Co bedzie dalej w zwiazku z nazwa ronda w Warszawie ?

Korean women are trafficked into China.\31\ Traffickers, many of whom operate in organized networks, use false promises to lure North Korean women into China and abduct those entering China on their own.\32\ In many cases, traffickers reportedly sell the women into forced ``marriages'' with Chinese nationals for amounts ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 yuan (US$294 to US$2,934).\33\ There is a high demand for ``brides'' in northeastern China where men outnumber women in some areas by as much as 14 to 1,\34\ and where poor, disabled, or elderly men have difficulty finding wives.\35\ In other cases, North Korean women are trafficked into the sex industry, where they are forced to work as prostitutes in brothels or in Internet sex operations.\36\ Some women reportedly have been sold and resold up to seven or eight times,\37\ and trafficked North Korean women have testified to being beaten, sexually abused, and locked up to prevent escape.\38\ The Chinese government's repatriation of trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, and the Chinese government is obligated under Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (TIP Protocol) to ``consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently . . . giving appropriate consideration to humanitarian and compassionate factors.'' \39\ The Chinese government's failure to prevent trafficking of North Korean women and protect them from revictimization also contravenes its obligations under Article 9 of the TIP Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.\40\ Although the central government has taken some minor steps to combat trafficking and protect trafficking victims along its borders with Vietnam and Burma \41\ [see Section II-- Human Trafficking], traffickers continue to traffic an estimated 90 percent of the North Korean women living in China,\42\ and the Chinese government refuses to provide these victims with legal alternatives to repatriation.\43\ Another problem that stems from China's unlawful repatriation policy is the denial of education and other public benefits for the children of North Korean women married to Chinese citizens. There are anywhere from several thousand to several tens of thousands of these stateless children in China,\44\ and their numbers continue to rise.\45\ China's Nationality Law guarantees citizenship and, by extension, household registration (hukou) to all children born in China to at least one parent of Chinese nationality.\46\ China's Compulsory Education Law, moreover, provides that all children age six years and older shall receive nine years of free and compulsory education, regardless of race or nationality.\47\ Some local governments refuse to register Chinese-North Korean children without seeing documentation that the mother is a citizen, has been repatriated, or has run away.\48\ Local authorities contravene Chinese law and the Chinese government's commitments under international law when they refuse these children the hukou they need to attend school and obtain healthcare.\49\ Denial of hukou forces these children to live in a stateless limbo. Moreover, when their North Korean mothers are repatriated, a significant number of these children also become orphaned, as the fathers are unwilling or unable to take care of them.\50\ Reemergence of Famine Conditions The Chinese government's repatriation of North Korean refugees continued as famine conditions in the DPRK have worsened since late 2009. In April and June 2010, international NGO and overseas media reports compared food shortages in the DPRK to the food crisis of the 1990s,\51\ which killed an estimated 1 million North Koreans.\52\ Existing food shortages in late 2009 were exacerbated by a failed DPRK government devaluation of the North Korean currency in November 2009.\53\ In June 2010, the New York Times interviewed eight North Koreans who had left the DPRK not long before and reported that half of them planned on defecting to South Korea.\54\ While many North Koreans may enter China in pursuit of food and basic necessities for survival,\55\ the Chinese government contravenes its commitments under international law when it makes the blanket assertion that North Korean refugees in China are illegal economic migrants and not refugees.\56\ The North Korean government's imprisonment and torture of repatriated North Koreans renders those North Koreans in China who did not leave the DPRK for fear of persecution ``refugees sur place'' under international law, or those who fear persecution upon return.\57\ Thus, whether North Koreans in China left the DPRK for fear of persecution or fear persecution upon return to the DPRK, the 1951 Convention and its Protocol obligate the Chinese government to refrain from repatriating them.\58\ In 2009 and 2010, however, the Chinese government continued to repatriate North Korean refugees and reportedly stepped up its efforts to do so before the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.\59\ Public Health Introduction China has committed to ensuring all its citizens the right to ``the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health'' \1\ and has taken steps toward this goal. The rising cost of healthcare and limited access to quality services, however, remain top concerns for many living in both urban and rural areas of China.