Co bedzie dalej w zwiazku z nazwa ronda w Warszawie ?

.\47\ ANNUAL MEETINGS: NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE At the annual meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2010 (Two Sessions), the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo, discussed the plan to increase NPC and NPC Standing Committee supervision over governmental affairs, and NPC delegates expressed displeasure regarding some government work. Increasing NPC supervision of governmental affairs is one of the goals outlined in the HRAP.\48\ Wu said the NPC and the NPC Standing Committee would launch special topic ``inquiry and questioning'' work by inviting cadres from the State Council departments to sit in on meetings, listen to suggestions, and ``respond to inquiries, and answer questions'' regarding ``issues of broad concern to NPC delegates'' and the supervision of economic work.\49\ During the Two Sessions, NPC delegates expressed their displeasure about some government work: 479 delegates opposed the Supreme People's Court report and 411 delegates opposed the report on the work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.\50\ The 2009 Finance and 2010 Budget Report and the Government Work Report fared better with 317 and 36 opposing votes, respectively.\51\ In March, newspapers in two regions of China published editorials criticizing authorities for restricting lawmakers and political advisors' freedom of speech after a city government advisor admitted officials had pressured him during the Two Sessions to be cautious about discussing divisive policies.\52\ LOCAL PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCES: POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN GUANGZHOU ``Multi-party cooperation and political consultation'' purportedly take place among the Party, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and eight ``approved'' minor political parties.\53\ During this reporting year, the Guangzhou Municipal Central Party Committee issued a notice which provides for political consultation to be brought into the city's policy processes.\54\ Specifically, it provides for political consultation between the municipal Party committee and each of the eight ``approved'' political parties at the municipal level or between the municipal Party committee and the municipal-level people's political consultative conference regarding a variety of documents including important local laws and regulations, long-term municipal economic and social plans, and leadership choices.\55\ The notice outlines several consultative meeting types at which political consultation purportedly takes place.\56\ A Wei Wen Po article reported that this is the first instance of such an experiment in China, and if the experiment goes smoothly, officials reportedly will promote it throughout Guangdong province in the second half of 2010.\57\ Village Autonomy, Elections, and ``Democratic Management'' Authorities have established ``grassroots autonomy'' or village elections for village committees,\58\ and while village elections have spread throughout China, their implementation remains problematic. In a December 2009 interview with the People's Daily, a spokesperson for a department within the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) noted that in a small number of villages, there are several problems with the operations of village organizations.\59\ During this reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to implement plans to put in order open government affairs and ``democratic management'' in so-called ``difficult villages.'' Authorities in different regions label villages ``difficult'' for a variety of reasons. In Guizhou province, which reported that 3.13 percent of its villages were ``difficult villages,'' \60\ the category included villages that have not had successful village elections, had long-term problems with tensions between villagers and leaders, had longstanding issues with citizens taking grievances to higher authorities, or had problems with transparency of village affairs, among others.\61\ At a video conference in February 2009, authorities pointed out that 6 percent of the villages across the country are ``difficult villages'' and that local officials had been underreporting their numbers.\62\ In December 2009, authorities held a national meeting to share local authorities' experiences regarding open village affairs and ``democratic management'' in ``difficult villages'' across the country.\63\ The conference followed a plan issued by the MCA in July 2009 to resolve problems in ``difficult villages'' between 2009 and 2011 and a joint opinion issued in February 2009 by high-level authorities outlining the guiding ideology, principles, goals, responsibilities, and methods authorities link to transforming ``difficult villages.'' \64\ The National People's Congress Standing Committee reviewed draft amendments to the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees (Organic Law) in January and again in June \65\ in part to potentially strengthen Party control over villages and remedy problems with village elections and village governance. Proposed changes to the law, if passed, reportedly could mandate that villagers establish village affairs supervision mechanisms, make it easier for rural residents to remove village committee members, and make it simpler to convene village meetings to decide on village issues.\66\ In addition, there has been debate regarding a proposed change that would strengthen Party leadership over the running of village affairs.\67\ Authorities collected public comments on the draft law from the end of December 2009 to the end of January 2010.\68\ In February, authorities in Beijing attempted to prevent village leaders, who were attending a meeting in Beijing on February 25 to discuss the proposed amendments to the Organic Law, from holding a press conference. Police threatened one of the eight village leaders who planned to speak and prohibited the tea shop where the conference was to be held from opening. Two of the leaders found an alternate site and held the press conference there.\69\ Party and Government Accountability and Transparency ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION Corruption reportedly remains high and continues to be one of the top three concerns of Chinese citizens, according to a survey conducted since 2006 by the People's Daily Online.\70\ Transparency International gave China a score of 3.6 (out of a possible 10, which signifies ``highly clean'') on the organization's 2009 Corruption Perception Index, which is a measurement of the perceived levels of public sector corruption.\71\ During this reporting year, official discipline inspection and supervision entities from around the country reported receiving nearly 1.32 million complaints and information tips from citizens between January and November 2009, according to information from an official joint press conference.\72\ Prosecution entities reportedly investigated 2,687 government officials who were allegedly involved in three categories of cases in 2009: infringement of people's rights, graft, and malfeasance.\73\ In May 2010, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Supervision announced that 3,058 officials had received punishments ranging up to life imprisonment in cases concluded over a six-month period beginning in October 2009 for wrongdoings related to China's economic stimulus funds or construction projects.\74\ In addition, the Communist Party reportedly punished 5,241 individuals for issues relating to corruption involving economic stimulus funds.\75\ It is unclear how many officials were subject to both Party and government punishment. MEASURES TO CURB CORRUPTION AND PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY Authorities pledged in the 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan to stringently implement corruption prevention measures.\76\ Central and local Communist Party and Chinese government entities also issued new or revised corruption prevention measures related to the disclosure of assets,\77\ the closure of ``liaison offices'' in Beijing associated with local government lobbying efforts,\78\ and a revised ethics code.\79\ Chinese authorities have taken additional steps to encourage reporting of corruption. Whistleblower protections, however, remain insufficiently developed at this time. [For more information on whistleblower protections, see Section III--Access to Justice--Administrative Law Developments.] In October 2009, the Party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision established a new hotline to accept citizen tips and complaints about corruption.\80\ According to the Legal Daily, 70 percent or more of the cases of work-related offenses filed with procuratorate offices initially involved a tip from a citizen.\81\ Citizens who make allegations risk retribution. According to material from the Supreme People's Procuratorate reported by the Legal Daily, 70 percent of the people who filed tips with procuratorate offices were subject to various forms of retribution.\82\ According to the South China Morning Post, however, a procuratorate official said that fewer than 200 cases of retaliation were reported each year.\83\ The Legal Daily report indicated that some experts believe the law inadequately protects whistleblowers and that many forms of retribution technically are ``legal'' or are ``hidden.'' \84\ In one case of retribution in March 2010, police in Hubei province held Chen Yonggang for seven days of an eight-day detention on suspicion of ``defamation,'' after Chen used the Internet to question government budget choices that he believed were extravagant.\85\ Chen said he would not make such Internet postings again. County police reportedly will give Chen compensation for detaining him illegally.\86\ In June, Chinese lawmakers discussed a second draft of the revised Administrative Supervision Law proposal, which included a draft provision designed to provide legal protection for informants who report suspected official corruption.\87\ Chinese lawmakers and officials are considering institutional changes and measures to resolve other ongoing problems with official infringement of citizens' rights and to improve government accountability. Experts believe that a new round of training for county officials signals a continuing restructuring of county-level governance; the former system of ``accountability upwards'' will be modified to one of ``accountability downward.'' \88\ One official from the Party Construction Department of the Party Central Committee Party School noted that most mass incidents and frictions occur at the county level and stated that ``the capability of the county government to deal with such events is closely related to the stability of the whole country.'' \89\ During this reporting year, central officials urged local governments to eliminate local policies that could impinge on the rights of citizens. In May 2010, a Supreme People's Court vice president requested that local governments rapidly eliminate ``local policies'' that work to limit acceptance of administrative court suits.\90\ A May China News article pointed out that for years, administrative behavior has been a ``blind spot'' for judicial supervision, including local administrative policy documents or so-called ``red (letter) head documents'' issued by administrative organs at every level of government.\91\ The article noted that ``red (letter) head documents'' repeatedly have been found to be illegal, giving rise to numerous problems in administrative law; without examination for their legality, these documents could ``deprive citizens of their rights.'' \92\ During this reporting year, Guangdong province officials released for public comment a draft provision that would, if passed, limit the applicability of these ``red (letter) head documents'' to five years and restrict their scope in three areas.\93\ BUDGET TRANSPARENCY Chinese authorities at the central level urged local officials to share information about official budgets with the public, and citizens put pressure on government agencies to reveal their budgets. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests there is some variation in the willingness on the part of local government agencies to make their budgets public. In March 2010, the Ministry of Finance made public national budget figures for the second time since early 2009, and included more budget categories, which increased the length of the material issued publicly from 4 to 12 pages.\94\ Also in March, the National People's Congress (NPC) reportedly requested that all budgets approved by the NPC be made public, including the State Council's budget.