Co bedzie dalej w zwiazku z nazwa ronda w Warszawie ?

January 26, 2010, for the ninth round of formal dialogue with Communist Party officials.\49\ The 15-month interval between the eighth and ninth rounds of dialogue was the longest since such contacts resumed in 2002.\50\ Du Qinglin, head of the Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the most senior Chinese official engaged in discussions with the Dalai Lama's envoys, reportedly briefed the envoys on the Fifth Forum and claimed that the forum showed that ``[no] country or party in the world can match China and the [Communist Party] in using the resources of the whole country to support the development of an ethnic region.'' \51\ Neither side reported substantive progress as a result of the ninth round of dialogue and both sides reiterated key positions,\52\ but senior figures referred to certain developments in a positive manner. For example, Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's envoys both emphasized the important role of Fifth Forum developments.\53\ Zhu Weiqun, Deputy Head of the UFWD, praised the ``better attitude'' of the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari.\54\ In March 2010, Lodi Gyari referred favorably to the Party's Fifth Forum decision to consider development issues throughout all Tibetan autonomous areas: We welcome the fact that the Fifth Tibet Work Forum has looked into the issues of development in all Tibetan areas--the Tibet Autonomous Region as well as other Tibetan areas. It is our strong belief that all the Tibetan areas must be under a uniform policy and a single administration. If we take away the political slogans, many of the issues that have been prioritized by the Forum are similar to the basic needs of the Tibetan people outlined in our Memorandum.\55\ Other developments at the ninth round of dialogue included: Party adds more preconditions on the Dalai Lama. Du Qinglin listed four types of expression (or criticism) that the Dalai Lama must not ``indulge in'': \56\ ``National interests brook no infringement''; ``The principles of the Constitution brook no trampling on''; ``National dignity brooks no vilification''; and ``The common wishes of the people of all ethnic groups brook no deviation.'' The Tibetan ``Note.'' The Dalai Lama's envoys provided to UFWD officials a ``Note'' with additional explanation of the eighth-round ``Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,'' which elaborated on behalf of the Dalai Lama a more detailed explanation of Tibetan aspirations for ``genuine autonomy'' than had been available previously.\57\ The Note contained ``constructive suggestions for a way forward'' and addressed ``fundamental issues,'' according to a February 10, 2010, Special Envoy statement.\58\ Party rejection of the ``Note.'' At a February 2 press conference, Zhu Weiqun rejected the Note and claimed that the envoys refused to ``revise a single word'' of the Memorandum or ``make any concession.'' \59\ Zhu repeated that the Party is willing to discuss only the Dalai Lama's ``personal future and the future of those around him.'' \60\ Religious Freedom: Tibetan Buddhists ``Can Believe Whatever They Want as Long as It's Legal'' The Chinese government and Communist Party's push to define and manage a ``normal order'' for Tibetan Buddhism, and transform the Tibetan Buddhist community into one that adheres to state-approved positions and practices, creates increasing restraints on the exercise of freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists. In March 2010, Lhasa's mayor summed up the limits on freedom of religion: ``In Tibet, people can believe whatever they want as long as it is legal.'' \61\ STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF LAW IN SHAPING, CONTROLLING TIBETAN BUDDHISM During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party strengthened their push to use policy and legal measures to shape and control what Chinese officials, including President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao, refer to as the ``normal order'' for Tibetan Buddhism. Hu directed senior Party leadership figures attending the Fifth Tibet Work Forum to guide Tibetan Buddhism ``to keep in line with socialist society'' and to rely on the Party's ``basic principles for religious work'' and the government's ``laws and regulations'' to achieve that end.\62\ [See Domestically, Fifth Forum Sets Far-Reaching Objectives for 2010-2020 in this section.] Some of the principal regulatory instruments to which Hu referred were not issued until recent years; the most recent measure went into effect days before the Fifth Tibet Work Forum commenced. In addition to China's principal regulatory measure on religion, the 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs,\63\ the central and Tibet Autonomous Region governments have issued at least four regulatory measures since 2007 that provide increased state control of Tibetan Buddhism.\64\ Effective January 1, 2007. The TAR People's Government Standing Committee issued the TAR Implementing Measures for the Regulation on Religious Affairs (TAR Measures), imposing stricter and more detailed controls on monks, nuns, monasteries, and nunneries in the TAR than previous measures.\65\ Effective March 1, 2007. The State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued the Measures for Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record (Record Measures), requiring nationwide re-registration of ``professional religious personnel.'' \66\ Effective September 1, 2007. SARA issued the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism. The measures could transform Tibetan Buddhism in China by empowering the Party and government to gradually reshape the religion by controlling one of the religion's most unique and important features--lineages of teachers that Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations (trulkus) and that can span centuries.