\2\ Authorities at the central \3\ and local \4\ levels took steps to launch initiatives in 2009 to address healthcare challenges, but distribution of medical services continued to vary widely by location.\5\ During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange issued new regulations on foreign funding that have led to increased restrictions on the activities of public health non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Authorities also have heightened targeted harassment of certain public health NGOs and individual advocates in the past year. Official corruption and lack of transparency continued to hinder the prevention of infectious disease outbreaks, posing the potential risk of further spread of infectious disease domestically as well as globally. A government circular issued in December 2009 improved the outlook for Hepatitis B virus carriers to enjoy equal treatment in employment and education, but specific cases this year continued to highlight a need for consistent enforcement of existing laws and regulations prohibiting health-based discrimination. Healthcare Reform The Chinese government considers unrestricted access to basic healthcare a universal right,\6\ and in the 2010 reporting year, officials echoed calls for its realization \7\ and took steps to implement related policies. In an effort to close the wide gap in access to basic healthcare as well as deal with issues of corruption within the healthcare system, the State Council passed a large-scale medical reform plan in January 2009 and a corresponding three-year implementation plan in April 2009.\8\ Central and local authorities have begun to implement some goals outlined in the plan, such as initiating a pilot public hospital reform project in 16 cities,\9\ establishing a basic medicine system with a national official list of approved pharmaceuticals,\10\ initiating a plan to train 60,000 general practitioners in the next three years and 300,000 by 2020,\11\ and increasing aid for children suffering from serious illnesses.\12\ Despite these initial steps toward healthcare reform, health inequities persist between urban and rural regions in China. According to an April 2010 study on urban/rural differences in China's public health sector, ``[p]eople living in urban areas have an advantage in life and health compared with those in rural areas, and there is no exception to this pattern in all the 31 provincial-level administrative units.'' \13\ While the majority of urban residents tend to enjoy greater healthcare benefits, including more widespread medical insurance coverage \14\ and higher quality of facilities and care,\15\ the growing population of migrant workers and their families who live in urban areas but do not possess an urban hukou (household registration) still faces difficulties in accessing basic health services.\16\ In addition, some children may not have a hukou in China because they are born ``out of plan,'' that is, not in compliance with birth limits imposed by population planning policies, and their parents do not pay the required fines.\17\ [For additional discussion of China's population planning policies, see Section II--Population Planning.] Lack of a valid hukou raises barriers to access to social benefits typically linked to the hukou, including subsidized healthcare and public education.\18\ [For additional discussion of China's hukou system see, Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement.] Rural areas continue to lack the necessary resources to provide adequate healthcare to local residents.\19\ As noted in the Commission's 2009 Annual Report, access to healthcare in these areas remains dependent on local authorities' interpretation, implementation, and management of healthcare initiatives.\20\ The Rural Cooperative Medical System--a cooperative medical care program in which farmers are reimbursed for their medical expenses from a fund to which farmers and local and central government entities contribute \21\--reportedly expanded in certain areas.\22\ Nevertheless, reports in previous years have pointed to problems with this system, including forced participation in some areas,\23\ as well as a significant fiscal burden on local governments \24\ and an insufficient number of administrative personnel.\25\ Infectious Disease The Chinese government has committed to taking steps to prevent, treat, and control infectious diseases,\26\ but curtailing the spread of infectious disease remained a challenge this year.\27\ Infectious diseases highlighted in domestic and international news reports this reporting year included hand-foot-mouth disease,\28\ syphilis,\29\ viral hepatitis,\30\ HIV/AIDS,\31\ and tuberculosis.\32\ Resources in many rural areas are insufficient to prevent and control the spread of infectious disease effectively,\33\ and problems with government transparency continue to hinder the effectiveness of existing measures.\34\ For example, in March 2010, China Daily reported that tainted vaccines in Shanxi province led to the deaths of four children and sickened dozens more between 2006 and 2008.