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important development because these are the first instances in which courts accepted cases initiated by a group registered as a social organization. In another development, the Chinese citizen environmental organization Chongqing City League of Green Volunteers, headed by Wu Dengming, filed an administrative reconsideration request because Wu questioned the legality of low fines levied by environmental protection authorities against hydroelectric dam companies that disregarded a June 2009 order to stop construction of two dams along the Jinsha River and because the water below the dam site was affected by the construction.\88\ The group withdrew the request in August 2009 after representatives from the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Chongqing City Environmental Protection Bureau, and the ACEF consulted with Wu.\89\ SUPPRESSION OF CITIZEN DEMANDS FOR A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT During this reporting year, citizen environmental complaints increased, highlighting mounting citizen demand for a cleaner environment. Environmental complaints increased in 2009, according to a report about MEP Vice Director Zhou Jian's speech during an April national environmental petition work videoconference.\90\ There was a greater number of ``petitions to higher authorities'' and ``a trend of mass petitions'' in 2009 according to a separate news report on the conference.\91\ The report noted eight focal points for 2010 petitioning work, including ``further unblocking petitioning channels'' and ``strengthening petitioning mediation work.'' \92\ Major lead poisoning incidents across China during this reporting year led citizens to file petitions and engage in protests. Some of these incidents involved citizen detentions and draw attention to issues of government accountability. After the series of lead poisoning incidents, central authorities promised to take regulatory action to address heavy metal pollution problems on a national scale \93\ and ``placed importance on petitions about heavy metal pollution.'' \94\ Select lead poisoning incidents in late 2009 and 2010 include: In August 2009, in Wugang city, Hunan province, approximately 1,000 residents clashed with police after as many as 1,354 children living nearby tested positive for various levels of lead poisoning.\95\ The plant linked to the pollution that caused the lead poisoning reportedly did not have approval to operate from local environmental authorities. Local officials reportedly briefly detained 15 of the ill children's parents who participated in the protest, accusing them of being Falun Gong practitioners and reportedly intimidating and warning other parents not to talk to the media about the case.\96\ Also in August 2009, lead pollution in Fengxiang county, Shaanxi province, led to elevated blood lead levels in 851 children and protests by hundreds of citizens. The case highlighted ongoing compliance problems related to environmental laws and policies, gaps in government accountability, and insufficient protection for citizens' rights, including that of access to information.\97\ In September 2009, in Jiahe county, Hunan province, authorities stopped a bus carrying 53 Jiahe residents who were taking their children to obtain blood tests to determine if they had lead poisoning and subsequently detained 3 of the residents, accusing them of ``disrupting traffic.'' They released one citizen later because of a medical condition. As of mid-March 2010, a second citizen remained in detention, while the fate of the third citizen was unknown.\98\ Chinese citizens are becoming increasingly vocal about concerns over potentially polluting enterprises prior to their construction. In some cases, citizens report they were not given opportunities to utilize institutionalized channels to voice their grievances. In some cases, authorities have arrested organizers of subsequent anti-pollution demonstrations. During this reporting year, ``not-in-my- backyard'' protests broke out against planned landfill facilities in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and in Anhui province, where authorities shelved project plans due to public discontent.\99\ In Fuxing village, Guanyang county, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, village officials reportedly did not consult with the village committee, nor did they convene a village representative meeting before moving forward with a landfill project. Only the village Communist Party committee approved of the construction.\100\ In July, public security officers formally arrested six citizens who along with other villagers had repeatedly demonstrated and petitioned against construction of the nearby planned landfill since mid- 2009.\101\ Authorities arrested Liu Zhengjiao, Mo Jian, Wang Zhaosheng, He Nianfa, Wang Shuangfa, and Wang Qiwen.\102\ Irregularities in the handling of these cases were apparent.\103\ Guanyang public security officers detained Liu Zhengjiao on June 15 but reportedly did not inform his family or charge him until July 11, at which time they arrested and charged him on ``suspicion of disturbing public order.'' \104\ A China Economic Times report noted irregularities with the detention orders or arrest warrants for Mo Jian, Wang Qiwen, and Wang Shuangfa.\105\ Large-scale not-in-my-backyard protests also broke out during this reporting year in several areas, including Jiangsu province and Guangzhou municipality, over the planned construction of trash incinerators and cogeneration plants. The protests involved detentions of demonstration organizers, but also appeared to impact the construction schedule of a plant in at least one area. From October 21 to 23, 2009, thousands of citizens reportedly protested plans to build a cogeneration plant in Pingwang town, Wujiang city, Jiangsu province, and police detained 16 people when citizens and police clashed.