\95\ During this reporting year, 45 Beijing municipal government agencies were to make public their budgets, and by a May deadline, most of those agencies reportedly did make information available on the Internet.\96\ Nevertheless, a news report suggested some experts and Beijing residents thought that the figures made public were not detailed enough nor presented clearly.\97\ In October 2009, Li Detao, a Shenzhen resident working with Public Budget Watch, a volunteer group, submitted open government information requests to government agencies in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Nanjing.\98\ The Bureau of Finance in Shanghai responded to Li Detao's requests but refused to provide him with the information he requested, declaring it a ``state secret.'' \99\ Officials at the Bureau of Finance in Guangzhou, however, called Li and informed him that the 2009 financial budgets for 114 agencies would be placed on the Internet.\100\ The report said Li believes that this is among the first times he has seen government agencies in a first- level (provincial-level) city make their budgets widely available to the public.\101\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Open Government Information ------------------------------------------------------------------------- In May 2008, the Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI Regulations) took effect.\102\ The OGI Regulations are part of China's anticorruption efforts and are intended to increase public access to information and expand public oversight and participation.\103\ The OGI Regulations require proactive disclosure of certain types of information by government agencies, allow for citizen requests for access to government information, and provide legal remedies for violations of the regulations. During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the State Council General Office issued an opinion and the Supreme People's Court (SPC) issued two opinions (one proposed) relating to the OGI Regulations. The State Council General Office's opinion was issued in January 2010. That opinion affirmed guidance found in a 2008 opinion \104\ allowing agencies to limit who may make an information request. Specifically, agencies may deny requests that do not relate to a requester's ``special needs'' in their ``production, livelihood, or scientific and technological research.'' \105\ The 2010 opinion also encourages agencies to release more information up front to reduce requests and to strengthen systems for determining whether information should be withheld on the grounds of state secrets or national, public, or economic security.\106\ In November 2009, the SPC released for public comment proposed measures concerning the hearing of administrative cases involving open government information (OGI).\107\ Within the month-long consultation period, the court collected 411 comments.\108\ Internet users and a Chinese professor expressed concern that the draft gives courts too much discretion to deny the release of information for reasons such as ``state secrets'' or so as not to disrupt ``normal administrative activities.'' \109\ That same month, the SPC issued an opinion dealing with administration litigation that calls on courts to ``vigorously accept'' new categories of cases, including OGI cases.\110\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Open Government Information--Continued ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chinese citizens reportedly have responded to the OGI Regulations with ``dynamism'' amidst ongoing challenges to their ``right to know.'' \111\ The latest annual work reports on OGI requests in some of China's larger cities reported numbers of requests received that ranged from thousands to hundreds of thousands.\112\ The level of detail provided on the disposition of requests varied. Shanghai, for example, provided information on why certain requests were denied, disclosing that 152 requests were denied because they involved ``state secrets.'' The efforts of one Shenzhen resident, Li Detao, to file OGI requests for budget information from the governments in different locales illustrates some lack of uniformity regarding the handling of OGI requests. Shanghai officials denied Li's request for budget information on state secret grounds while Guangzhou officials granted his request.\113\ Media stories reported that officials denied or had yet to respond to notable OGI requests, including one Shanghai resident's request for information about compensation for demolished homes,\114\ one regarding the death toll in and the costs associated with the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake,\115\ and one regarding Shanghai lawyer Yan Yiming's request on China's economic stimulus spending.\116\ Chinese and Western researchers have conducted studies assessing implementation of the OGI Regulations, with varying results.\117\ Results of at least one Chinese study and one joint Chinese-Western study showed variation in the effectiveness of government agencies in implementing the OGI Regulations.\118\ Studies highlighted the need to strengthen OGI mechanisms within government agencies and indicated that Chinese citizens' awareness and use of OGI mechanisms may be relatively low in some areas.\119\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Open Government Information--Continued ------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to the 2009 annual work reports from Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chongqing municipalities, the number of OGI lawsuits heard by courts in these jurisdictions numbered 147, 199, 3, and 1, respectively.\120\ Since Shanghai has had a local OGI regulation since 2004, there is some comparative data that shows that OGI-related lawsuits increased from 35 cases in 2006 to a high of 258 cases in 2008.\121\ Details regarding the disposition of the OGI court cases also varied.\122\ One Western expert on China's OGI noted that ``Chinese courts have frequently refused to accept lawsuits over information disclosure or have found in favor of the government.'' \123\ Chinese media reported on notable lawsuits. A June 2010 Democracy and Law article reported that Shanghai lawyer Li Honghua filed lawsuits against 80 provincial and city governments after he was dissatisfied with responses he received to his requests for information on government spending of a 4 trillion yuan (US$588 billion) stimulus package. Seven courts reportedly agreed to hear his case.\124\ In January 2010, a court in Wuhan concluded the city's first OGI case, ruling that an agency had violated the law by not responding to an information request within the legal time limit.\125\ In May, the Haidian District People's Court in Beijing ruled against a plaintiff who had requested information about the local environmental protection bureau's approval of a nearby medical waste incinerator, on the grounds that the plaintiff did not live close enough to the waste facility.\126\ [For more information on implementation of the OGI initiative in the environmental protection sector, see Section II-- Climate Change and the Environment.] Taken together, developments relating to the OGI regulations over the past year suggest that officials are seeking to provide greater clarity regarding how the regulations should be implemented, while citizen interest in requesting government information and seeking legal remedies for government inaction continues to grow. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Public Input on Draft Regulatory Instruments, Public Hearings Citizens and groups in China have little direct access to political decisionmaking processes; however, they are increasingly able to utilize various channels to express opinions regarding proposed policies and regulatory instruments. During this reporting year, authorities continued to signal they would expand public participation in policymaking related to issues involving the public interest. A March 2010 Legal Daily article outlined some of the channels through which experts and citizens can express their opinions about draft regulatory instruments including expert meetings, the Internet, and public participation in roundtables, discussion meetings, and public hearings.\127\ According to the article, authorities granted citizens the opportunity to submit suggestions on 67 administrative legal measures over a six-year period beginning in 2004.\128\ According to the same article, a spokesperson from the State Council Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO) said that since June 2007, authorities have made all administrative regulations, excluding those involving state secrets and national security, available in principle on the Internet and open for public comment.\129\ The U.S.-China Business Council released in April 2010 its annual review of China's compliance with its policies and its bilateral agreements that relate to transparency. The report noted that the NPC had complied with regulations stipulating it must allow a 30-day comment period on all draft laws at least once during the NPC's three-reading review process.\130\ It also noted, however, that the SCLAO had been inconsistent in publishing ``trade and economic-related administrative regulations and department rules'' for the 30-day public comment period.\131\ The SCLAO posted on its Web site only approximately 25 percent of the regulations and rules issued or posted for comment during the Council's report period, which represents a decline from the previous year.\132\ Citizens and the media continue to express concern regarding the implementation and impact of public hearings. Public hearings in China have expanded across the country since 1996 with the promulgation of China's Law on Administrative Punishment and offer limited opportunities for public engagement regarding various policy topics.\133\ During this reporting year, at least a few cities have issued local measures \134\ in order to implement a 2008 State Council decision directing cities and counties to expand the scope of public hearings and to establish a hearing system to solicit citizen opinions regarding laws, regulations, provisions, and major government administrative policies that are relevant to the interests of citizens.\135\ During this reporting year, several news articles reported that citizens were concerned about the implementation of water price hearings because of problems reported in several cases around the country.\136\ In some of these cases, relevant authorities tried to prevent critics from attending hearings or excluded certain groups of citizens that may be adversely affected by the proposed policy, leaving them with no opportunity to speak out, among several other issues.\137\ A Chinese university professor argued in a December 2009 China Daily commentary that the impact of public hearings on policy is limited.\138\ Commercial Rule of Law Introduction As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), China is bound by commitments outlined under both the WTO agreements and China's accession documents.\1\ During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, foreign investors in China have found an increasingly uneven playing field and lack of progress in China's compliance with WTO principles of transparency and national treatment, i.e., treating foreign and domestic companies equally with respect to goods, services, and intellectual property rights.\2\ The Chinese government's implementation of its WTO commitments, including those regarding transparency and non-discrimination, is a measure of the overall development of rule of law in China and of the Chinese government's willingness to abide by its international commitments. The Chinese government's record in meeting WTO commitments is mixed. When China joined the WTO, the Chinese government agreed to adhere to WTO transparency standards, under which all laws, regulations, and other measures relating to trade shall be published in a timely manner.\3\ According to China's two largest trading partners, the United States and the European Union, the Chinese government's current record in transparency is poor.\4\ Further, when joining the WTO in 2001, the Chinese government committed to ensuring that all trade-related measures would be administered in a non-discriminatory manner and that, under the principle of national treatment, foreign and domestically owned companies would be treated the same. However, the government has become increasingly protectionist in the period since 2008.