\35\ According to the report, whistleblower Chen Tao'an, who had worked for the provincial center for disease control and prevention, attributed the deaths and sickening of children to ``abuse of power and corruption by local health authorities.'' \36\ A May 2010 Human Rights Watch article reported that local health officials did not investigate the case but rather denied the story as ``basically untrue.'' \37\ Chen Tao'an was also demoted, according to the report.\38\ According to an October 2009 study in the Lancet, an international medical journal, China's domestic vulnerability to the spread of infectious disease has a significant impact on global public health.\39\ Mental Health In 2001, China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights \40\ and in doing so committed itself to ensuring ``the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.'' \41\ Mental illness continues to increase in prevalence, however, and the rate of treatment remains low, incubating what one report calls ``a quiet crisis in China.'' \42\ The World Health Organization now considers mental illness the greatest burden on the country's healthcare system, over heart disease and cancer, according to an April 2010 Telegraph report.\43\ According to a July 2010 study in the Lancet, ``mental ill-health'' affects more than 100 million people in China, of which ``serious [mental] illnesses'' affect 16 million.\44\ Several news articles attribute China's increase in cases of mental illness to recent social changes and resulting social problems.\45\ Against the backdrop of a low number of qualified psychiatrists, few hospitals equipped with mental health facilities, and widespread stigma regarding mental disorders, most individuals have never been treated for their mental disorders, according to the Lancet study.\46\ Following a series of violent attacks on adults and children in spring 2010 by individuals who allegedly suffered from mental illness, which reportedly raised public concerns about those who fall through the cracks of the system and their potential harm to society, Chinese officials at the central and local levels took steps to address the country's deficient mental healthcare system.\47\ News media sources inside and outside China reported widely on a sudden wave of violent attacks--mostly targeting school children--that took place from March to May 2010.\48\ The perpetrators in at least three of the attacks reportedly suffered from mental illness.\49\ In May 2010, the China Daily reported official plans in Hubei province to initiate a mental health screening program that would include free treatment for those perceived as a potential threat to ``public safety.'' \50\ According to the same report, authorities in Fujian province ordered a similar screening of ``serious patients with an inclination to violence.'' \51\ It is unclear what standards are used to evaluate patients or what safeguards exist to prevent misuse. In June, Vice Minister of Health Yin Li announced that the country would ``increase the rate of treatment for those with serious mental illness and reduce [the occurrence of] disturbances and trouble that bring harm on society,'' and in the next two years renovate and expand 550 mental health facilities.\52\ As noted in a July Lancet report, however, ``such hospitals have been used as a means to silence individuals exercising their freedom of expression. Protestors and dissenters have been put in institutions against their will by local authorities, diagnosed with mental disorders they do not have, and given drugs and electroshock treatments they do not need.'' \53\ Official news media reported in 2009 that authorities had circulated a draft of China's first national mental health law for expert review.\54\ According to one Shenzhen lawyer quoted in the report, ``The draft has made some progress after 25 years of construction and amendments but it may still be difficult to get public support as several loopholes have been left unfilled.'' \55\ While the report indicated that authorities would put the law into effect as early as the end of 2009,\56\ the Commission has not observed reports of further developments on the legislation during this reporting year. Public Health Advocacy Despite official recognition this year of the valuable role non-governmental actors have played in raising awareness about health concerns, combating stigma, and promoting prevention of diseases,\57\ some involved in public health advocacy continued to face government harassment and opposition in the past year.\58\ The Chinese government continued to exert control over advocates' right to freedom of association through strict registration requirements that limit some organizations' ability to legally function independently of the government.\59\ In addition, in December 2009, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange issued a circular that tightens restrictions on organizations that receive foreign funding.\60\ Some in China's non-governmental organization (NGO) community have expressed concern that the new circular may be used to specifically target NGOs.\61\ [See Section III-- Civil Society for more information on the December 2009 circular.] Additional examples of government pressure on public health advocates in the past year include: According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), officials from Xincai county, Henan province, detained HIV/AIDS advocate Tian Xi on August 6, 2010, after he had broken office supplies the previous day when the director of Xincai County No. 1 People's Hospital refused to hear his request for resolution of his case.