\106\ Early in 2010, Beijing authorities announced they will move forward with plans to build more incinerators in the city despite city residents' protests and community campaigns to look at other options.\107\ Citizens in Panyu district, Guangzhou municipality, protested plans to build an incinerator, and on November 23, 2009, over 1,000 residents held a ``sit-in in the city.'' \108\ Authorities reportedly ordered a media blackout on November 5 \109\ and detained several people, four on ``suspicion of organizing and instigating an illegal gathering.'' \110\ As of July 2010, the fate of those detained was unknown. However, also in response to these protests, local officials eventually suspended, but did not cancel, the incinerator project.\111\ Citizens also engaged in demonstrations protesting pollution problems after the fact, following unsuccessful attempts to utilize the petitioning (xinfang) system and other institutionalized channels to resolve their grievances. Specific cases also highlight possible ill-treatment of citizens, the lack of public involvement in environmental decisionmaking, and the non-transparency of the media. In Tibetan areas in Gansu province, citizens reportedly petitioned, among other things, for tighter controls over air pollutants emitted by a cement plant in Madang township, Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, after attempts to resolve the problem through talks with the cement company were unsuccessful.\112\ A crowd of 200 to 300 people gathered at the cement factory to protest, and some were reportedly detained and others injured by police.\113\ In May and June, ``thousands'' of Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) protested against mining activities.\114\ One citizen said that Tibetans had repeatedly appealed for an end to the mining activities; authorities brought in armed police to quell dissent.\115\ [For more information on mining and a June 2009 negotiated agreement to cease the mining in parts of the TAR, see Section V--Tibet.] In July 2010, in Jingxi county, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, thousands of villagers participated in demonstrations over the course of three days beginning on July 11, against a long-term water pollution problem reportedly caused by an aluminum plant.\116\ One article notes that villagers said the local media had been barred from reporting on the case.\117\ Authorities reportedly detained the ``troublemakers,'' i.e., the people who allegedly acted illegally to ``instigate the incident.'' \118\ One account noted that authorities had detained 17 people involved in leading the demonstrations.\119\ As of August, more information about those detained was unavailable. During this reporting year, there were other cases where authorities detained or harassed citizens for their environmental activism. In March 2010, authorities in Guangzhou detained Xiao Qingshan, a longtime labor rights advocate, for seven days for ``disturbing public order,'' for standing outside the Nanfang News Group office educating people about the alleged linkages between official corruption and environmental pollution.\120\ In April, Beijing police prevented the ``Environmental Protection and Citizen Responsibility Discussion Forum'' from taking place \121\ and raided the home of forum participant and rights defender Gu Chuan.\122\ Authorities also arrested and imprisoned citizens, in part for their environmental activism. In August 2009, public security officers in the Tibet Autonomous Region detained brothers Rinchen Samdrub and Jigme Namgyal reportedly after a local environmental protection group they founded accused local police of hunting protected wildlife species.\123\ On July 3, a Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture court sentenced Rinchen Samdrub to five years' imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for three years on the charge of ``inciting splittism.'' The court accused him of posting a pro-Dalai Lama article on his Web site.\124\ On November 13, the Changdu Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) Committee ordered Jigme Namgyal to serve 21 months' RTL for ``harming national security'' by illegally gathering information and video material on the local environment, collecting propaganda material ``from the Dalai Clique,'' and ``severely interfering with state power organizations'' and ``harming social stability'' by organizing local residents to conduct ``irregular petitioning'' of authorities.\125\ In April 2010, authorities released Wu Lihong, an environmental advocate, after he served a three-year prison sentence for alleged extortion and fraud. Wu had documented pollution in the Lake Tai region, Jiangsu province, for many years.\126\ Upon his release, Wu reported mistreatment by officials while in detention and in prison.\127\ III. Development of the Rule of Law Civil Society Introduction During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government continued to tighten control over what it considered to be politically sensitive individuals and organizations through harassment, closing of offices, and new regulations that could make it more difficult for groups to receive foreign sources of funding. Though localized experiments aimed at simplifying the legal registration process for civil society organizations (CSOs) \1\ are currently taking place in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen, a special economic zone, it is too early to conclude whether such reforms will succeed or be replicated in other parts of China. The number of CSOs in China continues to grow, and their impact continues to be evident. Official government statistics indicate that the number of registered groups increased from 288,000 in 2004 to 430,000 in the first quarter of 2010.