\5\ One June 2010 report quoted the head of the U.S. delegation to the WTO as saying, ``China has become much more focused on developing industrial policy initiatives aimed at helping Chinese enterprises move up the value chain in key industries, and China has demonstrated a highly selective interest in continuing to open its market more fully and fairly to foreign participation.'' \6\ The foreign business community has found increased problems in the Chinese government's regulatory system and its application to business operations in China. The AmCham-China 2010 Business Climate Survey for the first time found ``inconsistent interpretation and implementation of laws'' to be the top challenge for the 318 members that responded to the survey.\7\ The survey also found increased concern over ``obtaining required licenses and national protectionism, coupled with consistent concern about bureaucracy in China . . . .'' \8\ The Chinese government has increasingly made use of industrial policies, which favor state-owned companies at the expense of foreign-owned companies,\9\ and in some cases, such as the auto parts import provisions of the 2004 Auto Industrial Policy, which are not in keeping with WTO requirements on non- discrimination.\10\ This jeopardizes equality before the law and neutral legal enforcement. Such use of industrial policies also negatively impacts transparency. Industrial Policies and Commercial Law Developments The Chinese government's use of industrial policies to direct economic growth, rather than strictly relying on market- based principles, hinders development of rule of law.\11\ Industrial policies lay out comprehensive frameworks for the government's direction of relevant sectors, providing, for example, details on subsidies and other benefits, restructuring of key industrial entities, financing, technological development, and export goals. Industrial policies are implemented through various measures, including laws and regulations, which in some instances do not comply with WTO requirements, as in the WTO case on the Chinese government's imposition of measures affecting the import of auto parts. In that case, the WTO dispute settlement body found in 2008 that certain provisions of China's Policy on Development of the Automotive Industry, together with implementing legislation, violated WTO rules.\12\ Under China's Protocol of Accession, the government agreed to provide comment periods for new legislation when possible.\13\ However, as industrial policies spell out the scope and direction of legislation, comments on the legislation may carry less weight, rendering the comment period less meaningful. Discussions of two industrial policies, cultural industrial policy and automotive policy, follow below. Industrial Policy--Cultural Industry During this reporting year, the Chinese government moved forward with a plan for promoting the so-called cultural industry through subsidies and other forms of support and guidance, passing legislation, and arranging financing in the sector. In July 2009, China Daily reported that the State Council had adopted a plan for the industry's development in light of the financial crisis,\14\ and on September 26, 2009, the central government published the Plan to Vigorously Promote the Cultural Industry (Plan).\15\ The Plan covers filmmaking, publishing, printing and reproduction, advertising, the performing arts and entertainment, animation, cultural exhibitions, and digitalization,\16\ and lists a number of policy measures for the Chinese government to take to further develop the industry, including, for example, financing, reforming the state-owned cultural entities, preferential land use and tax policies, development of creative industry parks, assistance with exporting, provision of subsidies, and investment.\17\ The Plan was issued within two months after the panel established by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body reported its findings in a case concerning Chinese regulation of importation and distribution of certain foreign cultural products.\18\ In that case, the WTO panel found Chinese regulations restricting the ability of foreign companies and Chinese-foreign joint ventures to import or distribute reading materials, audiovisual home entertainment products, and sound recordings, or to import films for theatrical performances, violated WTO rules.\19\ Though an industrial plan lays out the framework for the development of the sector, it is implemented through legislation and other similar measures by responsible government departments. During the period since the issuance of the Plan, government departments have issued a number of implementation measures. In September 2009, the Ministry of Culture--the ministry with overall supervisory responsibility for the industry--published its Guiding Opinion Concerning Speeding Up Development of the Cultural Industry (Guiding Opinion).\20\ The Guiding Opinion was dated September 10, but was not published until after the State Council announced the Plan, and sets out additional details on the covered industries and on the means to accelerate development of the industry. Financing. The Plan to Vigorously Promote the Cultural Industry (Plan) calls for financing of the industry.\21\ In September 2009, a report indicated that the central government would establish a fund to invest in the cultural industry and that China Film would be recommended for listing on China's stock exchange.\22\ The China Securities Journal reported on March 30, 2010, six months after the issuance of the Plan, that the domestic entertainment and media industry would grow 9.5 percent annually but noted that cultural enterprises in China still had trouble obtaining financing.\23\ On April 8, the central bank and nine other government departments issued the Guidance on Financial Support To Reinvigorate and Develop the Culture Industry, which related to providing financing to support the cultural industry.\24\ Exports. The Plan calls for expanding trade in Chinese cultural products and for Chinese cultural products to have greater influence on international markets.\25\ In 2010, 6 government departments accredited 211 printing and reproduction companies as Major Culture Export Enterprises and 255 printing and reproduction projects as Major Culture Export Projects, which the Ministry of Commerce would support to become more competitive on export markets.\26\ Sectoral policies. During this reporting year, government departments in charge of particular cultural sectors issued measures implementing the Plan. For example, in January 2010, the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) issued a guiding opinion for the development of printed materials, digital and non-paper media, animation and electronic games, and press and publications distribution and logistics; \27\ the Ministry of Culture accredited 100 enterprises as Animation Enterprises, eligible for preferential tax policies; \28\ and the State Council issued Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Development of a Flourishing Movie Industry.\29\ In March, GAPP worked out a plan for international best sellers.\30\ Regulation of markets. The Chinese government regulates the cultural industry strictly, as evidenced by the strict censorship prevalent in China.\31\ In December 2009, the Ministry of Commerce issued a notice on special management of the cultural markets during the New Year and the weeklong Spring Festival, including supervising online games and Internet cafes, online music and cell phone music, and lip- syncing and unlawful performances.\32\ [For information on censorship in China, see Section II--Freedom of Expression.] Industrial Policy--Automotive During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government revised its 2004 Auto Industrial Policy, and implemented its Auto Stimulus Program, which it had issued in March 2009.\33\ The dramatic development of China's auto sector has been guided by China's 2004 Auto Industrial Policy.\34\ The policy sets out comprehensive guidelines for China's auto industry, including the development and acquisition of technology, structural adjustment of the auto sector through the formation of large corporate groups, foreign investment in the sector, growth in the domestic auto market, and automobile exports.\35\ In 2006, the United States, European Union, and Canada challenged certain provisions of China's auto policy concerning tariff rates applicable to the import of auto parts and assemblies, and the legislation implementing these provisions, at the WTO.\36\ The WTO dispute panel found that the provisions discriminated against imported auto parts and thus were inconsistent with WTO requirements.\37\ The Chinese government appealed the panel's ruling, which subsequently was upheld by the WTO Appellate Body. Accordingly, the panel requested that the government bring the auto parts import provisions of the policy, as well as its implementing legislation, into conformity with WTO obligations by September 1, 2009.\38\ The government did so in August 2009, effective September 1, 2009.\39\ In the five years from the issuance of the policy till the import provisions were revised, foreign automakers with factories in China started buying parts produced in China, in part because of the discriminatory measures.\40\ Both the auto policy and the Program for the Adjustment and Rejuvenation of the Auto Industry call for development of automotive technology through a combination of imported technology and independent research and development, or indigenous innovation.\41\ Chinese companies' overseas acquisitions, including state-owned Beijing Automotive's acquisition of rights to certain Saab technology from General Motors in December 2009 \42\ and Zhejiang Geely's purchase of Volvo from Ford in March 2010 (financed in large part by Chinese state-owned banks), have provided access to foreign technology.\43\ Transparency The Chinese government's implementation of its WTO transparency commitments has been uneven. In its Protocol of Accession to the WTO, the government committed to publish all laws, regulations, or other measures affecting trade, to allow a reasonable comment period before implementation, and to establish or designate an official journal for this purpose.\44\ The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in a 2010 report notes that while the State Council issued regulations in 2001 requiring comment periods and hearings, ``only a small proportion of new or revised laws and regulations have been issued after a period for public comment, and even in these cases the amount of time provided for public comment generally has been short.'' \45\ According to the USTR report, a 2006 State Council notice directed all government authorities to send trade-related rules to the Ministry of Commerce for publication in its gazette, but compliance with this requirement is ``far from complete.'' \46\ The USTR's finding is similar to the April 2010 analysis conducted by the US-China Business Council on transparency in China.\47\ China's transparency obligations have been the subject of several dialogues between the U.S. and Chinese governments.\48\ Most recently, at a meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade in October 2009, both governments agreed to continue to cooperate and to develop a workplan on transparency for 2009-2010.\49\ [For more information on transparency, see box titled Open Government Information in Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance.] Government Procurement In 2009, Chinese government procurement exceeded 700 billion yuan (US$147 billion).\50\ This is an area of importance to Chinese citizens and to non-Chinese companies alike. As noted in a WTO overview, ``Procurement systems have a significant impact on the efficiency of the use of public funds and, more generally, on public confidence in government and on good governance.'' \51\ When China joined the WTO, the Chinese government made several commitments related to government procurement, including that it would begin negotiations to join the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) under the WTO ``as soon as possible.'' \52\ While there has been some minimal progress toward this end, it is still subject to negotiation.\53\ During this reporting year, the Chinese government continued to develop legislation to improve its procurement system for domestic companies. In January 2010, the government issued for comment draft Implementation Rules for the 2003 Government Procurement Law,\54\ which clarify certain open issues in the law. According to a China Daily report, the draft ``is aimed at specifying the law, including details over domestic goods in government procurement, to further fight any corruption in the purchasing process.'' \55\ The draft rules specify when the procuring party should withdraw from a procurement proceeding because of a relationship to the supplier, and provide details on the definition of domestic goods, projects, and services. On May 21, 2010, four Chinese government departments issued the Notice on Collecting Public Comments on Administrative Measures for Government Procurement of Domestically Made Products.