\62\ Officials initially placed Tian under administrative detention, but on August 17, they took him to the Xincai County No. 2 People's Hospital for medical treatment.\63\ On August 21, officials notified Tian's family of his transfer into criminal detention at the Shangcai County Public Security Bureau (PSB) Detention Center, and on August 23 he was formally arrested for ``intentional destruction of property.'' \64\ According to Tian's father, in 1996, Tian was infected with HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C through a blood transfusion he received at Xincai County No. 1 People's Hospital after sustaining a mild concussion. Since learning of his illnesses in 2004, Tian has persistently petitioned for resolution of his case as well as those of others similarly infected.\65\ Beijing officials detained Tian in December 2009 and July 2010 reportedly in connection with his petitioning activities. He is currently held at the Shangcai County PSB Detention Center and, without access to his regular medications, he is reportedly in poor health.\66\ HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia continues to serve a three-and-a-half year prison sentence for allegedly ``inciting subversion of state power.'' He is expected to be released in June 2011.\67\ In April 2010, authorities denied family members' requests for his medical parole, despite recent indications that Hu's health has deteriorated.\68\ Due to ``increasing government harassment,'' Wan Yanhai, a prominent AIDS activist and founder of the NGO Beijing Aizhixing Institute, left China for the United States with his family in early May 2010.\69\ Recent restrictions on foreign donations as well as recent run-ins with officials-- including police interruption of a Guangzhou event at which he was speaking in March and harassment by the municipal fire department in April--reportedly factored into his decision to leave China.\70\ Beijing tax bureau officials also launched an investigation into Aizhixing's tax records in March 2010 \71\ in a move that was reminiscent of developments that led to the shutdown of the Open Constitution Initiative in July 2009.\72\ [For more details regarding official pressure on Aizhixing and other NGOs, see Section III--Civil Society--Legal Framework and Government Controls.] According to a CHRD report, on June 13, the hotel scheduled to host a legal training organized by the Beijing Yirenping Center (Yirenping)--an NGO that works to raise awareness about public health risks and eliminate discrimination against those carrying certain diseases--notified the center's director, Lu Jun, that it had cancelled the reservation due to official pressure.\73\ On the same day, the antivirus software on Lu's personal computer revealed attempts by a remote computer to make changes to his computer and copy documents from his hard drive.\74\ The attacks followed six previous hotel cancellations of Yirenping's planned legal training workshops, one of which was reportedly due to looting and vandalizing of the host hotel.\75\ Health-Based Discrimination Despite provisions in China's domestic laws and regulations and commitments under international conventions that explicitly forbid discriminatory practices in employment and education against persons with disability or infectious disease,\76\ regulation and punishment of such discrimination reportedly continue to be a challenge.\77\ The Chinese government took steps this year to combat discrimination against Hepatitis B carriers,\78\ but at least two reports involving discrimination against Hepatitis B carriers this year highlight the need for continued progress. According to a March 2010 report by the Hong Kong-based labor rights organization China Labour Bulletin, a university graduate with Hepatitis B won a lawsuit in October 2009 against Xiasha Hospital in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, for violating his right to privacy when it revealed his test results to a potential employer. Despite the success of this suit, many hospitals continue with such practices, according to the report.\79\ [For additional information on employment discrimination, see Section II--Worker Rights.] According to a report by the Beijing Yirenping Center, some kindergartens in Haikou city, Hainan province, reportedly continued to refuse enrollment to children with Hepatitis B in March 2010.\80\ July 2009 draft regulations on the management of health practices in nurseries and kindergartens contain provisions that prohibit such action.\81\ On August 30, 2010, the Yingjiang District People's Court in Anqing city, Anhui province, accepted what may be China's first case of employment discrimination based on HIV status.\82\ University graduate Xiao Wu (alias) brought a lawsuit against the Anqing Department of Education (DOE) for refusing to hire him as an instructor after he passed the written tests and interviews for the position but then tested positive for HIV in a subsequent medical examination.