\2\ However, unofficial estimates for the total number of groups, including unregistered grassroots organizations, range from two to eight million.\3\ CSOs in China address a wide array of social issues, such as HIV/AIDS, women's rights, worker rights, religious charity work, and environmental concerns.\4\ In the aftermath of recent earthquakes in Qinghai and Sichuan provinces, for example, CSOs played an instrumental role in organizing a national humanitarian response as part of the rescue effort.\5\ The Beijing Yirenping Center, a public health advocacy organization, pressured the government to introduce measures aimed at eliminating discrimination against Hepatitis B virus carriers.\6\ As severe drought affected southwest China in early 2010, Oxfam Hong Kong allocated funds for relief efforts and worked with local officials to provide drinking water and other supplies for residents.\7\ Still, many Chinese officials hold conflicting views of civil society organizations. While acknowledging that CSOs serve a necessary and even helpful function as mediating mechanisms between the government and society, Chinese authorities also look upon many groups with suspicion, fearing that ``Western countries have used non-governmental organizations extensively . . . to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, create turmoil, and even subvert the regimes of the host countries.'' \8\ China, one Chinese scholar warned, ``has to be vigilant about [Western intervention].'' \9\ As such, Chinese authorities allowed many CSOs that focus on providing basic social services to operate freely, and forcibly closed some that tried to form networks or carry out projects that the government considers to be ``politically sensitive.'' As a former editor of the China Development Brief, an online newsletter dedicated to news about non-governmental organizations (NGOs), explained, one never knows ``where the line is, and it does shift''--for it is ``civil society with Chinese characteristics,'' where groups are ``light, not antagonistic and not pushing the envelope too far.'' \10\ The Chinese government's actions to harass and tighten its control over CSOs operating in China contravene both Chinese law and international conventions. China's Constitution states that ``citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech . . . of assembly, of association . . . .'' \11\ Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that: Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others . . . no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety . . . .\12\ Legal Framework and Government Controls The Chinese government imposes strict registration requirements for civil society organizations (CSOs). Under the 1998 Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Organizations, an individual who wishes to organize an NGO \13\ in China must first obtain a sponsorship agreement from a government administrative department in a relevant ``trade, scientific or other professional area'' at the appropriate level of government before registering with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA).\14\ In other words, groups that wish to operate locally must register with the corresponding local government administrative departments and local MCA units; those that wish to operate nationally must do so with national departments and the MCA. In their role as sponsoring agencies, the local government administrative departments are charged with the duty to supervise the NGOs that they register, including ``record keeping with respect to establishment, modification, and closure of social organizations,'' completing annual reviews on the organizations, and ``applying disciplinary sanctions to organizations which fail to comply'' with MCA regulations.\15\ Such a dual management process has presented problems for various groups, as permission to organize is difficult to obtain from local sponsors who are sometimes reluctant to take on the burdens of supervisory responsibilities.\16\ Groups that fail to obtain permission to organize are not protected under the law and are also barred from receiving outside donations.\17\ Many experts conclude that the cumbersome dual management requirement has had a chilling effect on Chinese civil society. In part to avoid government interference, some groups in China register as ``commercial entities'' rather than as NGOs subject to the Chinese government's targeted oversight, even though registering as ``commercial entities'' means that these groups are subject to different tax schemes than government- registered NGOs.\18\ At the same time, because such groups are neither NGOs nor legally recognized commercial enterprises, they risk becoming targets for closure. As the Commission reported in 2009, the Open Constitution Initiative (OCI), or Gongmeng, provides one prominent example. Founded in 2003, OCI attracted authorities' attention by challenging China's ``black jails,'' campaigning for migrant workers' rights, and helping parents of babies hurt in the tainted milk incident of 2008 to seek legal redress.\19\ Authorities ultimately fined the organization 1.42 million yuan (US$208,823) for allegedly evading 250,000 yuan (US$36,764) in taxes \20\ before shutting it down, apparently because OCI did not register as an NGO.