\56\ The draft clarifies that domestic goods and services include products of foreign- invested companies in China.\57\ Indigenous Innovation The Chinese government's use of industrial policy intersects with government procurement in the area of indigenous innovation. China's industrial policies have called for Chinese domestic development and ownership of technology.\58\ The government's policy on indigenous innovation is directed toward encouraging technological development in certain key sectors of the economy, with final consideration the development of potential exports, as well as substitution of products using Chinese technology for imported products using non-Chinese technology. Although indigenous innovation policy only applies to government procurement at the central level, there are concerns with the policy's application at the provincial and local levels.\59\ Although the Chinese government has encouraged indigenous innovation since at least 2007,\60\ there has been significant regulatory activity during this reporting year, which has led to widespread concern from the international business community and to high-level United States and China discussions of indigenous innovation. In November 2009, three Chinese government departments issued the Circular on Launching 2009 National Indigenous Innovation Accreditation Work,\61\ requiring companies to apply by December 2009 for their products to be ``accredited'' as qualifying for government procurement. The circular, which covers six broad categories of products in high technology, or new energy or energy efficient areas, provided that only products using intellectual property initially registered in China would be eligible for accreditation.\62\ In December 2009, four government departments issued the Catalogue Guiding Domestic Innovation in Major Technology Equipment, which listed products that could be certified as indigenous innovation products, eligible for certain procurement preferences.\63\ Although China is not a member of the WTO GPA, the policies potentially raise market access or intellectual property issues under the WTO.\64\ Foreign government response to the December documents was negative,\65\ and perhaps in response, on April 10, 2010, the Chinese government issued a draft notice without the requirement that intellectual property first be registered in China.\66\ Other issues remain, including the resolution of conflicts between national policies and local-level government decisions on indigenous innovation,\67\ and a group of large American, Canadian, and European business associations submitted a letter to the Chinese government commenting on the draft, urging China to join the GPA, and urging the Chinese government ``not to publish the indigenous innovation product list and not to carry forward this program.'' \68\ Intellectual Property Rights China's record on protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) remained poor during this reporting year. China is on the U.S. Government's Priority Watch List for 2010, and named in the Special 301 Report of April 30, 2010, which notes, ``China's IPR enforcement regime remains largely ineffective and non-deterrent.'' \69\ According to the report, ``IPR enforcement at the local level is hampered by poor coordination among Chinese ministries and agencies, local protectionism and corruption, high thresholds for initiating investigations and prosecuting criminal cases, lack of training, and inadequate and non-transparent processes.'' \70\ In October 2009, revisions to China's Patent Law went into effect, and in February 2010, revisions to the Patent Law's implementing rules went into effect.\71\ While the revisions provide some clarification, the Special 301 Report notes some concerns, ``including the effect of disclosure of origin requirements on patent validity, inventor remuneration, and the scope of and procedures relating to compulsory licensing, among other matters.'' \72\ The National People's Congress revised the Copyright Law, effective April 1, 2010, to close a loophole on the scope of protection and to add an article concerning registration of pledges of copyright.\73\ To implement the law's language on pledges of copyright, the National Copyright Administration issued for comments a draft Measure for Registration of Copyright Pledge on April 26, 2010.\74\ According to the Supreme People's Court (SPC) 2009 Annual Report on Intellectual Property Cases, there were 440 IPR cases pending before the SPC in 2009, an increase of 33.7 percent over 2008.\75\ The SPC concluded 390 IPR cases in 2009, an increase of 111.96 percent over 2008.\76\ A Chinese court ruled that Microsoft had infringed the rights of Chinese software maker Zhongyi Electronics in November 2009.\77\ However, in April 2010, Microsoft won a major case against a Chinese insurance company, Dazhong Insurance, which was using pirated copies of Microsoft software.\78\ Dazhong indicated it would appeal the ruling, accusing Microsoft of acting monopolistically.\79\ Antimonopoly Law During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, two of the three government departments charged with enforcing China's 2008 Antimonopoly Law (AML) issued implementing legislation. To clarify the merger control procedures, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued two sets of measures on concentrations of businesses, both of which came into effect on January 1, 2010.\80\ The State Administration for Industry and Commerce on May 25, 2010, issued three draft rules for comment, covering monopoly agreements, abuse of dominance, and administrative monopolies.\81\ If promulgated, the draft rules will provide greater clarity on the types of conduct forbidden by the AML. The AML has the potential to enhance competition in the Chinese economy and to benefit Chinese consumers, but may conflict with Chinese industrial policies encouraging the development of large domestic companies and protecting state- owned enterprises. A comparison of MOFCOM's merger rulings in cases involving non-Chinese companies with MOFCOM's lack of review of mergers of large Chinese state-owned companies highlights this conflict. During this reporting year, MOFCOM has blocked or given conditional approvals to a number of deals involving foreign companies, in some cases forcing global companies to divest assets outside of China.\82\ In the period since the AML came into effect in August 2008 to the end of 2009, MOFCOM has completed 60 merger reviews, 6 of which MOFCOM approved with conditions, and 1 of which MOFCOM blocked. MOFCOM only publishes rulings on mergers that it rejects or approves with conditions, so it is difficult to tell whether the parties to unconditionally approved mergers are state-owned enterprises or non-Chinese companies. The six that were conditionally approved involved mergers between non-Chinese parties.\83\ This has led some multinationals to believe the AML ``is being used as a tool to protect domestic rivals from competition and suspect that--unlike in the US, EU and Japan--merger reviews are open to industrial policy considerations.'' \84\ However, as a matter of industrial policy, the Chinese government intends to create large ``national champions,'' for example, in automobiles and steel.\85\ Indeed, the 2008 merger of two large state-owned enterprises, China Unicom and China Netcom, was large enough to trigger a merger filing with MOFCOM but, reportedly, none was filed.\86\ Food Safety and Product Quality FOOD SAFETY Following the passage of China's Food Safety Law in March 2009 and implementing legislation \87\ during this reporting year, the Chinese government continued to develop its food safety regime, though problems remain. The Chinese government issued regulations on food additives and on monitoring food safety and a rectification plan for the catering industry, and established a high-level Food Safety Commission headed by Vice Premier Li Keqiang to coordinate the work of government departments involved in food safety.\88\ Nonetheless, there still are risks in the food supply, according to a report by Radio Free Asia, as indicated by recent cases of poisoned chives and dyed beans.\89\ The report notes that analysts point to several problems, including poor government supervision, lack of coordination among departments, and lack of compensation.\90\ Parents of the children sickened by the contaminated Sanlu milk in 2008 continue to seek redress.\91\ Zhao Lianhai, who organized a group representing the parents and is a parent of a sickened child, was tried in March for ``inciting social disorder,'' according to his lawyer.\92\ Four parents, unable to obtain redress in China, sued in small claims court in Hong Kong in April 2010.\93\ However, the Hong Kong court refused the case on jurisdictional grounds.\94\ PRODUCT QUALITY Problems with the quality of Chinese products are well known outside China, with recent cases of toxic sofas exported to England, reported cadmium in children's jewelry imported into the United States, and toxic drywall imported into the United States.\95\ The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine has taken some steps, including setting up a blacklist system in January 2010 for companies with illegal quality problems, and announced plans to establish a recall system for home appliances this year.\96\ Tort Liability Law The National People's Congress Standing Committee passed the Tort Liability Law in December 2009.\97\ The law took effect July 1, 2010, and covers product liability and product recalls.\98\ The law provides for punitive damages where a producer or seller of a defective product has knowledge of the defect, but still produces or sells the product, and it causes serious injury or death.\99\ Exchange Rate Policy and Export Restraints The value of the Chinese yuan continues to be the subject of criticism and concern among policymakers and the general public in the United States and around the world. Article XV(4) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides that contracting parties ``shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of [the GATT], nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.'' \100\ The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) state that ``each member shall . . . avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members[.]'' \101\ From July 2008 till June 2010, China maintained a yuan- dollar exchange rate of about 6.83 yuan to the dollar.\102\ According to one economist, this has given Chinese manufacturing ``a large cost advantage over its rivals, leading to huge trade surpluses.'' \103\ On June 19, 2010, just before a G-20 meeting, Chinese officials made statements concerning greater exchange rate flexibility for the yuan.\104\ As of the end of August 2010, however, there has been no real change. According to a July 8 Treasury Department report, ``China's continued foreign reserve accumulation, the limited appreciation of China's real effective exchange rate relative to rapid productivity growth in the traded goods sector, and the persistence of current account surpluses even during a period when China's trading partners were in deep recession together suggest that the renminbi remains undervalued.'' \105\ During this reporting year, the United States challenged China's restraints on exports of certain key input materials at the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), these restraints tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese manufacturers by lowering prices of inputs to manufacturers in China, giving them a competitive price advantage.\106\ When it joined the WTO, China committed to eliminate export restraints, with certain exceptions enumerated in China's WTO accession documents.\107\ However, according to a 2010 USTR report on foreign trade barriers, ``China has increased the artificial advantages afforded to its downstream producers by making the export quotas more restrictive and by imposing or increasing export duties on many raw materials at issue.'' \108\ The United States brought a WTO challenge against China over export restraints on nine materials used in the manufacture of steel and chemicals, joined by the European Union and other third parties.\109\ In March 2010, the Director-General of the WTO composed a panel to hear the case,\110\ and in May, the panel made certain preliminary rulings in response to a request by China.