\83\ According to China Labour Bulletin, Xiao is not seeking monetary compensation beyond legal expenses but rather acknowledgment from the court that the DOE's refusal to hire him constituted an ``illegal act'' and must be corrected with ``concrete action.'' \84\ Although HIV cannot be spread through daily contact, one DOE employee told the China Daily, ``Our decision not to hire [Xiao] is to protect the students.'' \85\ According to the report, Xiao Wu also expressed concern that the publicity of the case may negatively impact his future.\86\ Climate Change and the Environment Introduction The Chinese government continued to strengthen regulatory structures and institutions to address climate change and environmental pollution and degradation. However, major implementation, enforcement, and compliance difficulties remain. Despite challenges, data reliability, access to information, and transparency in the climate change and environmental protection sectors have improved in some areas. Chinese leaders have emphasized their intent to rely on domestic monitoring, reporting, and verification of China's greenhouse gas emissions and reductions data, but at the same time, they have signaled some willingness to discuss transparency issues with international actors, and are working to improve data reliability. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and some local environmental protection bureaus have expanded ``open government affairs'' efforts, which, in the Chinese context, often refer to open government information systems and E-government, among other initiatives, but implementation has been uneven. Chinese officials remained willing to engage in cooperative programs with international actors related to climate change and environmental protection. Some policies and projects intended to address climate change, especially in relation to hydroelectric dam construction and other energy projects, could be linked to infringements upon citizens' rights. Citizen environmental complaints continued to increase in number as citizens increasingly voiced concerns about potentially polluting projects. However, channels available to citizens to express environmental concerns and grievances were not always open, contributing to the rise of antipollution demonstrations. Chinese authorities continued to stifle selectively environmental activism and suppress citizens who were involved in or organized collective action to halt perceived environmental harms. Climate Change CHINA'S COMMITMENTS, GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS Chinese leaders signed the United Nations Copenhagen Accord \1\ in 2010, and took additional steps to address climate change. The Chinese government agreed to voluntarily ``endeavor to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 2020 compared to the 2005 level,'' among other actions.\2\ In a communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, Chinese authorities emphasized that China's ``autonomous domestic mitigation actions are voluntary in nature.'' \3\ In November 2009, Xie Zhenhua, the Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, explained to the press that China will incorporate related targets in its next domestic five-year plan that will go into effect in 2011.\4\ The Chinese government has not agreed to carbon emission caps, only to carbon intensity reductions. According to Chinese officials, China's carbon emissions are likely to continue to rise for decades, peaking between 2030 and 2040 according to some officials, and prior to 2050 according to others.\5\ The Chinese government included climate change-related language in China's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) and initiated related institutional and regulatory changes; in addition, non-governmental actors are taking steps to address climate change. The HRAP contains several specific goals \6\ connected to energy and climate change that reiterate goals outlined in preexisting national climate change, energy, and environmental plans.\7\ Energy reportedly accounts for 85 percent of China's carbon emissions.\8\ Several Chinese energy- related institutional and regulatory developments have the potential to impact China's capacity to meet its voluntary carbon intensity targets, if adequately managed or implemented, including passage of new amendments to China's revised Renewable Energy Law in December 2009,\9\ the establishment of the National Energy Commission in January 2010,\10\ and the ongoing development of climate change programs in provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions.\11\ Citizen groups and networks have been active during this reporting year,\12\ publishing reports,\13\ issuing a public statement urging more proactive steps to address climate change,\14\ and engaging in activities to educate the public about a low carbon economy.\15\ DATA RELIABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY While challenges remain, the Chinese government has taken steps to improve the reliability of its energy data. However, China has had less experience collecting and reporting greenhouse gas emission data than it has had with energy data.\16\ The State Council, the National Bureau of Statistics, and the National Development and Reform Commission are reportedly responsible for collecting and verifying China's energy data.