\67\ Effective January 10, 2010. The Buddhist Association of China \68\ issued the Measures for Confirming the Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel (Confirming Measures).\69\ The measures provide that Tibetan Buddhist ``religious personnel'' whose credentials were ``confirmed'' prior to the measure's effective date need not repeat the confirmation process, but that the monastery or nunnery Democratic Management Committee (DMC) \70\ must examine and verify the monk's, nun's, or trulku's conformity with political, professional, and personal criteria.\71\ After the DMC submits an opinion on the applicant to the local Buddhist Association for approval, the association will issue a registration certificate to the ``religious professional.'' \72\ The TAR government reported on the date the Confirming Measures took effect that it would complete re- registration by the end of 2010--including recording the government's assessment of the ``qualifications'' of Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and ``living Buddhas,'' a Chinese term for trulkus.\73\ The number of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns subject to re-registration under the Record Measures and Confirming Measures is substantial. The central government has reported the total number of monks and nuns in the Tibetan areas of China as approximately 120,000 as long ago as 1997 \74\ and as recently as June 2009, according to a U.S. State Department report.\75\ The impact of the measures could result in substantial losses to the monastic community if authorities apply re-registration in a manner intended to weed out monks and nuns whom authorities suspect of holding beliefs that the government does not deem to be ``legal.'' Such views include religious devotion toward the Dalai Lama and support of the Dalai Lama's recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama.\76\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Three Top-Ranking Lamas: Deepening Alarm; a Hint on Location; Explanation of Escape From Tibet ------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Dalai Lama expressed deepening alarm on the outlook for Tibetan Buddhism in China. A senior Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) official commented on the current status of Gedun Choekyi Nyima, who was five years old when he disappeared after the Dalai Lama recognized him as the 11th Panchen Lama in May 1995.\77\ The Karmapa, the spiritual head of the Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism,\78\ explained publicly why he decided to escape from Tibet at the end of 1999. The Dalai Lama spoke in his 2010 annual March 10 address \79\ about the outlook for Tibetan Buddhism under current Chinese policies: ``Today, the Chinese authorities are conducting various political campaigns, including a campaign of patriotic re-education, in many monasteries in Tibet. They are putting the monks and nuns in prison-like conditions, depriving them [of] the opportunity to study and practice in peace. These conditions make the monasteries function more like museums and are intended to deliberately annihilate [Tibetan] Buddhism.'' \80\ The Panchen Lama (Gedun Choekyi Nyima) and his family are ``living a very good life in Tibet,'' Chairman of the TAR government Pema Choling (Baima Chilin) told reporters on March 7.\81\ He said that Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his family ``are reluctant to be disturbed,'' \82\ and described Gedun Choekyi Nyima as a ``victim'' [apparently of the Dalai Lama] who ``lives the life of an ordinary citizen like us.'' \83\ Also in March, Gyaltsen Norbu, the Panchen Lama that the Chinese government installed in December 1995,\84\ entered the ``political arena'' as a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.\85\ The Karmapa, in a January 2010 interview, stated that he fled from Tibet to India because he feared that ``the Chinese government would have assigned me political duties as I became older.'' \86\ Life in China might have been ``endurable'' if he had been able to focus only on his religious functions, he said. The Karmapa fled his religious seat at Tsurphu Monastery, located in Duilongdeqing (Toelung Dechen) county, Lhasa municipality, TAR, on December 28, 1999, at the age of 14 and arrived in Dharamsala, India, the Dalai Lama's residence in exile, on January 5, 2000.\87\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Tibetan Development Initiatives: Party Claims National, International Stakes for Its ``Tibet Work'' The January 2010 Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum) set out Communist Party and central government economic development objectives for 2010 to 2020. The objectives principally focus on accelerating and strengthening a development model that subordinates respecting and protecting Tibetan culture to Party and government priorities. President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao claimed high stakes nationally and internationally for the success of such objectives, telling forum attendees that Party initiatives in Tibetan areas address ``the urgent need in safeguarding ethnic solidarity, safeguarding social stability, and safeguarding national security,'' as well as ``the urgent need in creating a favorable international environment.'' \88\ Hu outlined Fifth Forum development objectives that included building major infrastructure projects,\89\ increasing natural resource exploitation,\90\ and continuing to push forward the construction of a ``socialist new countryside'' (compulsory settlement of nomadic herders and resettlement of farmers).\91\ The Fifth Forum objectives build upon the Great Western Development campaign that the State Council launched in 2000,\92\ and (because of the magnitude of forum objectives) will increase pressure on Tibetans to accept and adapt to a development model the fundamental properties of which the Party describes as ``Chinese characteristics,'' but that would retain ``Tibetan traits.'' \93\ Tibetan resentment against Chinese policies--including poor implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law \94\ and consequences of development initiatives \95\--helps to explain the wave of Tibetan protests that began in March 2008.