Amended State Secrets Law above.] The law retains the vague definition of state secrets that allows officials to declare almost any matter of public concern a state secret.\91\ In addition, the amended law adds a new provision, Article 28, which requires Internet and other telecommunication companies to cooperate with authorities' investigation of state secret leaks and, upon discovering a leak, to stop transmission of the secret, preserve any relevant records, and notify officials.\92\ This provision further codifies in law a requirement that appears in existing administrative regulations.\93\ Internet companies that violate Article 28 will face punishment from police, state security officers, or government officials.\94\ In December 2009, the National People's Congress Standing Committee issued the Tort Liability Law, effective July 1, 2010, which includes a provision (Article 36) exposing Internet service providers (ISPs) to liability for failing to remove content that infringes upon the rights of others, to the extent the ISP is aware of or is informed of such content.\95\ A state-controlled media article noted that the liability provision could pressure ISPs to be overzealous in removing content, including politically sensitive content.\96\ Furthermore, the article said it is unclear to what extent the ``aware'' clause requires ISPs to actively search the Internet for prohibited content.\97\ The pressure to censor politically sensitive content affects foreign companies in China in ways that may have an impact on trade and may further limit the free flow of information, as the controversy between the Chinese government and the U.S. company Google this past year clearly illustrated. In January 2010, Google announced that partly because of ``attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web'' in China, the company was ``no longer willing to continue censoring'' search results on Google.cn, its search engine for China.\98\ In explaining the problems Google faced in China, a Google representative told the Commission at a March 2010 hearing that Chinese government censorship requests put Google in a ``terribly difficult position'' because ``there's not very much transparency at all about what's being requested, and whether it's being requested of everybody.'' \99\ Google's stated refusal to censor the search engine it created for the Chinese market raised the possibility that it would be forced to shut down this service. Some Chinese citizens supported Google's position but worried about losing access to a source of information that censored less than domestic alternatives.\100\ In February, Nature magazine released a survey of 784 Chinese scientists, 84 percent of whom said that blocked access to Google would ``somewhat or significantly'' hinder their research.\101\ Google announced in March that it would automatically redirect mainland users to its less censored Hong Kong site, but in June modified this practice out of fear that the Chinese government would not renew Google's Internet content license.\102\ PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND BROAD RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNET ACCESS This past year, officials sought to tighten broad prior restraints on citizens' ability to post content on the Internet. All Web sites hosted in China are required either to be licensed by or registered with the government, and sites providing news content or audio and video services require an additional license or registration.\103\ In December 2009, the state-run domain name registrar announced rules barring individuals from registering for the Chinese domain name ``.cn'' for their Web sites, limiting registrations to only entities with business licenses.\104\ Although officials and domestic and foreign media cited pornography and online fraud concerns with ``.cn'' sites, some in China questioned the reasonableness of banning all individual registrations.\105\ In February 2010, the government rescinded the ban, but added a new requirement that applicants must submit a photo and meet in person with the Internet service provider assisting people with Web site registration, which could have a chilling effect given China's restrictions on political content.\106\ In its 2009 Annual Report, the Commission also reported that the government had issued a secret directive requiring Internet users in China to provide their real name and identification number before posting a comment on major news Web sites.\107\ This past year, Wang Chen, the State Council Information Office Director, confirmed the existence of the requirement and said the government was exploring a real name identification system for comment services generally.\108\ The government continued its periodic crackdown on illegal Web sites, often couched as anti-pornography campaigns. A February 2010 report by the government news agency Xinhua indicated, however, that only 12 percent of the 136,000 Web sites targeted in a government crackdown were shut down for having pornography, while most had failed to register.\109\ Officials continued to target sites devoted to posting news or videos. In November 2009, officials shut down Yeeyan, a site that published translations of English and Chinese articles, for failing to have a license to provide news.\110\ To obtain a license to provide online news in China, an applicant must have at least five full-time news editors with at least three years of experience in journalism, as well as registered capital of no less than 10 million yuan (US$1.48 million).\111\ Yeeyan reportedly came back online 39 days later, after removing all ``political news'' from the site.\112\ As the Commission reported in its 2008 Annual Report, a 2008 regulation requires audio and video Web sites to be wholly state-owned or state- controlled in order to obtain a license.\113\ In December 2009, officials in a crackdown on unlicensed audio and video sites shut down BTChina, a popular video-sharing site, which they also accused of hosting pornography.