\111\ There are reports that USTR is considering a separate WTO case against China concerning its restraints on exports of rare earth metals, which are essential for production of certain high technology products,\112\ and are the found in many products, including, for example, ``iPads, BlackBerries, plasma TVs, lasers, wind turbines, hybrid engines, and smart bombs.'' \113\ USTR cited the policies on rare earths during China's 2009 Transitional Review Mechanism.\114\ In 2009, China supplied about 97 percent of the global demand for rare earths.\115\ However, China has cut its export quotas, decreasing its rare earth shipments for the second half of 2010 by 72 percent,\116\ and is planning to consolidate domestic production in a few Chinese companies.\117\ Foreign companies are not allowed to engage in rare earth prospecting or mining in China,\118\ but can enter into rare earth smelting or refining joint ventures with Chinese partners.\119\ Property Under China's Constitution and system of property law, land is categorized into ``urban land'' and rural, or ``collectively-owned land.'' \120\ Urban land is owned by the state.\121\ Urban land cannot be sold, but the state can grant the right to use urban land for a term of years upon payment of a land grant premium. The period of the grant is 70 years for land classified as residential, 50 years for industrial, and 40 years for recreational/tourism/commercial.\122\ While only the state can grant urban land use rights, a grantee can transfer such rights. The parties cannot, however, change the type of usage, i.e., residential, industrial, or recreational/tourism/ commercial. Collectively owned land can be used only for agricultural purposes, or for residences or services for farmers, who can enter into land use contracts with the collective for a period of 30 years.\123\ China's real property system raises both commercial rule of law and human rights issues. During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, there were many cases of expropriation and abuses by local governments and property developers, including forced evictions.\124\ The International Federation for Human Rights notes that there are no statistics on the number of evictions in China but states that, according to the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, ``at least 1,25 million households were demolished and nearly 3,7 million people were evicted'' in the period from 1997 to 2007.\125\ Land disputes, especially forced evictions, are a major cause of social unrest in China.\126\ As a commercial matter, the supply of land, including through conversion of collectively owned land into urban land for industrial use, is necessary for China's economic development and the land sales provide revenue for the government.\127\ According to one ``semiofficial'' estimate, revenue from land sales makes up as much as 60 percent of local government revenue.\128\ Further, according to at least one expert, the Chinese government subsidizes production by its state-owned enterprises in part by providing them with free or undervalued land.\129\ This brings down costs, making Chinese exports more competitive internationally. EXPROPRIATION OF URBAN AND RURAL LAND, COMPENSATION, AND ABUSES The dramatic changes in Chinese land law since the country's founding in 1949 have resulted in conflicting regulations, and in many cases, unclear title, which coupled with the rapid rise in property values, has led to widespread demolitions and evictions.\130\ In some cases, there is collusion between local officials and property developers, for example, through officials' ownership interests in the property developers, or through family relationships.\131\ Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which the Chinese government has ratified, provides for the right to housing, and General Comment 4, paragraph 18, adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1991, provides that ``instances of forced evictions are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant and can only be justified in the most exceptional circumstances.'' \132\ Urban Land Expropriation Expropriation of urban land for redevelopment is governed by China's Constitution and legislation including the 2007 Property Law, the 2004 Law on Administration of Urban Real Property, and the 2001 Regulations on Government Housing Demolition in Urban Areas (2001 Demolition Regulations).\133\ The Property Law allows expropriation of urban land in the ``public interest,'' subject to compensation for demolition and resettlement.\134\ After the Property Law came into effect, the Law on Administration of Urban Real Property was revised to add a new Article 6, providing that the state may expropriate urban land in the ``public interest,'' subject to granting compensation to the rights holder. Neither law defines the term ``public interest,'' which allows abuse of expropriation.\135\ Article 6 further provides that when an individual's residence is expropriated, that individual's living conditions should be protected.\136\ There has been widespread abuse in the process of expropriation of urban land, with forced evictions, lack of adequate compensation, and poor procedural protection.\137\ Owners who refuse to leave their homes in some cases have been harassed, beaten, or illegally detained.\138\ There have been countless cases of forced eviction reported in the press,\139\ including the case of a Sichuan woman who set herself on fire in November 2009 to protest the demolition of her home.\140\ This case triggered a debate among Chinese Internet users concerning forced demolitions.\141\ In December 2009, five law professors from Peking University sent an open letter to the National People's Congress calling for the repeal or amendment of the 2001 Demolition Regulations, which they said violate the Constitution and the Property Law.\142\ In January 2010, the government issued for public comment draft Regulations for Expropriation and Compensation of Residential Buildings on State Owned Land.\143\ The draft provides that evictions must be in the ``public interest'' and sets out seven categories of public interest, such as national defense installations.\144\ However, the draft allows expropriation other than in the public interest in certain circumstances where the developers get permission from the relevant government departments.\145\ The draft contains procedures for expropriation with greater protection for evicted residents, including public comment periods and better terms of compensation payment and calculation. At least two of the law professors who had called for the amendment considered the draft an improvement, though it allows certain demolitions that do not meet the public interest requirement and it does not cover expropriation of collectively owned land.\146\ As of July 2010 the draft had not been passed. One of the five professors, Jiang Ming'an, told the South China Morning Post that, ``if the draft regulation goes into effect, the western provinces would barely be able to attract investment, as real estate developers would find it difficult to acquire land under the new rules.'' Noting the reliance of local governments on income from land sales, Jiang said that ``less government revenue could affect the implementation of projects that aim to improve people's livelihoods.'' \147\ The government has issued other documents since the publication of the draft in January 2010 to address problems with forced evictions, including a State Council directive issued in May to stop forced demolition and a Ministry of Land and Resources notice issued in July to local governments concerning compensation to homeowners.\148\ In May, China Daily reported that the State Council had ordered localities to put in place land compensation standards before July.\149\ Expropriation of Collectively Owned Land The draft Regulations for Expropriation and Compensation of Residential Buildings on State Owned Land apply to urban land only, leaving rural residents with a lower level of protection than that provided by the draft.\150\ Many of the disputes leading to mass protests involve collectively owned land around major cities.\151\ Though farmers can enter into 30-year contracts with their collectives for use of collectively owned land,\152\ in some cases, the village committee takes the land back to ``reallocate'' it.\153\ In other cases, the village committee, local government, and developer conspire to convert land into urban land, which the local government can then sell to the developer.\154\ Finally, the Property Law mandates payment of compensation for the land, fixtures, and crops; subsidies for resettlement; and premiums for the farmers' social security.\155\ Often, these amounts are paid to the village committee, and in some cases, very little reaches the original inhabitants.\156\ COOLING AN OVERHEATING PROPERTY MARKET During the reporting year, the Chinese government took a number of measures at the national and local levels to cool the property market and curb speculation, and the Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection issued rules to stop officials from ``meddling in the real estate industry,'' in a nod to corruption in the construction sector.\157\ These efforts were against the backdrop of a surge in property prices of 23.6 percent in 2009.\158\ In January 2010, the State Council issued a notice ordering local governments to curb speculation and provide affordable housing for residents.\159\ In April, the State Council issued the Circular on Determined Suppression of the Exceedingly Rapid Rise of Certain Urban Housing Prices.\160\ The Bank of China announced that, in principle, it would stop issuing home loans to purchasers who already owned two or more homes,\161\ and reportedly the Chinese government planned to put a moratorium on real estate firms raising capital.\162\ The Ministry of Land and Resources issued the Circular on Issues Relevant To Strengthening the Supply and Regulation of Land Use for Real Property in March 2010.\163\ A number of localities, including Hainan, Chongqing, Beijing, and Shanghai, introduced measures as well.\164\ Access to Justice Introduction During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Commission observed instances in which Chinese officials failed to meet international and domestic standards in upholding and protecting citizens' access to justice. International human rights standards require effective remedies for official violations of citizen rights. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: ``Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.'' \1\ Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed but not yet ratified, requires that all parties to the ICCPR ensure that persons whose rights or freedoms are violated ``have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.'' \2\ China's Constitution similarly provides protections, under Article 41, for citizens seeking to petition or criticize the Chinese government for ``violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary.'' \3\ Chinese citizens, particularly disadvantaged groups--such as ethnic minorities, religious adherents, and laid-off workers--however, continue to face substantial obstacles in seeking remedies for violations of their legal rights by government entities and officials. During this reporting year, international media and domestic news sources widely reported on a range of systemic obstacles to justice, from the official targeting of human rights advocates to the unlawful detention of petitioners. The National People's Congress Standing Committee issued laws and regulations--including a revision to the State Compensation Law and a new Mediation Law--which, if faithfully and effectively enforced, may improve access to justice for Chinese citizens in the future. However, the Chinese government's policy of targeting Chinese human rights defenders and lawyers that handle ``sensitive'' case work continued unabated, jeopardizing the potential of these reforms to produce positive results.\4\ Systemic abuses within China's xinfang (letters and visits), or petitioning, system continue to reflect official unwillingness to protect the legal rights of Chinese citizens.\5\ Administrative Law Developments During this reporting year, the Chinese government continued to promote administrative law reforms that reportedly aim to provide greater oversight of state agencies, protect citizen interests, and enhance supervision of government employees. The administrative law system in China, however, remains beset with fundamental institutional challenges. For instance, although the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) gives Chinese citizens the right to file lawsuits to challenge ``concrete'' administrative acts that violate their lawful rights and interests, Chinese media sources have consistently criticized difficulties within the legal system that undermine the effectiveness of the ALL.