\96\ Government and Party officials have not acknowledged publicly the unpopularity of their Tibetan development policies. UPDATES ON KEY DEVELOPMENT TOPICS Railroad construction. Chinese government plans to complete a network of railways crisscrossing the Tibetan plateau by 2020 have the potential to have a profound impact on the Tibetan culture and the ecological environment.\97\ During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, state-run media reports disclosed limited progress on Tibetan railway construction. Work on the first section of the Sichuan-Tibet railway, between Chengdu city, the capital of Sichuan province, and Kangding (Dartsedo), the capital of Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), will start by the end of 2010, according to a January 2010 Sichuan government report.\98\ An April Chinese news report, however, said that work would start ``next year''(2011).\99\ Construction of a railway segment from Lhasa eastward to Linzhi (Kongpo) that both the Sichuan-Tibet and Yunnan-Tibet railways will use will start in 2013 at the earliest, according to a state-run media report.\100\ The government has not yet decided whether to route the railway to the north of the Brahmaputra River (Yarlung Tsangpo) or to the south of the river.\101\ A southern route would position the railroad much closer to a section of disputed, heavily militarized border between the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and Linzhi prefecture in the TAR.\102\ Experts favor the southern route, the report said.\103\ Construction of the railway extension westward from Lhasa to Rikaze (Shigatse) city, initially ``expected to be completed in 2010,'' \104\ remained in preparatory stages as of March 2010.\105\ Construction work began on September 26, 2010, and will take four years to complete, according to an official news media report.\106\ Expansion of mining. A TAR official said in March 2010 that the mining industry share of TAR gross domestic product would increase from the current level of about 3 percent to between 30 percent and 50 percent by 2020.\107\ The TAR government has designated nine ``special zones for mineral industries,'' the official said.\108\ Tibetan protests against Chinese government mineral exploitation and resulting environmental damage continued during the Commission's 2010 reporting year and could increase further if the government expands mining without adequate protection for Tibetans and their environment. On May 15, 2010, for example, People's Armed Police reportedly fired on 200 to 300 Tibetan villagers in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, after they attempted to protest at the gate of a cement factory they held responsible for fouling the atmosphere, damaging a roadside Buddhist pagoda, and blocking access to their village.\109\ And according to a report in early May, ``thousands'' of Tibetans renewed protests against mining on what Tibetans regard as a sacred mountain in Mangkang (Markham) county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, after the companies involved disregarded a June 2009 negotiated agreement to cease the mining.\110\ Forced settlement of nomadic herders, resettlement of farmers. Chairman of the TAR government Pema Choling (Baima Chilin) said in March 2010 that ``constantly deepening efforts to build a new socialist countryside'' was a priority following the Fifth Forum.\111\ China's state-run media reported in November 2009 that ``more than 1 million farmers and herdsmen'' in the TAR were already ``enjoying safe houses,'' and that by the end of 2009 an additional 330,000 nomadic herders and farmers would move into new houses.\112\ These figures total approximately 1.33 million, a figure equal to about half the TAR Tibetan population.\113\ A September 2009 State Council Information Office white paper listed ``building settlements for formerly nomadic people'' as a measure to ``relieve the poverty the ethnic minorities suffer,'' \114\ but an international advocacy organization said in 2010 the policy threatens Tibetan nomads' livelihoods and often results in ``ghetto-like'' conditions.\115\ Managing the ``floating population.'' Lhasa's mayor said in March 2010 that following the March 2008 Lhasa rioting, the city had implemented measures ``reinforcing the management [of] the floating population and communities.'' \116\ The mayor did not specify whether he referred to Tibetan or Han itinerant workers and traders.\117\ Chinese officials have acknowledged that Tibetan resentment against increasing numbers of non-Tibetan workers and traders \118\ traveling into the TAR was a factor in the March 14, 2008, Lhasa riots.\119\ Premier Wen Jiabao in his March 2010 National People's Congress work report called on the government to improve services and ``do a good job in employment and management work'' for the ethnic minority ``floating population.'' \120\ State-run media reported that Wen's comments were the first time the issue has been raised in a national work report.\121\ Political Imprisonment of Tibetans: Law as a Tool of Repression Reports of Tibetan political protest and detention declined during the Commission's 2010 reporting year based on Commission monitoring as of early September.