\21\ In any case, OCI's experience sent, in the words of a Human Rights Watch researcher, ``a chilling effect across China's nascent civil society,'' since ``most NGOs are much more fragile than [OCI].'' \22\ During this reporting year, Chinese officials repeatedly harassed and interfered with the operations of the Beijing Aizhixing Institute (Aizhixing), a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization that activist Wan Yanhai founded in 1994. Having already been questioned or detained by authorities several times in the past 12 years, Wan was familiar with official harassment and interference, as some of his most significant and politically sensitive work involved publicizing the spread of HIV resulting from blood contamination cases in the 1990s among villagers in Henan province.\23\ In March 2010, when the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference convened in Beijing, authorities ordered Wan to cancel a seminar marking International Sex Worker Rights Day.\24\ On March 25, local taxation bureau officials in Beijing went to Wan's offices to conduct an unannounced investigation into his organization's tax records from the previous year. A month later, fire officials showed up for a safety inspection.\25\ Tax officials had investigated Aizhixing before, in September 2008, but they did not find any problems with the group's accounting.\26\ Wan ultimately left China for the United States in May, saying that ``the attacks from the government had become very serious for my organization and for me personally'' and that, already ``under a lot of stress,'' he had concerns for his personal safety.\27\ Peking University released a notice on March 25, 2010, announcing that it was canceling ties with four university- affiliated organizations, including the Center for Women's Law and Legal Services (Center).\28\ The Center was China's first NGO dedicated to women's rights issues, and over its 15-year history it had provided free legal counseling to more than 70,000 people, handled over 2,000 cases, and proposed more than 70 pieces of legislation.\29\ Although the university's dean of social sciences told the South China Morning Post that the cancellations were part of a routine restructuring aimed at eliminating ``some institutes that no longer suit the current trend,'' Guo Jianmei, who founded the Center, confirmed to Asia Week that the Ministry of Education had made the cancellation decision, adding that ``higher-up'' authorities had told university officials that, because the Center accepted overseas funding, and because it was creating a public interest lawyer network, the political risks were relatively high.\30\ At least one international NGO, like its domestic counterparts, also faced politically motivated harassment from Chinese authorities during this reporting year. On February 4, 2010, the Ministry of Education (MOE) issued a notice warning Chinese students to ``sever all ties'' with the British relief agency Oxfam, accusing the organization of being an ``[NGO] seeking to infiltrate our interior.'' \31\ Although Oxfam's Hong Kong Director Howard Liu insisted that his agency had never challenged the government's policies or laws and was only interested in alleviating poverty, the MOE notice referred to Oxfam Hong Kong Chairman Lo Chi-kin--also a member of Hong Kong's Democratic Party who has spoken in support of direct elections and political reforms in Hong Kong--as a ``stalwart of the opposition faction.'' \32\ Continued Regulatory Tightening A new circular that tightens rules concerning foreign donations to domestic organizations provides another example of the Chinese government's further strengthening of its control over civil society. On December 25, 2009, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued a circular concerning ``foreign exchange donated to or by domestic institutions,'' which went into effect on March 1.\33\ Stating that foreign donations shall ``comply with the laws and regulations . . . of China and shall not go against social morality or damage public interests,'' \34\ the SAFE circular requires all NGOs seeking to receive foreign donations to present the following information: 1. An application stating that the ``donation is not against national prohibitive regulations . . . that the overseas institution is a non-profit institution, [and] that the domestic enterprise shall strictly follow the agreement in making use of the donation and bear the legal responsibility thus caused.'' \35\ 2. A copy of the receiving organization's business license.\36\ 3. A notarized donation agreement stating the purpose of the donation.\37\ 4. The registration certificate of the overseas non- profit organization (with Chinese translation attached).\38\ One particularly problematic element of the new SAFE circular is the requirement that the donation agreement be notarized.\39\ The Global Times, which operates under the official People's Daily, reported that two months after the rules became effective, ``banks, notary service providers and non-profit outfits are in the dark about how to get a donation agreement `notarized.' '' \40\ Moreover, some notaries reportedly will also require some donors to be present in China for the notarization.\41\ The new circular will also require all foreign donations to go into special foreign exchange bank accounts, allowing SAFE to ``improve the administration of donated foreign exchange and facilitate the donated foreign exchange receipts and payments.'' \42\ The circular also provides the central and provincial governments additional control over religious organizations by requiring an additional level of approval to accept one-time donations of more than one million yuan (US$147,000).\43\ While it is unclear whether authorities established the SAFE rule to specifically target NGOs, some NGOs fear that the rule can be used as such.