\114\ The owner denied the pornography charge and said that government regulations prevented him from obtaining a license.\115\ A September 2009 government notice stated that beginning in March 2010, officials nationwide would need to inspect their jurisdictions for audio and video Web sites operating without a license.\116\ In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), authorities maintained blanket restrictions on the Internet, international phone calls, and text messages, put in place following demonstrations and riots in Urumqi starting July 2009, and gradually began lifting them only after almost half a year had passed.\117\ It was not until May 2010 that officials restored more complete Internet access.\118\ Authorities claimed that overseas elements had directed the violence \119\ and that restrictions were imposed to prevent further violence.\120\ The actual role the communication devices played in violent rioting (as opposed to demonstrations) was unclear,\121\ however, and the wide-reaching restrictions-- affecting all Internet, SMS, and international phone content and lasting for months after the July 2009 events--exceeded permissible boundaries allowable under international human rights standards. [See International Standards for Free Expression in this section.] The press freedom organization Reporters Without Borders noted in October 2009 that the restrictions were overbroad and prevented XUAR residents from sharing information about the ensuing government crackdown.\122\ [For more information, see Section IV-- Xinjiang--Controls Over Free Expression.] Freedom of the Press STATE POLICY While China's Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, in practice Communist Party and government control and regulation of Chinese news media and publishing continued to violate international standards. [See International Standards for Free Expression in this section.] International standards prohibit restrictions on free expression for political control, but in China the official policy is that the media is subordinate to the Party's interests. In a November 2009 speech, top Party official Li Changchun marked Journalists' Day in China by telling journalists to ``persist in strengthening and improving the Party's leadership over news propaganda work.'' \123\ This policy continued to be reflected in media coverage of major events. Following the April 2010 Yushu earthquake in Qinghai province, Li said that propaganda reporting had been effectively utilized to ``create a good public opinion atmosphere'' for disaster relief work and told Chinese media to reflect the ``good(ness)'' of the Communist Party and ethnic groups ``uniting'' in disaster relief.\124\ The government also continued with state-led expansion of the media industry in order to spread China's influence globally. In July 2010, the central government's news agency Xinhua launched a global English-language television channel.\125\ NEWS MEDIA Censorship and Guidance of News This past year, the Commission observed numerous reports of officials continuing to direct media coverage of topics they deemed politically sensitive. The Party, primarily through the Central Propaganda Department, issues frequent directives to Chinese news media informing them about the stories they can and cannot cover or how to cover a story, including requiring them to run only Xinhua reports.\126\ The following table indicates some of the publicly known directives over the past year, as well as other instances where officials sought to control news coverage: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Restricted Topic Restriction ------------------------------------------------------------------------ November 2009--Southern Weekend's Ban on reprinting of interview and interview with U.S. President posting on the Internet.\127\ Barack Obama. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ January 2010--Lunar New Year CCTV (national television station) Holiday in February. ordered to avoid negative news.\128\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ March 2010--Dispute between Google News Web sites ordered not to and Chinese government over report information released by Internet censorship. Google, to play down Chinese citizens' displays of support for Google, and to publish only stories by central government media.\129\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ March 2010--Annual meetings of Ban on negative news on front pages National People's Congress and and in headlines.\131\ Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.\130\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ April 2010--Coal mine disaster in Local officials reportedly ordered Shanxi province. journalists to leave the area and reduce coverage.\132\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ April 2010--Yushu earthquake in Officials attempted to ban non- Qinghai province. local journalists from covering quake. Media later ordered to reduce coverage and focus on Shanghai 2010 World Expo.\133\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ April 2010--Shanghai 2010 World Officials ordered news media to Expo. adhere to only central media reports when activities of central officials are concerned.\134\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Political Loyalty and Prior Restraints The Chinese government claims that government licensing and supervision of journalists is needed to prevent corruption and protect journalists.\135\ Journalists continue to be subject, however, to political requirements unrelated to corruption or protecting journalists. In March 2010, a high-level official at the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), the Chinese government's main regulator of the press, said that journalists in China would be required to pass a new qualification exam that will test them on their knowledge of ``Chinese Communist Party journalism'' and Marxist views of news.