\122\ The apparent decline may suggest that Tibetans generally are less willing to risk the consequences of political protest in the presence of the ongoing security crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave of Tibetan political protests that began in March 2008. The Commission, however, cannot determine the extent to which the apparent decrease may have resulted from heightened security measures that reduce the frequency of protests and detentions (thus reducing the number of reports of protest and detention), or the extent to which Chinese government suppression of information flow may have prevented reports of protest and detention from reaching international monitoring and reporting organizations (thus reducing such agencies' ability to report protests and detention). China's security and judicial institutions' use of laws on ``splittism'' and ``leaking state secrets'' \123\ during this reporting year infringed upon Chinese citizens' constitutionally protected freedoms of speech, religion, association, and assembly \124\--first by using the law on ``splittism'' to punish Tibetans who criticize or peacefully protest government policies, and then by using the law on ``leaking state secrets'' to punish Tibetans who attempt to share with other Tibetans information about incidents of repression and punishment. For example, a Chinese court reportedly sentenced Dondrub Wangchen to imprisonment on the charge of ``splittism'' for using film media to disseminate Tibetan views on topics such as Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama.\125\ Prosecutors reportedly used the charge of ``leaking secrets'' to seek conviction of Konchog Tsephel and Kunga Tseyang for using their Web sites to share with other Tibetans--including Tibetans outside of China--information and views on Tibetan experiences of detention, imprisonment, and religious and cultural repression during the ongoing crackdown.\126\ [See box titled Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural Expression below for more information on these cases.] Chinese government officials moved during the Commission's 2010 reporting year to diminish or end the public influence of emergent Tibetan civic and intellectual leaders.\127\ Prior to this reporting year, the apparent misapplication of China's Criminal Law to imprison Tibetan leaders and remove them from society involved religious figures, e.g., Bangri Chogtrul (1999),\128\ Sonam Phuntsog (1999),\129\ Tenzin Deleg (2002),\130\ and Phurbu Tsering (2008).\131\ During this reporting year, officials misapplied the law in order to imprison environmentalist and art collector Karma Samdrub and charge secularist intellectual Tagyal--both of whom had developed cooperative relationships with the government and avoided ``political'' activity, according to reports.\132\ Some officials may suspect that such leaders could encourage in Tibetan citizens a commitment to civic values and responsibilities that the Party may regard as a potential obstacle to the Party's exclusive exercise of political power.\133\ Other officials may have sought retribution against the men for more parochial reasons.\134\ In Karma Samdrub's case, a court in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region sentenced him on June 24, 2010, to 15 years' imprisonment for ``tomb- robbing,'' a charge first brought against him in 1998 and dropped the same year.\135\ Officials revived criminal proceedings against Karma Samdrub after he attained national acclaim as an environmentalist,\136\ and then sought the release of two of his brothers whom public security officials detained in August 2009 after an environmental protection organization they founded accused local officials of hunting protected wildlife.\137\ In the case of Tagyal--an intellectual who worked at a government publishing house and advocated for a more secular Tibetan society \138\--officials in Qinghai province charged him in May 2010 with ``inciting splittism'' after he used veiled language the previous month to urge Tibetans to avoid corrupt official channels when donating money to aid victims of the April 2010 Yushu earthquake in Qinghai.\139\ Other accounts attribute his detention to the publication of a book he wrote about the 2008 Tibetan protests.\140\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural Expression ------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, Chinese courts sentenced Tibetans to imprisonment for seeking to make information and views about the Tibetan protests and their consequences available to other Tibetans (inside and outside of China). Some of the sentenced Tibetans used cultural or entertainment media to articulate their views. Five examples follow. Dondrub Wangchen, film-maker. On December 28, 2009, the Xining Intermediate People's Court, located in Xining city, Qinghai province, reportedly sentenced Dondrub Wangchen to six years in prison on the charge of ``splittism'' for making a documentary film featuring Tibetans in Qinghai expressing on camera their views on the Dalai Lama, the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, and Chinese law.\141\ Konchog Tsephel, civil servant and Web site operator. On November 12, 2009, the Gannan (Kanlho) Intermediate People's Court, located in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Gansu province, reportedly sentenced Konchog Tsephel to 15 years' imprisonment for ``disclosing state secrets.'' \142\ The charge reportedly was linked to essays he published on his Tibetan-language Web site.\143\ Kunga Tseyang, monk and Web site operator. On November 12, 2009, the Gannan Intermediate People's Court reportedly sentenced Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery monk Kunga Tseyang to five years in prison on the charge of ``disclosing state secrets'' for publishing essays, photographs, and environmental information on his Tibetan- language Web site.\144\ Ngagchung, monk. In January 2010, the Ganzi (Kardze) Intermediate People's Court, located in Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province, reportedly sentenced Serthar Buddhist Institute (Larung Gar) monk Ngagchung to seven years' imprisonment for ``leaking information'' on the Tibetan situation to ``separatist forces'' outside of China via telephone and other means.