\44\ As the organization Asia Catalyst put it succinctly, the new SAFE rule completes the government's goal to create ``a chill that shuts some NGOs down, allows others . . . to survive but limits the overall growth of the sector--and without sparking an international outcry . . . .'' \45\ Limited Reform in Shenzhen Despite an overall trend of tighter controls, at least one case of limited localized reform took place in the past year. In July 2009, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) and the city of Shenzhen signed the Cooperation Agreement on Pushing Forward With Integrated Reforms to Civil Affairs Undertakings (Agreement), which delineates a deepening of systemic reforms concerning the registration and management of social organizations. The Agreement calls for Shenzhen to ``take the lead in experimenting with some of the MCA's major reform projects and measures,'' \46\ and to ``explore establishing a system whereby civil society organizations apply and register directly with the [MCA].'' \47\ The reforms, if successful, could potentially lead to a system, at least in Shenzhen, where the MCA will supervise and regulate CSOs alone, without a sponsor organization, making it possible for future individuals wishing to form organizations--including NGOs--to have a relatively less complicated one-stop shop process.\48\ The Agreement is also being used by certain civil society organizations, such as ones that provide services to the poor and migrant workers, to forgo registrations altogether and to be recognized by local authorities provided that organizations file the required papers properly.\49\ 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan At the national level, the 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP), issued by the State Council Information Office in April 2009, also referenced the need to broaden the channel to ``support mass organizations to participate in social management and public services, so as to protect the people's legitimate rights and interests.'' \50\ The plan pledges to strengthen the ``construction and management of social organizations'' in order to ``enhance their functions in serving society'' and that ``revisions will be made'' to the Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Management of Non-Commercial Institutions, and Regulations for the Management of Foundations ``to ensure social organizations conduct activities in accordance with the law and their respective charters.'' \51\ Moreover, as stated in the HRAP, the government encouraged social organizations to ``participate in social management and public services'' and to establish ``private non-enterprise entities in the fields of education, science and technology, culture, health care, sports and public welfare.'' \52\ The plan also aims to develop and standardize ``all kinds of foundations to promote programs for the public good.'' \53\ Notwithstanding the goals stated in the HRAP, however, the findings in this section suggest otherwise: that the overall trend is one in which the government continues to tighten its control over civil society, intimidates individuals that it deems threatening to ``social stability,'' and shuts down organizations that conduct activities and projects that it considers to be politically sensitive. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Three Major Regulations That Govern NGO Operations in China ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (1998) This set of regulations defines ``social organizations'' as ``non- profit organizations voluntarily created by citizens in order to achieve the collective desires of members, and conduct activities according to their charters.'' \54\ It sets forth the administrative, registration, supervision, and management requirements that NGOs must follow in order to operate in China.\55\ It also requires that social organizations not ``harm the unification, security, and ethnic unity of the state; damage state interests, the public interests of society, and the lawful rights and interests of other organizations and citizens; or violate prevailing social morals.'' \56\Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Management of Non- Commercial Institutions (1998) This set of regulations addresses institutions that ``engage in such activities as education, science and technology, culture, or public health, that the state, with an objective of social welfare, runs through state organs or other organizations using state assets.'' \57\Regulations for the Management of Foundations (2004) This set of regulations places ``foundations'' into two categories: groups ``aimed at fundraising from the general public . . . and those that are not'' and lays out specific and different rules for both categories of groups.\58\ It sets forth the administrative, registration, supervision, and management requirements that Chinese and foreign foundations must follow in order to operate in China.\59\ It requires foundations to have charters and boards of directors, and specifies expenditure requirements.\60\ Under the regulations, local sponsoring agencies are obligated to supervise these foundations, and to ensure that they follow all applicable laws and regulations.