\136\ In November, the All-China Journalists Association issued a revised ethics code that maintains political requirements, including to ``be loyal to the Party,'' ``persist in correct guidance of public opinion . . . giving first place to positive propaganda,'' and ``abide by the Party's discipline for news workers.'' \137\ Government warnings against unlicensed journalistic activity also appear intended to ensure centralized control over the news. In a February 2010 People's Daily interview, a GAPP official noted that commercial Web sites and unlicensed ``Internet journalists'' are not allowed to independently report news on the Internet.\138\ The official said that the only news Web sites that are allowed to conduct their own reporting are ``traditional media'' already licensed by the government, naming as examples People.com.cn (of the Party's flagship newspaper People's Daily) and Xinhuanet.com (of the central government's news agency).\139\ The close ties between some media and the state may exacerbate corruption among journalists. According to one foreign news organization, ``[w]hen journalists from China's top news agencies approach a bureaucrat or businessmen, they have not only market power behind them but something even more formidable, the power of the state.'' \140\ Punishment of Journalists and Newspapers Chinese journalists and newspapers continued to face official pressure and punishment for reporting on issues authorities deemed to be sensitive. In November 2009, General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) officials ``severely punished'' four newspapers for publishing what they deemed to be ``false'' reports claiming that much of China's wealth is held by a small percentage of the population.\141\ In May 2010, GAPP officials ordered Business Watch to halt publication for one month because it had published an article on a major state power company's alleged monopolistic activities.\142\ The story was published during the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March 2010 and prompted some delegates to criticize the power company.\143\ Authorities reportedly cited Business Watch for ``violating propaganda discipline'' and creating a ``negative influence.'' \144\ In early March, the Central Propaganda Department reportedly issued a warning to top editors at the Economic Observer, after it and 12 other newspapers jointly published an editorial criticizing and calling for reform of China's household registration system.\145\ Zhang Hong, an editor and co-author of the editorial, reportedly was removed from his position. [For more information, see Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement--Significant Household Registration (Hukou) Policies and Regulatory Developments in 2010--The Joint Editorial on Hukou Reform]. In May 2010, an editor of the China Economic Times was reportedly removed from his position after the paper reported that poorly handled vaccinations in Shanxi province led to deaths and sickening of children.\146\ [For more information, see Section II--Public Health.] Foreign and Hong Kong Journalists Credentialed journalists reporting for foreign news organizations in China are subject to fewer restrictions than their domestic counterparts but continued to face harassment. As a result of China hosting the Olympics in 2008, since January 2007, foreign journalists allowed into China technically may report without additional government permission, with the notable exception of permission being required to enter restricted areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region.\147\ At the World Media Summit held in Beijing in October 2009, President Hu Jintao promised that the government would ``guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of foreign news organizations and reporters, and facilitate coverage and reporting by foreign media in China according to relevant laws and regulations.'' \148\ The Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, however, reported several cases of harassment this past year when reporters tried to cover sensitive events or geographic areas. In November 2009, police and local foreign affairs officers in Kashgar city, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), reportedly harassed Italian and American journalists after finding out their occupation.\149\ In February 2010, police in Chengdu city, Sichuan province, forced nine Hong Kong reporters into a holding room under the pretext that they wanted to check the journalists' credentials.\150\ The reporters were attempting to cover the trial of activist Tan Zuoren. The police released the reporters only after the verdict was announced. The reporters encountered further harassment outside the court as they tried to interview Tan's lawyer.\151\ Chinese authorities continued to harass Chinese citizens working with foreign journalists and to prevent citizens from speaking to foreign journalists. In late April 2010, authorities threatened a Chinese employee with loss of work after he helped a German journalist film video of a migrant school slated for demolition in Beijing.\152\ Police accused the assistant of conducting ``independent'' reporting.\153\ In June 2010, public security officials in the XUAR reportedly ordered people not to speak to foreign journalists without authorization in the wake of the one-year anniversary of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi.\154\ PUBLICATIONS Prior Restraints and Political Publications Considered Illegal The Chinese government continued to engage in campaigns to root out unlicensed publications and publications containing what officials deemed to be ``illegal'' political content. All newspapers and publications must be licensed by the government, have a government sponsor, and meet certain financial requirements.