\6\ In November 2009, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) addressed concerns over administrative litigation by issuing an opinion on the protection of administrative litigants, which aims to strengthen the system for accepting administrative cases and to resolve ``complainant difficulties.'' \7\ In May 2010, however, the Legal Daily criticized the ``chronic [justice] problems'' that exist in administrative lawsuits (commonly referred to as ``citizens sue officials''), due in part to the problem of lower level courts creating policies to restrict citizens from exercising administrative litigation rights.\8\ According to a May 2010 article in the Southern Metropolis Daily, the low success rate of administrative lawsuits not only reflects the reality of ``citizen-official'' power dynamics, but also demonstrates the ``awkwardness'' of the ALL.\9\ The article notes that even when plaintiffs win their cases, the ``difficulty of implementing'' the decisions remains.\10\ In addition, in June 2010, Chinese officials announced that revisions to the Administrative Reconsideration Law (ARL) would be included in the 2010 annual legislative agenda of the State Council.\11\ The ARL allows Chinese citizens to submit an application to State Council departments for administrative review of specific government actions that violate the applicant's legal rights and interests.\12\ In July, a China University of Politics and Law professor said the scope of the ARL should be expanded: ``the scope of administrative reconsideration cases should be broader than the scope of administrative litigation--except where otherwise provided by law, any administrative influence over the rights of citizens should be included within the scope of reconsideration.'' \13\ In July, Gao Fengtao, Deputy Director of the State Council's Legislative Affairs Office, told official news media: ``Although administrative reconsideration has made significant progress and achieved significant results, the functional role of the administrative reconsideration system has yet to be effectively developed.'' \14\ In April 2010, the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) adopted the first revision to the 1994 State Compensation Law (SCL) in more than 15 years.\15\ The amendments to the SCL reportedly will expand the scope of state liability and grant citizens greater ability to obtain compensation.\16\ The revised SCL, which will go into effect in December 2010, includes amendments that will allow citizens to claim compensation for psychological injury, will enhance detainees' protections by allowing compensation when authorities sanction the mistreatment of criminal suspects in detention centers, and will shift the burden of proof to authorities when a detainee dies or is incapacitated, so that officials will now be required to provide evidence demonstrating they were not responsible.\17\ Under the revised SCL, victims will be allowed to apply directly for compensation; the current SCL stipulates ``victims should first apply for state compensation at the department which caused the loss, and . . . in some cases, the citizen must first obtain written acknowledgement of violation from the department before applying for compensation.'' \18\ The April amendments come after years of criticism over the SCL's effectiveness. The law, which had been dubbed the ``Non-Compensation Law'' by many due to its complicated procedures, underwent one draft amendment in 2008 and two in 2009.\19\ In 2009, Chinese courts tried a total of 1,531 cases in which citizens applied for state compensation.\20\ Only one-third of the complainants, however, received compensation, according to the Southern Metropolis Daily.\21\ The recently revised SCL received some public criticism for not including earlier draft recommendations on prolonged detention, which would have allowed for state compensation in cases where criminal suspects were detained wrongly within the period stipulated by the Criminal Procedure Law (up to a total of 37 days).\22\ In June 2010, the NPCSC endorsed amendments to the Administrative Supervision Law (ASL), which entered into effect on October 1, 2010.\23\ The ASL fulfills an important function in China's national legal system, stipulating measures that bolster administrative control, cover government oversight, and boost agency efficiency. The revised ASL aims to expand the scope of supervision from administrative agencies to those more broadly involved in public management activities. In addition, if properly implemented, the ASL will improve the monitoring of agencies by strengthening the responsibility to protect whistleblowers and by stipulating that individuals who reveal an informant's personal information may be punished according to the law.\24\ The issue of retaliation against whistleblowers has become a serious problem for the law's implementation--the Supreme People's Procuratorate revealed in late June that ``approximately 70 percent of informants suffered varying degrees of retaliation or covert retaliation.'' \25\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Mediation Reform: The People's Mediation Law ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the 2010 reporting year, the Commission observed ongoing government efforts to advance and expand China's system of dispute settlement through mediation.\26\ China's official state media claim that local-level mediation of civil disputes has existed in China for ``thousands of years.'' \27\ In recent years, however, the Chinese government has promoted an official ``great mediation'' (da tiaojie) campaign nationally in part to relieve pressure on courts amid what has been deemed a ``litigation explosion.'' \28\ According to a Ministry of Justice official, by the end of 2009, the country had 4.94 million mediators (renmin tiaojie yuan) and 824,000 mediation organizations (renmin tiaojie zuzhi).\29\ In June 2010, Xinhua reported that these organizations handled 7.67 million cases in 2009 and that less than one percent of mediated cases went on to litigation.\30\ In 2009, Sichuan Province mediated 527,000 disputes, which the government claimed contributed to a 23.5 percent drop in ``mass incidents'' and a 47.3 percent decline in grievances filed through the petition (xinfang) system.\31\ In January, Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang affirmed the Sichuan model on mediation and called on officials to do more to eliminate and resolve disputes at the grassroots level.\32\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Mediation Reform: The People's Mediation Law--Continued ------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the reporting year, the Chinese government moved to streamline mediation procedures.\33\ Most notably, on August 28, 2010, the National People's Congress Standing Committee passed the first People's Mediation Law (PML), which will take effect on January 1, 2011.\34\ In presenting the draft law for approval in June, Minister of Justice Wu Aiying told the Standing Committee that ``Mediation should be the first line of defence to maintain social stability and promote harmony.'' \35\ The PML stipulates the legal basis for establishing mediation committees as the organizations charged with resolving disputes.\36\ The PML stipulates, for instance, procedures on the creation of mediation committees within village committees (cunmin weiyuanhui) and neighborhood committees (jumin weiyuanhui).\37\ The PML also requires local-level governments to provide financial support for mediation work.\38\ Some observers, however, have pointed out possible shortcomings in the new People's Mediation Law. Article 14, for instance, stipulates that mediation committees must select mediators that are ``impartially upright and enthusiastic in carrying out the people's mediation work.'' \39\ It further states that the mediators must possess the ``certain level of education, policy and legal knowledge of adult citizens.'' \40\ The PML, however, does not specify professional qualifications or procedures for how committees will determine impartiality.\41\ Critics of the PML have expressed concern with how the new law will ensure mediation outcomes are enforced.\42\ In July 2010, a Beijing Youth Daily article pointed out that ``the courts are strongly pushing mediated settlements, but the rate of voluntary execution for mediated settlements is far less than that for litigated settlements.'' \43\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders During its 2010 reporting year, the Commission noted ongoing official efforts to discourage, intimidate, and physically harm human rights lawyers and defenders who took on issues officials deemed ``sensitive.'' In what activists have said is a ``widespread official clampdown'' on human rights defenders, Chinese authorities targeted human rights lawyers with extralegal detention, administrative punishments, and harassment. In April 2010, Chinese officials announced even greater restrictive measures on the legal profession.\44\ The whereabouts and condition of prominent human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who gained international attention for representing marginalized citizens and religious practitioners, remain unknown. On March 28, 2010, Gao reportedly resurfaced at Wutai Mountain, a sacred Buddhist landmark in Shanxi province, after ``disappearing'' into the custody of public security officers in February 2009.\45\ In early April 2010, Gao gave several interviews to foreign reporters, claiming he had been ``released'' months earlier and planned to end his human rights campaigning in hopes of reuniting with his family.\46\ Weeks later, however, Gao ``vanished'' again, after visiting with family in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.\47\ The disappearance of Gao has raised concerns internationally about the Chinese government's willingness to silence critics. In a May 2010 Wall Street Journal op-ed, Professor Jerome Cohen of New York University Law School and Beth Schwanke, Legislative Counsel for Freedom Now, stated that ``[i]f the government can act with impunity toward a lawyer as prominent as Gao Zhisheng . . . other dissidents will continue to be `disappeared,' as have many protesters unknown to the outside world.'' \48\ As noted in the Commission's 2009 Annual Report, law firms and legal advocacy organizations faced similar challenges in advocating on behalf of their clients and human rights topics. The Beijing Yitong Law Firm, a firm well known for taking on ``matters deemed sensitive by the authorities,'' remained inactive after Chinese authorities shut down the law firm for six months in March 2009.\49\ In March 2010, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that Beijing's Anhui Law Firm, a human rights law firm that failed its annual examination and evaluation in May 2009, was forced to move from its Chongwen district offices after Bureau of Justice and Public Security Bureau officials pressured the firm's landlord not to renew its lease.\50\ The Chinese government has also continued its crackdown on non-governmental organizations representing disadvantaged groups. In late March, Peking University severed ties with its Center for Women's Law Studies and Legal Services, a high-profile women's rights advocacy group that has been involved with sensitive legal work in recent years.\51\ [For more information, see Section III--Civil Society.] In May 2010, prominent Chinese AIDS rights advocate Wan Yanhai, founder of the Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, fled China for the United States after facing increasing pressure and harassment from government sources.\52\ [For more information, see Section III--Civil Society.] The following examples illustrate the mistreatment that Chinese human rights lawyers suffered during this reporting year under public security measures and government policies. On November 20, 2009, Chinese security officials placed ``dozens'' of Chinese human rights lawyers and defenders, including prominent human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong, ``under house arrest or under surveillance'' during U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to China.\53\ [For more information about house arrests and ``soft detention,'' see Section II-- Criminal Justice--Arbitrary Detention.] Chinese authorities held Jiang for more than 13 hours at a Beijing police station, without any documentation authorizing the detention, the day after Jiang requested to meet with President Obama.