\17\ The National People's Congress Standing Committee passed a revision to China's Law on Statistics in June 2009, which came into effect on January 1, 2010, that imposes penalties on officials who ``intervene in government statistical work and manipulate or fabricate data.'' \18\ In previous years, China reportedly has acknowledged problems with energy figures \19\ and the Chinese government states it has taken regulatory and institutional steps to improve the reliability of its energy data.\20\ Current opinions regarding the reliability of China's energy data are mixed.\21\ Chinese leaders have emphasized their intent to rely on domestic monitoring, reporting, and verification of China's greenhouse gas emissions and reductions data.\22\ At the same time, they have signaled some willingness to discuss transparency issues with international actors.\23\ Chinese leaders signed the Copenhagen Accord and accepted an undefined role for the international community in ``consultations'' regarding information on the implementation of China's emission reductions.\24\ Premier Wen Jiabao further signaled the Chinese government's intent to improve transparency of China's climate change-related data in his speech at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit.\25\ China already is engaged in cooperative programs with international actors regarding energy and carbon emission reduction data, including projects with the International Energy Agency \26\ and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.\27\ During U.S. President Barack Obama's trip to China in November 2009, both sides agreed to ``provide for full transparency with respect to the implementation of mitigation measures and provision of financial, technology and capacity building support.'' \28\ CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES: CONSEQUENCES AND CHALLENGES To mitigate China's carbon dioxide emissions, Chinese authorities intend to increase China's reliance on renewable energy sources, especially hydroelectric power.\29\ Hydroelectric dam construction requires the relocation of citizens from construction zones,\30\ which, without adequate procedural protections, could place the rights of relocated citizens at risk. There have been numerous reports of infringements on the rights of populations affected by the Three Gorges Dam hydroelectric project. These reports have uncovered forced evictions, below-standard compensation, suppression of advocates, and government corruption during resettlement processes, as well as the documented threat of severe hardships that may be faced by relocated citizens, including homelessness, unemployment, conflicts between resettled citizens and existing populations, and poverty among resettled migrants.\31\ Authorities reportedly intend to address problems relating to early resettlement by implementing a ``post-Three Gorges plan'' starting in 2010.\32\ China Daily reported in January 2010 that China has ``basically'' completed the first phase of the Three Gorges Dam resettlement, which involved, in part, relocating 1.3 million people and 1,500 enterprises from Chongqing municipality and Hubei province.\33\ The Three Gorges hydroelectric dam project is not the only one plagued by problems with citizen resettlement schemes. Over the years, the construction of the Pubugou Hydropower Station along the Dadu River, partially in Hanyuan county, Sichuan province, reportedly has been delayed repeatedly because of disputes over resettlement issues.\34\ During this reporting year, a dozen families in Hanyuan county reportedly resisted officials' efforts to compel them to move to make way for additional construction on the dam.\35\ Hanyuan county officials reportedly arrested six people in June who repeatedly petitioned against alleged unfair resettlement terms.\36\ Lei Keqiao and five other women reportedly travelled to the township government to petition in May and police arrested them, accusing them of trying to injure a township official.\37\ In another hydroelectric dam case, one 2010 research paper published by the Social Science Research Network, based on survey data, asserts that some resettlement practices in three villages affected by the construction of the Liuku Dam in the Nu River (Salween River) watershed may not be in accordance with national laws, including the cost and size of replacement housing, lack of access to agricultural land, lack of long-term economic support programs, and paucity of citizen input into decisionmaking processes.\38\ In August 2010, public security officials from Linwei district, Weinan city, Shaanxi province, and Beijing reportedly detained, but did not formally arrest, Xie Chaoping, an author and a journalist with a magazine under the Procuratorate Daily, in Beijing on suspicion of ``illegal business activities.'' \39\ Xie's lawyer reportedly has said the charge is linked to publication of Xie's documentary book ``The Great Migration,'' which documents the historical impact of relocation programs related to the Sanmenxia hydroelectric dam.\40\ The migrants residing in Weinan reportedly are the primary subjects of the book.\41\ Spark Magazine published the book as a supplement.\42\ Xie reportedly used his own money to print the supplement, and agreed not to include advertisements or to sell it.