\155\ Chinese regulations include vague and sweeping prohibitions on the publication of materials that ``destroy ethnic unity, or infringe upon ethnic customs and habits,'' ``propagate evil cults or superstition,'' or ``harm the honor or interests of the nation.'' \156\ The non- governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported in March 2010 that the government Web site of Jilin city, Jilin province, posted an article on how the city's local press and publications bureau was targeting 38 different kinds of ``illegal political publications,'' including those ``attacking the Party and the country's leaders,'' ``attacking the Party's policies,'' and ``inciting ethnic splittism.'' Banned publications included those about China's present and former leaders, Charter 08 (a political reform and human rights treatise), the XUAR and Tibetan protests and riots of the last two years, and the Dalai Lama.\157\ In July 2010, the writer Yu Jie said police threatened him with imprisonment if he published a book critical of China's Premier Wen Jiabao.\158\ Officials waged campaigns against ``illegal'' publications around politically sensitive events or areas. Following the April 2010 Yushu earthquake in Qinghai province, the Qinghai ``Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications'' Office issued a notice calling on officials to strengthen supervision of the ``cultural market'' to ensure it ``remains stable and orderly.'' \159\ The Ministry of Culture, from April to June 2010, waged a campaign against ``illegal'' political publications and cultural products centered on major tourist sites, ethnic minority areas, and Shanghai, host of the 2010 World Expo.\160\ In May, the official newspaper China Daily reported that local authorities in Lhasa city, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), passed a rule requiring anyone wishing to make photocopies to supply their ID and have their ID numbers registered. The article cited a police official's claim that ``separatists'' hand out banners and pamphlets with illegal content in the TAR.\161\ Worker Rights Introduction Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or in practice, full worker rights in accordance with international standards, including the right to organize into independent unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the Communist Party, is the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU, and must align with its overarching political concerns of maintaining ``social stability'' and economic growth. Labor disputes and officials' concern with maintaining ``social stability'' intensified over this reporting year as layoffs, wage arrears, and poor and unsafe working conditions persisted. Growing concern on the part of local governments to maintain economic growth and employment continued to prompt some localities to respond to labor laws that took effect in 2008 (the Labor Contract Law, Employment Promotion Law, and Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law) with local opinions and regulations of their own that weakened some employee-friendly aspects of these laws. In response to collective labor action that was organized and large scale, the Chinese government continued to redirect labor disputes away from the formal channels of arbitration and litigation toward more ``flexible'' and ``grassroots-level'' negotiation and mediation. Strikes and demands for higher wages during 2010 revealed that workers, in some cases, have been emboldened not only by protections for workers codified in labor laws that took effect in 2008, but also by a tighter labor market. Backlogs in the handling of labor dispute cases continued to exceed time limits mandated by law. Migrant workers continued to face discrimination in urban areas, and their children still faced difficulties accessing city schools.\1\ Employment discrimination more generally continued to be a serious problem, and plaintiffs brought a growing number of antidiscrimination suits under China's Employment Promotion Law. Labor Dispute Settlement China's Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law (LDMAL) provides a specific timeframe within which disputes must be resolved, requiring arbitral tribunals to rule on cases ``within 45 days of the acceptance of the arbitration application by the labor dispute arbitration commission.'' \2\ If an extension is necessary for complex cases, it must be approved by the dispute commission and, in any case, may not exceed 15 days.\3\ If no decision is made within the timeframe set forth in the LDMAL, then parties may pursue litigation in courts.\4\ An ACFTU report indicated that, by the first half of 2010, some localities saw dramatic increases in the number of labor dispute cases.\5\ The hearing of labor disputes in many cases now takes far longer than the stipulated 45- to 60-day legal requirement.\6\ To adjust to the pressure of a rapidly rising caseload and address dissatisfaction with long delays between case filings and hearings, some local governments pushed disputes down to lower levels for resolution, encouraging, even coercing, disputants to resolve disputes through negotiation or grassroots mediation, often led by low-level officials.\7\ This emphasis on mediation and extrajudicial resolution has not been limited to local governments, but also has been reflected in national- and provincial-level regulations and circulars.\8\ In addition to large increases in arbitrated cases, labor dispute cases also continued to deluge Chinese courts. In some cases, these disputes were the result of strong dissatisfaction with arbitration proceedings, as most arbitrated cases can be reviewed in a court if either side is dissatisfied.\9\ In other cases, the increase reflected the strong and growing rights consciousness of Chinese workers who turned to new protections offered in labor laws that took effect in 2008. The Supreme People's Court reported that civil courts throughout China accepted 280,000 cases in 2008 (a 94 percent increase from the previous year) and 319,000 in 2009; during the first eight months of 2010, the number of cases totaled 207,400.\10\ As workers turn to strikes and protests, some officials believe that the government has an incentive to proactively address disagreements at worksites before they add to the case backlog or threaten ``social stability.'' \11\ In