\54\ While public security officials detained Jiang in a police car, a public security officer reportedly used excessive force in constraining Jiang's wife in front of his seven-year-old daughter. Public security officials reportedly later questioned the daughter at school while he was in custody. During President Obama's visit, Chinese authorities also placed other human rights lawyers, including Li Xiongbing, Li Heping, and Mo Shaoping, under police surveillance, with three or four police officers stationed in front of their homes.\55\ In December 2009, officials from the Fuzhou Municipal Justice Bureau, in Fujian province, suspended the legal license of Fuzhou-based criminal defense lawyer Lin Hongnan for one year, and in April 2010, justice officials reportedly notified Lin that his law firm would be dissolved for ``holding unlawful statutory conditions of establishment.'' \56\ The 70- year-old criminal defense lawyer represented one of three defendants accused of posting articles and video on the Internet calling on officials to investigate allegations of rape and murder in the death of a young woman in a highly publicized slander case.\57\ The three Internet users reportedly repeated claims by the woman's mother that her daughter was gang-raped and murdered by people with ties to local police. [For more information on the ``Case of the Fujian Netizens,'' see Section II--Freedom of Expression.] In late 2009, the Shahekou District People's Court, located in Dalian city, Liaoning province, sentenced human rights lawyer Wang Yonghang, in a closed court hearing without a lawyer, to seven years' imprisonment for defending Falun Gong practitioners and publishing articles on Internet sites outside of China. According to the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Wang met with his lawyers for the first time in January 2010, six months after domestic security protection officers kidnapped him on July 4, 2009. During the meeting, the lawyers verified reports that he had been ``violently beaten on three occasions, and that he suffered a severe ankle injury, which required surgery. . . .'' \58\ On July 12, 2010, after reportedly receiving orders from their superiors,\59\ police barred Beijing lawyer Zhang Kai from entering a court in Linfen municipality, Shanxi province.\60\ A prominent lawyer who has defended Christians in several sensitive cases over the past year,\61\ Zhang was attempting to file an administrative lawsuit on behalf of five Linfen church leaders sentenced to imprisonment in November 2009 following a violent raid on the Linfen-Fushan Church in September 2009.\62\ One officer reportedly referred to the issue as a matter of national security.\63\ [For more information on the Linfen-Fushan Church raid, see Section II--Freedom of Religion.] In June 2010, officials from the Beijing Justice Bureau's Lawyer's Management Office warned prominent human rights lawyers Li Heping and Li Xiongbing not to participate in the formation of the ``Rights Defense Lawyers' Association,'' and indicated that the Association would not be registered. In 2010, Chinese authorities continued to pressure human rights lawyers who took on sensitive cases by denying annual license renewals. In order to continue practicing law, lawyers in China must have their license to practice law renewed annually by passing the ``assessment and registration'' process, which is conducted by government-controlled lawyers associations.\64\ Some rights lawyers have stated that this process has become a political tool to silence human rights lawyers and intimidate other attorneys from joining their ranks.\65\ In July, the China Human Rights Lawyer Concern Group reported it had received information that six human rights lawyers--Jiang Tianyong, Wen Haibo, Zhang Lihui, Tong Chaoping, Yang Huiwen, and Li Jinsong--failed to pass the ``annual assessment and registration'' by the extended July 15 deadline.\66\ Some human rights lawyers passed the assessment only after accepting supplementary conditions, such as guaranteeing that they will avoid certain sensitive cases or decline interviews.\67\ After the deadline, prominent human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong described the pressures placed on lawyers and law firms: ``They put a lot of requirements on law firms, even making lawyers make strict promises, and at the same time making them pay guarantee deposits. But as soon as they say they are going to do a certain case, this insurance money disappears.'' \68\ In April 2010, the Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau permanently revoked the lawyer's licenses of Tang Jitian and Liu Wei, two Beijing human rights lawyers who represented a Falun Gong practitioner in an April 2009 trial in Sichuan province.\69\ The justice bureau officials accused Tang and Liu of ``disrupting the order of the court and interfering with the regular litigation process.'' According to the organization Human Rights in China, however, the two lawyers claimed that authorities illegally videotaped the trial, that the trial judge interrupted the proceedings repeatedly, and that unidentified men ordered the lawyers out of the courtroom.\70\ Although lawyers in China are usually permanently disbarred only if convicted of a crime, the New York Times quoted a law professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong who stated the permanent revocation of Tang and Liu's practicing licenses could be the first of its kind for a ``disruption-of-court'' charge.\71\ In early April 2010, Chinese authorities issued two new administrative regulations on the legal profession that Chinese media outlets claimed will ``strengthen the supervision and management of lawyers and law firms.'' \72\ The Ministry of Justice publicly stated the measures aim to standardize practices nationally, provide consistency across regulations, and ensure conformity with the 2008 Lawyers Law.\73\ The organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders, however, criticized the regulations, writing: ``it is clear that these regulations were designed to protect the interests of the government, rather than lawyers or the law.'' \74\ According to an April 2010 Associated Press article, lawyers and human rights groups in China warned that the new legal measures ``will allow authorities to punish lawyers . . . for actions such as talking to the media or even causing `traffic troubles.' '' \75\ Petitioning (Xinfang) The xinfang (letters and visits), or petitioning, system exists to provide a channel, outside court challenges, for citizens to appeal government, court, and Party decisions and present their grievances.\76\ China's Constitution and the 2005 National Regulations on Letters and Visits provide that Chinese citizens have the right to petition without retribution.\77\ Because of ``institutional weaknesses of the Chinese judiciary and government limitations on citizen political participation,'' citizen petitions are a ``popular channel'' for wronged Chinese citizens seeking accountability.\78\ Xinfang offices are found throughout the Chinese bureaucracy, including offices of the Communist Party, police, government, procuratorates, courts, and people's congresses.\79\ Citizen petitions cover a range of issues, from ``minor business disputes'' to the most egregious alleged abuses and accusations of ``murder, torture, and rape inflicted at the hands of government and police officials.'' \80\ Despite legal rights to petition and prohibitions against retribution, citizens may face official reprisals, harassment, violence, or detention in reeducation through labor centers, psychiatric hospitals (ankang), and extralegal ``black jails'' (hei jianyu).\81\ During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, central authorities continued to urge officials to handle petitions locally to prevent grievances reaching higher administrative offices, as authorities have noted increasing xinfang trends and labeled some petitioning activities as threats to ``social stability.'' In March 2010, Zhou Yongkang, member of the Politburo Standing Committee and secretary of the Politics and Law Commission of the Party Central Committee, wrote that ``much of what is reflected behind petitions and mass incidents are contradictions among the people that are triggered by interest-related complaints . . . [w]ith regard to the large number of contradictions and problems which have not yet risen to the level of petitions, they should also be resolved as quickly as possible in order to keep them from building up and intensifying.'' \82\ Zhou urged improving the mediation system and resolving ``social contradictions at the grassroots level.'' \83\ In November 2009, a Supreme People's Court official announced that the people's county system received 8.25 percent more complaints during the first six months of 2009 than it received in 2008, and he estimated that the number of complaints for the whole year could surpass 12 million cases.\84\ In March 2010, the Party's Central Political-Legal Committee for the first time named groups of farmers petitioning higher level officials as one of the ``internal three forces'' that threatened ``social stability.'' \85\ With growing concerns over xinfang trends, central and local authorities intensified restrictions on ``abnormal petitioning.'' \86\ In November 2009, Shenzhen municipal authorities reportedly issued the Circular Regarding the Lawful Handling of Abnormal Petitioning Behavior.\87\ The Circular identified 14 types of ``abnormal'' petitioning behavior, such as ``shouting slogans'' and ``wearing grievances,'' that would be subject to administrative disciplinary action, including reeducation through labor (RTL).\88\ Various provinces and cities have passed circulars similar to Shenzhen's.\89\ In April, Shenzhen authorities announced a new ``policy'' that would restrict those with a history of ``abnormal'' petitioning behavior from obtaining residence permits.\90\ Some authorities have already detained \91\ or sent to RTL centers citizens for exhibiting ``abnormal petitioning'' behavior, including repeat petitioners from Guangxi province who traveled to Beijing to air their grievances with higher level authorities.\92\ Abuse of Petitioners Regulations and evaluation systems dictate that local-level leaders bear responsibility if a large number of petitioners take their grievances to higher levels; in some instances, petitions may contribute to poor performance evaluations.\93\ These responsibility systems give local authorities an interest in suppressing group petitions and preventing petitioners from taking their grievances to higher administrative levels.\94\ During the 2010 reporting year, some collective petitioning activities resulted in police abuses. On June 24, 2010, approximately 200 relatives of children killed in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake reportedly stormed the Mianzhu city government, but were prevented from entering the building by 300 special police.\95\ On June 21, nearly 80 Dongjiangyan county parents of children killed in the Sichuan earthquake petitioned the provincial government in Chengdu for compensation, but 40 were detained and 3 appeared to still be in detention as of June 25.\96\ On April 27, 314 teachers from Gong'an county, Hubei province, knelt before the county government building and public security bureau to protest being illegally fired. Police administratively detained three of the organizers and sought two more associated with the kneeling protest.\97\ After a previous protest in 2009 by teachers in Gong'an county, authorities sent at least one organizer to a reeducation through labor center for one year.\98\ In 2010, Chinese authorities detained, threatened or placed under surveillance petitioners across China to ensure that their complaints regarding access to justice would not interfere with the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.\99\ Chinese authorities targeted a number of housing activists, including petitioners from Shanghai that sought to exercise their rights to petition against the relocation of 18,000 households in preparation for the Shanghai Expo site.\100\ International human rights organizations and media widely reported on official abuses and detentions related to the forced evictions and demolitions.\101\ In one such instance, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that Shanghai public security officials ordered Cao Yibao to serve one year of reeducation through labor in late May for ``disrupting public order,'' after being detained in April during an identification check on the Expo grounds. Cao, who is 60 years old and suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure, has petitioned for years since her home was demolished in preparation for the Shanghai Expo event.