\61\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Institutions of Democratic Governance Introduction China's political system is dominated by the Communist Party, with limited participation by non-Party members in decisionmaking that affects China's political affairs. During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Party and the central government continued actions to strengthen controls over society and to ``safeguard stability.'' Chinese authorities continued to have little tolerance for those involved in political activities not sanctioned by the Party. The Party continued to support isolated experiments with intraparty democracy and ``democratic management'' in localities around the country, and high-level leaders stated that the National People's Congress (NPC) and the NPC Standing Committee would strengthen supervision of governmental affairs and departments. While village elections for ``village committees'' have spread throughout China, their implementation remains problematic. Authorities plan to continue to strengthen open government affairs and various forms of ``democratic management'' in so- called ``difficult villages.'' Corruption remained high and of serious concern to citizens. To bolster the legitimacy of the Party, in part in response to citizen concerns about corruption and official accountability, Party organs and government agencies initiated measures to strengthen anticorruption efforts and improve local accountability and transparency. Authorities at central and local levels signaled that China's budget processes could become more open to public scrutiny. There is variation in the willingness of local government agencies to make their budgets public. During this reporting year, authorities continued to signal that they would expand public participation in government policymaking on issues of ``vital public interest'' through a variety of public forums, and would establish a public hearing system to gather citizen input on draft regulatory instruments. China's One-Party State and Political Control Although China voted as a member of the UN General Assembly in favor of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, China's political institutions do not comply with the standards outlined therein. Article 21 of the UDHR, for example, provides that, ``everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives . . . . [T]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.''\1\ China's political institutions also do not comply with the standards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and committed to ratify.\2\ Article 25 of the ICCPR requires that citizens be allowed to ``take part in the conduct of political affairs'' and ``to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections.'' Under General Comment 25 to the ICCPR, this language requires that: ``Where citizens participate in the conduct of public affairs through freely chosen representatives, it is implicit in article 25 that those representatives do in fact exercise governmental power and that they are accountable through the electoral process for their exercise of that power.'' (para. 7); ``The right to vote at elections and referenda must be established by law and may be subject only to reasonable restrictions . . . . [P]arty membership should not be a condition of eligibility to vote, nor a ground of disqualification.'' (para. 10); ``Freedom of expression, assembly and association are essential conditions for the effective exercise of the right to vote and must be fully protected.'' (para. 12); ``The right of persons to stand for election should not be limited unreasonably by requiring candidates to be members of parties or of specific parties.'' (para. 17); ``An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant.'' (para. 20).\3\ During this reporting year, the Communist Party emphasized Party building \4\ and increased Party membership. At the end of 2009, the Party had nearly 78 million members, an increase of approximately 2 million members from the previous year.\5\ The Party has established more than 3.79 million committees and branches throughout the country.\6\ These organizations reach down into and influence every sector of society, including villages and urban neighborhoods,\7\ as well as many enterprises,\8\ public service organizations (hospitals, schools, research institutes, etc.),\9\ government departments, and social organizations \10\ (shehui tuanti: foundations, nonprofit enterprises, and non-governmental organizations). The Party organizations in urban neighborhoods and residents committees (jumin weiyuanhui) \11\ play a role in citizens' political, social, and economic lives.\12\ During this reporting year, top Party leaders directed cadres to focus on Party construction at the most basic administrative levels,\13\ in military organizations,\14\ in academic institutions,\15\ and in social organizations.\16\ Social Controls, Maintaining Social Stability The Communist Party and the central government continued to focus on ``safeguarding social stability'' and strengthened controls over society. A March 2010 Southern Weekend article described the ``quiet'' changes to China's ``system of safeguarding stability,'' which the article argues began to take shape in preparation for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games and are now becoming standard practice.\17\ The story quotes an article by Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Secretary of the Politics and Law Commission of the Party Central Committee, in which Zhou stated, ``We should apply the successful experience of security at Beijing Olympic Games in developing a public order prevention and control system, deeply promote socialization, network formation, and informatization in developing the public order prevention and control system . . . .'' \18\ In the name of ``maintaining social stability,'' the Party and the government make extensive use of informant networks.\19\ Informant networks reportedly reach down into social institutions, such as schools.\20\ In December 2009, high-level official Yang Huanning reportedly said that collecting information (through informants) was important for ensuring ``social stability.'' He promised ``preemptive attacks'' against people that Party and government officials characterize as threats to social stability.\21\ In the spring of 2010, the Politics and Law Commission of the Party Central Committee reportedly launched a crackdown on groups for the protection of military personnel rights, underground labor unions, and groups of farmers petitioning higher level officials, labeling them the ``internal three forces'' and calling them ``threats to social stability.'' \22\ An April 2010 Tsinghua University Social Development Research Group report asserted that ``safeguarding stability'' has become one of the ``most important duties'' of local officials.