\145\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural Expression--Continued ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tashi Dondrub, singer. On January 5, 2010, the Henan (Yulgan) Mongol Autonomous County Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) Committee, located in Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, ordered Tashi Dondrub, a member of the county performing arts troupe, to serve 15 months' RTL for singing songs with ``provocative themes'' \146\ such as nostalgia for the Dalai Lama and sadness at the situation following the March 2008 protests.\147\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ UPDATES: PROTESTS, SENTENCING, POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE Although the number of published reports of Tibetan political protest and detention observed by the Commission declined during the 2010 reporting year, instances of protest continued to occur that suggest some Tibetan areas remain protest-prone even under heightened security measures. Two representative examples follow. Protesters demand release of Buddhist teacher in Sichuan. Tenzin Deleg (A'an Zhaxi), recognized by the Dalai Lama as a reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teacher, was convicted in a closed court in Sichuan province in November 2002 of conspiring to cause explosions and inciting splittism and is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment.\148\ In July 2009, Tibetans in Yajiang (Nyagchukha) county, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, presented to officials a petition calling for his release on the asserted basis that there was no proof of his guilt, he had not confessed to the alleged crimes, and officials had framed him.\149\ Beginning on December 5, several hundred Nyagchukha Tibetans participated in several days of protests calling for Tenzin Deleg's release.\150\ Public security officials and People's Armed Police reportedly beat and detained dozens of protesters and later released most of them.\151\ Middle school students protest in Gansu, TAR. On March 14, 2010, 20 to 30 Tibetan middle school students joined by at least 100 other Tibetans in the seat of Maqu (Machu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, staged a political protest calling for Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama's long life.\152\ Public security officials and People's Armed Police reportedly detained at least 40 protesters.\153\ On March 16, 30 to 40 Tibetan students from two middle schools in Hezuo (Tsoe), the capital of Gannan TAP, staged a brief protest and shouted slogans.\154\ Public security officials reportedly detained at least 20 of the students. On March 22, Tibetan primary school students briefly staged a protest in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region.\155\ During the protests, students in both locations reportedly called for Tibetan freedom, the Dalai Lama's long life, and his return to Tibet.\156\ In a closely watched case,\157\ on December 23, 2009, the Ganzi TAP Intermediate People's Court, located in Kangding (Dartsedo), Ganzi TAP, reportedly sentenced Phurbu Tsering,\158\ whom Tibetan Buddhists regard as a reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teacher, to eight years and six months' imprisonment.\159\ The same court had tried him on April 21, 2009, on charges of illegally possessing weapons or ammunition (an offense under China's Criminal Law, Article 128) and ``embezzlement'' (Criminal Law, Article 271), according to his lawyers, Jiang Tianyong and Li Fangping.\160\ The lawyers' defense statement to the court argued that insufficient evidence was available to support either charge and the government could not prove that Phurbu Tsering had not been framed by someone else.\161\ The court reportedly sentenced Phurbu Tsering to one year and six months' imprisonment for ``illegal possession of ammunition'' and seven years' imprisonment for ``misappropriation of public assets.'' \162\ The Commission has not observed during the 2010 reporting year any new developments in the cases of former monk Jigme Gyatso \163\ (detained in 1996 and serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub \164\ (sentenced in 2000 to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); Bangri Chogtrul\165\ (regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a reincarnated teacher; detained in 1999 and serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for ``inciting splittism''); or nomad Ronggye Adrag (sentenced in November 2007 to 8 years' imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a public festival).\166\ Summary Information: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment As of September 3, 2010, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained records of 824 Tibetan political prisoners believed to be currently detained or imprisoned. Of those 824 records, 765 are records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008,\167\ and 59 are records of Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 2008. It is certain that PPD information is far from complete for the period after March 10, 2008. Of the 765 Tibetan political prisoners believed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, according to PPD data: Slightly more than half (388) are detained or imprisoned in Sichuan province; the rest are detained or imprisoned in the Tibet Autonomous Region (183), Gansu province (105), Qinghai province (87), Yunnan province (1), and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1). 443 (approximately 58 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist ``religious professionals'' (monks, nuns, and trulkus). Sentencing information is available for 152 of the 824 Tibetans the PPD records as currently imprisoned or detained, as of September 3, 2010. Of the 152 Tibetan political prisoners for whom sentencing information is available, 116 were detained on or after March 10, 2008. The 116 sentences range in length from one year to life imprisonment.\168\ The average length of the 116 sentences imposed on Tibetan political prisoners detained on or after March 10, 2008, is approximately five years and nine months.\169\ Of the 141 Tibetan political prisoners for whom sentencing information is available, 36 were detained prior to March 10, 2008. The 36 sentences range in length from three years to life imprisonment.