\43\ Xie reportedly alleges that Weinan authorities detained him because his writings provide details about corruption, land disputes, and hardship suffered by migrants associated with the Sanmenxia relocation programs.\44\ Xie's lawyer and Chinese news stories raised questions about the charge against Xie, and noted procedural irregularities in the handling of his case.\45\ On September 17, the Linwei District People's Procuratorate announced it had rejected the public security bureau's request to arrest Xie on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence.\46\ Linwei public security officials released Xie on bail after holding him 29 days; however, they did not withdraw the case and will continue to investigate.\47\ In addition, in mid-September, Linwei public security officers detained Zhao Shun, the manager of the print shop that printed ``The Great Migration,'' although they reportedly have not provided the reason for the detention.\48\ During this reporting year, China's population planning officials sought to justify China's one-child policy by linking it to climate change,\49\ saying the policy was ``among the most cost-effective tools to reduce carbon emissions.'' \50\ However, as the findings of this report show, China's population planning policies in both their nature and implementation violate international human rights standards.\51\ [For more information, see Section II-- Population Planning.] Environmental Governance CHINA'S POLLUTION PROBLEMS UNDERESTIMATED Pollution remains a serious problem in China, and a report released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in February 2010 on the first national pollution source survey \52\ revealed that the levels of some pollutants are higher than previously reported. This is largely because authorities incorporated data from additional pollution sources in the survey,\53\ including agricultural sources, leachate from waste management facilities, and household waste from all ``cities and towns'' (except city-level county seats).\54\ The newspaper Caixin reported a high-level environmental protection official, Wang Yuqing, as saying that the MEP would compile and release most of the survey data by the end of 2010,\55\ but as of August 17, only an executive summary of the survey report was available.\56\ Beyond the pollution source survey, other research by Western and Chinese scholars is beginning to reveal the depth of China's ``cancer village'' problem.\57\ ``Cancer villages'' are, according to one study by U.S.-based scholar Lee Liu, farming villages that have a cancer cluster, i.e., an area ``where cancer is more prevalent as a result of cancer- causing pollutants.'' \58\ During his research, Lee found 241 ``officially'' reported and about as many ``unofficially'' reported ``cancer villages'' in China.\59\ ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES, OFFICIAL CORRUPTION China's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) includes themes of sustainable development and ``environmental rights.'' \60\ The HRAP also states that China will improve enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.\61\ The HRAP includes the stated goal of ``strengthening the rule of law in the sphere of environmental protection to safeguard the public's environmental rights and interests,'' \62\ but does not clearly outline the nature of these rights. Uneven implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, along with noncompliance, remain significant challenges. In October 2009, the National Audit Office released an audit report regarding spending for a major project to reduce water pollution between 2001 and 2007 in China's ``three rivers and three lakes'' (which span 13 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities).\63\ In some locations, auditors found inadequate environmental law enforcement, inaccurate environmental statistical data, work units that transmitted automated monitoring systems data on an irregular basis, and work units that did not have their monitoring equipment in proper working order.\64\ Selective official enforcement and enterprise noncompliance with China's environmental impact assessment regulations continue to blunt their effectiveness. For example, in Jiahe county, Hunan province, a site that had been plagued by lead poisoning incidents, 309 of 541 enterprises in the county reportedly had not undergone an environmental impact assessment process.\65\ Compliance problems in less developed areas of China are exacerbated because polluting enterprises with prohibited, antiquated equipment have been known to move to poorer areas within provinces or across provinces after being shut down in more developed areas.\66\ Official misconduct and corruption continued to be problems in the environmental sector during this reporting year. Discipline inspection and supervision entities around the country helped to investigate and manage over 10,000 cases involving government departments and Party cadres who violated major laws or regulations during the course of their administrative duties between January and November 2009.\67\ In addition, the official National Audit report released in 2010 revealed corruption; a significant amount of project funding had been misappropriated or was ``held back,'' according to China Daily.