\102\ PETITIONERS IN ``BLACK JAIL'' DETENTIONS Chinese authorities continued to use ``black jails'' (hei jianyu), secret detention sites established by local officials, to detain and punish petitioners that travel to Beijing and other provincial capitals to voice complaints and seek redress for injustices. [For more information, see Section II--Criminal Justice--``Black Jails'': Secret Detention Sites.] During this reporting year, the Commission observed several examples of black jail detentions that violated international and domestic laws.\103\ In June 2010, Xu Lingjun, a disabled People's Liberation Army (PLA) retiree from Shaanxi province, died in a black jail after suffering from starvation in detention. Xu and other petitioners were held after pursuing complaints against local officials. A former inmate from the black jail told Radio Free Asia that Xu ``had been detained for 10 months, and his family had been placed under very tight surveillance.'' According to the report, authorities at the black jail, established by the Communist Party's Politics and Law Committee of Shaanxi's Chenggu county, regularly beat detainees and failed to provide sufficient food.\104\ On May 7, 2010, black jail authorities released Beijing-based human rights advocate Li Jinping after domestic security protection officers abducted him on April 28 in Beijing. The guards refused to let Li leave the ``closely guarded room'' throughout the duration of his detention, and individuals beat and verbally abused Li. According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, authorities detained Li for seeking to demonstrate for ``an official re-evaluation of the legacy of Zhao Ziyang'' and for ``encouraging petitioners to join him to commemorate [Zhao,] the former [Communist Party General Secretary] known for his sympathy with demonstrators during the 1989 Tiananmen protests.'' \105\ FORCIBLE DETENTION OF PETITIONERS IN PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS During this reporting year, authorities continued to forcibly confine Chinese citizens--including petitioners--to psychiatric hospitals, because of outspoken petitioning activities. Chinese and foreign media outlets reported on petitioners committed to mental institutions for periods ranging from days (particularly around sensitive dates) to years.\106\ In late April, a China Youth Daily article exposed the case of Xu Lindong, a Henan petitioner held in psychiatric hospitals for more than six years despite his pleas of sanity. Authorities released Xu, a villager from Luohe city, Henan province, after he spent six and one-half years in forcible confinement for filing a petition, on behalf of a disabled friend, over a land dispute with local officials.\107\ During his detention, psychiatric officials shackled Xu 48 times, applied electric shocks on 54 occasions, and forced Xu to take psychiatric drugs. In late April 2010, China Youth Daily reporters, posing as relatives, revealed the wrongful detention, sparking widespread criticism of compulsory psychiatric commitments. In response to the case, more than 100 lawyers around the country reportedly signed a recommendation urging China's procuratorates to end the practice of falsely labeling citizens as ``mentally ill.'' \108\ In February 2010, Radio Free Asia reported that one Chinese non-governmental organization had collected the names of over 300 people who had been forcibly committed to psychiatric hospitals, including petitioners and Falun Gong practitioners.\109\ IV. Xinjiang Introduction Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) worsened during the Commission's 2010 reporting year. Following government suppression of a demonstration by Uyghurs and riots in the XUAR in July 2009, authorities instituted unprecedented levels of control over the free flow of information, denying XUAR residents and the outside world news about conditions in the region and increasing the government's capacity to manipulate information. Amid this information blackout, authorities strengthened security measures and campaigns to promote ``ethnic unity,'' using them to quell free speech, curb independent religious activity, and impose intrusive controls over the lives of XUAR residents. Authorities singled out Uyghurs in particular in security campaigns, and the whereabouts of some Uyghurs detained in the aftermath of the July demonstrations and riots remain unknown. Trials connected to events in July 2009 have been marked by a lack of transparency and violations of due process. Authorities detained, and in some cases, imprisoned, Uyghur Web site workers and a journalist in connection to free speech about the events and about broader conditions in the XUAR. Amid these developments, central government and Communist Party authorities inaugurated a ``central work forum'' on the topic of the XUAR in May 2010 that set central government and Party objectives for the region's economic and political development, intensifying a trend of top-down initiatives that prioritize state economic and political goals over the promotion of regional autonomy and broader protections of XUAR residents' rights. Against this backdrop, the government enforced other policies and measures that also fueled worsening human rights conditions in the region, including measures aimed at quelling dissent, promoting assimilation, and repressing independent expressions of ethnic and religious identity, especially among the Uyghurs. The XUAR government intensified steps to promote Mandarin Chinese and marginalize the use of the Uyghur language in XUAR schools, in violation of Chinese law. As in past years, some population planning policies in the region singled out non-Han ethnic groups. The government continued work to transfer Uyghur and other non-Han workers to jobs in the interior of China, through programs reportedly marked, in some cases, by coercion and abusive practices. Uyghurs and other groups within the XUAR remained subject to hiring practices that have allowed widespread discrimination against non-Han groups. Ongoing work to ``reconstruct'' the historic Old City section of Kashgar continued to undermine Uyghurs' right to preserve their cultural heritage. Repression of Islam in the XUAR worsened. [For more information on conditions for religious freedom in the XUAR, see Section II--Freedom of Religion--Islam.] Uyghurs seeking asylum outside of China continued to face barriers to accessing asylum proceedings and risk of refoulement to China under the sway of China's influence in neighboring countries and its disregard for international law, as illustrated by the Cambodian government's deportation of 20 Uyghur asylum seekers to China in December 2009, following Chinese government intervention. Repressive government controls throughout the region, especially those targeting Uyghurs, illustrated the status of the XUAR as a government-designated ethnic autonomous region that lacks true autonomy, particularly for the group in whose name it was established. Despite guarantees in Chinese law for measures of autonomy in governance and protections for ethnic minority rights,\1\ central and local government authorities exert control at a level antithetical to local residents' meaningful control over their own affairs and to the protection of their rights. Chinese government actions violate not only Chinese law but also international human rights law that the Chinese government is bound to uphold.\2\ Security Measures and Ideological Campaigns Top leaders from the central and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) governments and Communist Party pledged throughout the year to make ``upholding stability'' a top priority for the region.\3\ Zhang Chunxian, who replaced Wang Lequan as Party Secretary of the XUAR in April 2010,\4\ reiterated official calls to promote the ideology of ``stability above all else'' and to ``strike hard with maximum pressure'' against the ``three forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.\5\ Authorities continued to politicize security concerns, targeting peaceful human rights activity, political dissent, and free expression as threats to the region's security.\6\ The XUAR government took several steps in the past year to enhance the region's security capacity. The XUAR government increased spending for public security by 87.9 percent over the previous year in its 2010 budget, raising the total to 2.89 billion yuan (US$423 million).\7\ In December 2009, the XUAR government made revisions to its Regulation for the Comprehensive Management of Social Order, effective February 1, 2010, that redefine the region's priorities in maintaining social order, placing new prominence on ``striking hard'' against crimes of endangering state security (ESS).\8\ Authorities in China have used ESS charges to punish political dissent,\9\ and the new emphasis on such crimes in the XUAR regulation is unseen in most other social order regulations in China.\10\ The XUAR government also increased the number of ``special police'' in the region, with plans to recruit a total of 5,000 new officers.\11\ In the XUAR capital of Urumqi, where the July 2009 demonstrations and riots took place, authorities reported they would increase the number of 24-hour surveillance cameras in the city to 60,000 by the end of 2010.\12\ Urumqi authorities also described plans to hire 10,000 new officers to expand the ranks of ``patrol teams'' to monitor the city.\13\ Urumqi authorities launched a one-month stability operation in late June in the lead-up to the one-year anniversary of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots.\14\ In the aftermath of events in July 2009, the XUAR government also increased measures to promote ``ethnic unity'' in the region, using them as a vehicle for promoting longstanding government and Party policy and as a tool for restricting free speech. Authorities dispatched ``stability work teams'' to over 160 neighborhoods in Urumqi following events in July, to ``stress the truth about the incident, stress ethnic unity, and stress policy and law.'' \15\ In December, the XUAR People's Congress Standing Committee passed a regulation on promoting education on ethnic unity--apparently the first of its kind in China \16\--that aims to publicize Party policy toward ethnic minorities and that imposes tight controls on freedom of expression, with implications in areas such as academic freedom, educational curricula, and commercial decisions.\17\ The regulation includes administrative penalties and states the possibility of punishment under China's Criminal Law for spreading information deemed ``not beneficial'' to ethnic unity.\18\ In January and February 2010, XUAR authorities used administrative and criminal measures to punish people for spreading ``harmful'' information by telephone and text message, including information that ``influenced'' or ``destroyed'' ethnic unity.\19\ [For additional information, see Controls Over Free Expression in this section.] Authorities also bolstered ethnic unity education in XUAR schools and universities.\20\ Criminal Law and Access to Justice The criminal justice system in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained marked by rights abuses, overt politicization, and a lack of transparency. In the aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots, government reports provided inconsistent statistics on the number of people detained in connection to the events,\21\ while overseas media cited sources in the XUAR that described widespread security sweeps and mass detentions--including mass roundups of Uyghur men--indicating detention numbers that would exceed those reported at different times by the Chinese government and media.\22\ Some of the people reported to have been detained appeared to have no involvement in either acts of protest or violent activity in July.\23\ An October 2009 report from Human Rights Watch documented 43 cases of enforced disappearances after July 2009, while the report estimated that the true number of people in such situations was ``likely significantly higher than the number of cases documented'' in the report.\24\ In addition, Chinese authorities have not reported investigating accounts of state abuses committed during the events in July. In July 2010, the Uyghur Human Rights Project published a report, based on interviews with people present in Urumqi on July 5, 2009, that described the use of deadly police force against Uyghur protestors and Uyghur crowds that day.\25\ Trials held in connection to alleged crimes committed during the July 2009 demonstrations and riots were marred by violations of Chinese law and international standards for due process, including politicized judge selections and curbs on independent legal defense. Rozi Ismail, head of the XUAR High People's Court, reported in July 2009 that the court had selected judges for the trials who were ``politically reliable,'' \26\ and he reported in January 2010 that the XUAR High