\23\ The report also states that ``maintaining social stability'' has begun to influence the normal work of governments in some locations.\24\ Local officials reportedly have made serious investments in personnel to ``maintain stability'' and over the years increasingly have established specialized institutions, including ``stability preservation offices'' (weiwenban) or ``comprehensive governance offices'' (zongzhiban).\25\ China's public security expenditures for 2009 reportedly increased by 16 percent, and the budget for such expenditures is expected to increase by another 8.9 percent for 2010.\26\ Authorities at all administrative levels reportedly have established ``stability preservation funds'' from which they try to ``buy security'' by making payments to individuals with grievances in order to resolve conflicts before they escalate.\27\ The Tsinghua University group report noted several downsides to the use of these funds for the development of rule of law in China, including the potential that these funds will be used arbitrarily without any legal basis.\28\ Official Actions Against Democracy Advocates During this reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to show little tolerance for select individuals who advocated for greater democracy, who organized political parties, or who expressed political views not sanctioned by the Communist Party; for example: Liu Xianbin. On July 5, 2010, security officials in Suining city, Sichuan province, arrested Liu, a 1989 democracy movement participant and member of the banned Chinese Democracy Party, on charges of ``inciting subversion of state power.'' \29\ Liu was reportedly arrested because of his support for activists and human rights defenders and because articles penned by Liu had been posted outside of China.\30\ As of August 2010, Liu was still awaiting trial. Guo Quan. The Suqian Intermediate People's Court in Jiangsu province sentenced Guo, formerly a university professor, to 10 years in prison on October 16, 2009, for ``subversion of state power.'' \31\ The court found that Guo used the Internet to organize an ``illegal'' political party called the ``China New Democracy Party,'' among other charges.\32\ Xue Mingkai. The Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court sentenced Xue to 18 months in prison on charges of ``subverting state power'' on February 10, 2010, despite pleas by his mother to consider medical records showing that Xue had a mental illness.\33\ Authorities claimed Xue had contacted and joined the overseas China Democracy Party (CDP) in 2009 and planned to organize a ``China Democratic Workers' Party'' online in the summer of 2006.\34\ Luo Yongquan. In the summer of 2009, authorities in Shaoguan city, Guangdong province, ordered Luo, a member of the CDP and a poet, to serve two years of reeducation through labor. Authorities said that Luo publicly attacked the Communist Party and Chinese government in his poems.\35\ Intraparty Democracy Isolated experiments with intraparty democracy (also translated as ``inner-Party democracy'') are taking place around the country with high-level Communist Party support. Chinese writers on the subject maintain that intraparty democracy should come before democracy in society as a whole.\36\ The notion of intraparty democracy has been a part of the Party's basic institutional design since 1956.\37\ The decision drafted by Party leaders during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee meeting in September 2009 called for expanding intraparty democracy and called it the ``lifeblood of the Party.'' \38\ During this reporting year, Party authorities in various locations experimented with election monitoring systems (xuanju guanchayuan zhidu or minyi guanchayuan zhidu) during intraparty elections for residents' committee members and leaders.\39\ Election monitors typically were retired officials, people's congress and people's political consultative congress deputies, and Party committee members; but in some areas, people from other professions took on the role.\40\ The People's Congresses and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Chinese officials describe China's political system as a ``socialist democracy'' with ``multi-party cooperation'' and ``political consultation'' under the leadership of the Communist Party.\41\ The 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP), issued by Chinese authorities in April 2009, referenced the supervisory roles of the National People's Congress (NPC) \42\ and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).\43\ However, an official speech by Wang Chen, the Director of the State Council Information Office, on the comprehensive summary of the mid- term evaluation of the HRAP released in December 2009, included scant reference to civil and political rights developments related to the NPC and the CPPCC,\44\ except for noting the deliberations regarding the proposed revisions to China's Electoral Law.\45\ The NPC Standing Committee passed the revised Electoral Law in March 2010, which now awards the same proportion of NPC deputies per population to both rural and urban areas. (In the past, urban residents enjoyed greater representation.\46\) In summer 2010, Luojiang county, Sichuan province, reportedly began an experiment that established the country's first full-time, professional local people's congress deputies. While China's Constitution and other relevant laws do not prohibit professional deputies, there currently is not a specific legal foundation for them.\