\170\ The average length of the 36 sentences currently being served by Tibetan political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, is approximately 13 years and 5 months.\171\ VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau Introduction The United States supports a stable, autonomous Hong Kong under the ``one country, two systems'' formula articulated in the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.\1\ The United States also supports the high degree of autonomy of Macau set forth in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao and the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.\2\ The people of Hong Kong and Macau enjoy an independent judiciary \3\ and an open society in which the freedoms of speech, movement, and assembly are largely respected.\4\ According to the Hong Kong Basic Law, ``The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures''; the Basic Law also provides that ``[t]he ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage''; furthermore, under the Basic Law, the mainland Chinese government authorizes Hong Kong to exercise ``a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power. . . .'' \5\ Macau introduced national security legislation provided by Article 23 of the Macau Basic Law in October 2008, criminalizing treason, secession, subversion, sedition, theft of state secrets, and association with foreign political organizations that harm state security.\6\ The Macau government's passage of the legislation in February 2009 was praised by Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, at a celebration in December 2009 commemorating Macau's handover, raising concerns among some in Hong Kong that China would try to reintroduce similar legislation in Hong Kong.\7\ When similar legislation was proposed for Hong Kong in 2003, public protest was strong, and the government withdrew the legislation.\8\ Hong Kong UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, there has been limited progress toward universal suffrage in Hong Kong.\9\ A December 2007 decision of the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) prohibited the people of Hong Kong from directly electing both the chief executive and all members of the Legislative Council (Legco) by universal suffrage in 2012, or making other substantive changes to the electoral system.\10\ In light of the decision, the earliest possible dates for universal suffrage are 2017 for the chief executive and 2020 for Legco, though there is no guarantee of universal suffrage at those times. In line with the NPCSC decision, the Hong Kong government issued a consultation document on constitutional reform in November 2009, and on April 14, 2010, released its Package of Proposals for the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012.\11\ The government's proposals cover the 2012 election only. Currently, an 800-member election committee selects the chief executive. Under the proposals, the number of members of the committee is enlarged to 1,200, but the makeup and procedure of appointment to the committee are not changed. According to a Financial Times article, the election committee is ``dominated by pro-Beijing businessmen and community leaders.'' \12\ Currently, Legco has 60 members, only half of whom are directly elected. The other half are selected by ``functional constituencies,'' which represent ``key economic and social sectors.'' \13\ According to one commentator, ``By one estimate, this system allows 1% of the voters to fill half the Legco seats.'' \14\ The proposals add 10 seats to Legco, 5 selected by functional constituencies and 5 directly elected, thus not changing the proportion of Legco seats returned by direct election. The Basic Law provides that ``passage of bills introduced by the government'' require only a simple majority vote, but requires that the ``passage of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by individual members of the Legislative Council'' require a majority vote of each of the two groups in Legco, those directly elected through geographically-based elections, and those selected by the functional constituencies.\15\ The government proposals were criticized by some in Hong Kong.\16\ Legco approved the proposal package in June 2010, after it was amended to provide voters who do not belong to any functional constituency the right to elect Legco members from a list of candidates nominated by the district councilors to fill the five additional functional constituency seats.\17\ The vote for the package brought what the South China Morning Post described as an ``incremental boost to democracy--but not universal suffrage.'' \18\ ACTIVE DISSENT During this reporting year, Hong Kong citizens have continued to express their dissent, not only concerning the pace of progress toward universal suffrage,\19\ but also against other government actions, including plans to build a costly high-speed railway project.\20\ There were several large-scale protests during this reporting year, including a January 1, 2010, anti-government demonstration.\21\ According to a January 2010 article, ``The political system in Hong Kong is increasingly paralyzed, and street protests are growing more confrontational as public dissatisfaction on economic issues and a lack of democracy is rising.'' \22\ The Chinese government has expressed its concerns over Hong Kong protests with Peng Qinghua, the director of the mainland's Liaison Office in Hong Kong, saying that Hong Kong would not put up with what Peng characterized as radical demonstrations.\23\ FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION For the most part, the people of Hong Kong continue to enjoy freedom of expression. For example, Hong Kong rose three rankings to 48th over the previous year in the 2009 Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders.\24\ (For comparison, the United States rose from 36th to 20th during the same period, and China ranked 168th.) \25\ According to the U.S. State Department 2009 Human Rights Report, however, ``reports of self-censorship continued during the year.'' The report noted claims that businesses with interests in China owned most media outlets, making them ``vulnerable to self- censorship.'' \26\ The Hong Kong Journalists Association ``expressed regret'' concerning Esquire magazine's decision to pull a 16-page story on the June 1989 Tiananmen protests, and one of Hong Kong's free-to-air television stations was criticized at a public hearing for deliberately downplaying coverage of the annual Hong Kong commemoration of the Tiananmen protests.\27\ There were also concerns with the editorial independence of a new advisory board for the government-run Radio Television Hong Kong.\28\ Macau ABILITY OF MACAU CITIZENS TO INFLUENCE THEIR GOVERNMENT The ability of the people of Macau to influence their government is restricted by Macau's constitutional system, under which the chief executive is selected by a 300-person committee, and only 12 of 29 seats in the Legislative Assembly are filled by direct election.\29\ In July 2009, the selection committee chose Fernando Chui Sai On as the chief executive in an uncontested election.\30\ In September, voters selected 12 assembly members by direct election, the chief executive appointed 7, and an additional 10 were selected indirectly (in a manner similar to the system of functional constituencies in Hong Kong) in uncontested elections.\31\ The South China Morning Post reported that vote buying in the September legislative election was widespread, though reportedly not as widespread as in previous elections.\32\ CORRUPTION Corruption, and the belief that business and government are too close, are serious issues for the people of Macau, with corruption fueling discontent.\33\ Macau ranked 43rd in the 2009 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, which measures the perceived level of corruption in 180 countries.\34\ (By comparison, Hong Kong ranked 12th, the United States ranked 19th, and mainland China ranked 79th.) Bloomberg reported in December 2009 that 66 percent of Macanese questioned in a survey said that getting rid of corruption should be a top priority of the new government.\35\ NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (ARTICLE 23) Macau enacted national security legislation in March 2009, a move that was highly praised by mainland authorities.\36\ The impact of the law is not clear at this stage. However, one media report commented on Chief Executive Chui's use of force to put down a May Day demonstration in 2010, writing, ``Since the passage of Article 23 antisubversion legislation last year, he [Chui] has a freer hand to legally suppress public protest.'' \37\ China's International Human Rights Commitments The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enshrines a core set of rights and freedoms that individuals everywhere enjoy. Prior to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, China voted as a member of the UN General Assembly in favor of the adoption of the UDHR in 1948. According to the Chinese government's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP), issued in April 2009, ``China will continue to fulfill its obligations to the international human rights conventions to which it has acceded, and initiate and actively participate in exchanges and cooperation in the field of international human rights.'' \1\ During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government reiterated its stated commitment to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China signed in 1998. In October 2009, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said at a UN meeting, ``At present, legislative, judicial and administrative reforms are under way in China with a view to aligning our domestic legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and paving the way for its ratification.'' \2\ This statement followed similar expressions made during the Commission's 2009 reporting year. In the HRAP, for example, the Chinese government said it would ``continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.'' \3\ During the February 2009 session of the UN Human Right's Council's Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government's human rights record, the Chinese government supported recommendations that it ratify the ICCPR and said it was in the process of amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the ICCPR.\4\ The chart below lists what action China has taken on major human rights treaties and protocols to the treaties.\5\ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Declarations and Convention or Protocol Ratification Reservations Status (Excerpts) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ International Covenant on Ratified March The application of Economic, Social and Cultural 27, 2001. article 8.1(a) of Rights The Covenant the Covenant to also applies to the People's Hong Kong and Republic of China Macau. shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China and Labor Law of the People's Republic of China. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ International Covenant on Civil Signed October and Political Rights 5, 1998; not yet ratified. The Covenant applies to Hong Kong and Macau as described in the notes accompanying the Covenant. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Optional Protocol to the Neither signed International Covenant on Civil nor ratified. and Political Rights ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Second Optional Protocol to the Neither signed International Covenant on Civil nor ratified. and Political Rights ------------------------------------------------------------------------ International Convention on the Acceded to The People's Elimination of All Forms of December 29, Republic of China Racial Discrimination 1981. has reservations The Convention on the provisions with the of article 22 of reservation the Convention and made by China will not be bound also applies to by it. Hong Kong and Macau. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Convention on the Elimination of Ratified The People's All Forms of Discrimination November 4, Republic of China against Women 1980. does not consider The Convention itself bound by with the paragraph 1 of reservation article 29 of the made by China Convention. also applies to Hong Kong and Macau. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Optional Protocol to the Neither signed Convention on the Elimination of nor ratified. All Forms of Discrimination against Women ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Convention on the Rights of the Ratified March The People's Child 2, 1992. Republic of China The Convention shall fulfill its with the obligations reservation provided by made by China article 6 of the also applies to Convention under Hong Kong and the prerequisite Macau. that the Convention accords with the provisions of article 25 concerning family planning of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and in conformity with the provisions of article 2 of the Law of Minor Children of the People's Republic of China. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Optional Protocol to the Ratified 1. The minimum age Convention on the Rights of the February 20, for citizens Child on the Involvement of 2008. voluntarily Children in Armed Conflict Ratification entering the Armed also applies to Forces of the Hong Kong and People's Republic Macau. of China is 17 years of age. 2. The Government of the People's Republic of China is applying [safeguard measures] in implementing the foregoing provision. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Optional Protocol to the Ratified Convention on the Rights of the December 3, Child on the Sale of Children, 2002. Child Prostitution and Child The Protocol Pornography also applies to Macau. The application of the Protocol to Hong Kong requires prior domestic legislation by the Hong Kong government and the Protocol shall not apply to Hong Kong until the Chinese government notifies otherwise. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Convention against Torture and Ratified October The Chinese Other Cruel, Inhuman or 4, 1988. government does Degrading Treatment or The Convention not recognize the Punishment with the competence of the reservation Committee against made by China Torture as also applies to provided for in Hong Kong and article 20 of the Macau. Convention. The Chinese government does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of article 30 of the Convention. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Optional Protocol to the Neither signed Convention against Torture and nor ratified. Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Convention relating to the Status Acceded to [Subject to] of Refugees September 24, reservations on 1982. the following The Convention articles: 1. The with the latter half of reservation article 14, which made by China reads ``In the also applies to territory of any Macau. other Contracting State, he shall be accorded the same protection as is accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has his habitual residence.'' 2. Article 16(3). ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Protocol relating to the Status Acceded to With a reservation of Refugees September 24, in respect of 1982. article 4. The Convention with the reservation made by China also applies to Macau. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Convention on the Prevention and Ratified April The People's Punishment of the Crime of 18, 1983. Republic of China Genocide The Convention does not consider with the itself bound by reservation article IX of the made by China said Convention. also applies to Hong Kong and Macau. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ United Nations Convention against Ratified The People's Transnational Organized Crime September 23, Republic of China 2003. makes a The Convention reservation with also applies to regard to Article Hong Kong and 35, paragraph 2 of Macau. the Convention and is not bound by the provisions of Article 35, paragraph 2. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Acceded to The People's Punish Trafficking in Persons, February 8, Republic of China Especially Women and Children, 2010. shall not be bound supplementing the UN Convention The Protocol by paragraph 2 of against Transnational Organized also applies to Article 15 of the Crime. Macau. The Protocol. Protocol shall not apply to Hong Kong unless otherwise notified by the Chinese government. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Protocol against the Smuggling of Neither signed Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, nor ratified. supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime ------------------------------------------------------------------------ International Convention on the Neither signed Protection of the Rights of All nor ratified. Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Convention on the Rights of Ratified August Persons With Disabilities 1, 2008. The Convention also applies to Hong Kong and Macau. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Optional Protocol to the Neither signed Convention on the Rights of nor ratified. Persons With Disabilities ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ratification of the International Labour Organization Fundamental Conventions \6\ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Forced Labor Freedom of Association Discrimination Child Labor -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. 29 C. 105 C. 87 C. 98 C. 100 C. 111 C. 138 C. 182 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Not ratified. Not ratified. Not ratified. Not ratified. Ratified No- Ratified Ratified April Ratified August 8, vember 2, January 12, 28, 1999. 2002. 1990. 2006.