\68\ ENVIRONMENTAL OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and some local environmental protection bureaus have continued to implement ``open government affairs'' policies, but obstacles to accessing environmental information remain. In her remarks at an April 2010 Commission roundtable, an expert in Chinese energy and environmental issues noted the significant progress environmental protection organs have made in information disclosure in recent years, but also highlighted obstacles to better compliance with environmental open government information (OGI) measures, including the lack of capacity of local-level environmental bureaus, the vagueness of the measures, and inconsistency in making local officials accountable for failing to comply with the measures.\69\ During this reporting year, Chinese citizens continued to request environmental data and other information from environmental protection bureaus and offices. One joint Chinese/Western study of 113 cities also noted progress in the growth of the environmental OGI system, highlighting the good performances by some cities. It also noted overall low average performance on transparency, a little over 30 points out of 100.\70\ According to the MEP 2009 OGI report, the ministry received 72 requests for information, up from 68 last year, and had processed 71 of those requests by the time authorities published the report in March 2010.\71\ The MEP did not grant information in four cases.\72\ The MEP received nine administrative reconsideration requests.\73\ While the MEP did not reveal the nature of the information it decided not to grant or explain its refusal in the report, it acknowledged some of the shortcomings of its implementation of the Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI Regulations), including an incomplete catalog, nonstandardized procedures, and an insufficiently wide range of information open to the public.\74\ In October 2009, Beijing resident Ren Xinghui filed open government information requests with the Ministry of Finance, the Three Gorges Project Construction Committee under the State Council, and the China Yangtze Three Gorges Project Development Corporation requesting information on the budget and financing of the Three Gorges hydroelectric dam project.\75\ The Ministry of Finance refused Ren's request on November 16 and based the refusal on Article 14 of an official interpretation of the OGI Regulation, saying Ren's request had no direct relationship to his ``production, livelihood, and scientific and technological research.'' \76\ In January 2010, Ren sued the Ministry of Finance for refusing to fulfill his information request.\77\ On April 19, the court informed Ren that it would not accept his case.\78\ Two days later, Ren filed an appeal with the Beijing High People's Court.\79\ Media reports on incidents of pollution during the reporting period highlighted the lack of transparency in both the government's and industry's handling of information related to environmental disasters. Associated Press reporters covering a major oil spill after the explosion of a pipeline at a Dalian port quoted a Greenpeace statement as saying Greenpeace was ``surprised to see that the beaches have not been closed to visitors and lack any warning signs . . . . [a]s a result, locals and visitors unaware of the extent of the oil spill were playing in the water with their kids, risking exposure to petroleum.'' \80\ The New York Times reported that an American marine conservationist, who said he has seen ``spills all over the world,'' asserted that the magnitude of the spill was ``far more extensive than the official figures.'' \81\ Media reports on a July 3 wastewater pollution incident involving a copper mine in Fujian province owned by the Zijin Mining Group that reportedly led to the death of at least 2,000 tons of fish, include allegations by local residents of collusion between polluting enterprises and local authorities.\82\ According to a July 12, 2010, article by the Agence France-Presse, the Fujian province environmental protection bureau issued a statement saying it first detected the leak on July 3 and gave the order to begin monitoring it.\83\ The company, however, did not make a public announcement regarding the acid pollution until nine days after the incident occurred.\84\ The South China Morning Post reported that residents accused local authorities of covering up for the copper mining company after the July incident, and also after a similar smaller incident in June 2010.\85\ PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION During this reporting year, several developments occurred that are likely to impact decisions about who has standing to bring environmental public interest litigation cases in Chinese courts. For the first time, an environmental group initiated environmental administrative public interest lawsuits, and another group initiated an environmental administrative reconsideration case. The All-China Environment Federation (ACEF), a group that is ``overseen by the Ministry of Environmental Protection,'' brought two cases to China's special environmental courts, one against a local branch of a governmental ministry \86\ and the other against a private entity.\87\ Both ended in negotiated settlements. The cases mark an